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ABSTRACT  
 
This doctoral thesis is about the study of the social capital, its effects on the local 
development and on the socio-economic resilience of the Palestinians trapped, socially, 
politically, and economically, in the East Jerusalem's al-'Eizariyah area. The transformation 
of al-'Eizariyah since 2002 through the Israeli  encroachment on Palestinian land by 
instrumental use of the Separation Wall policies were analyzed and re-stated through the 
lenses of the sociological theory and concepts. Based on the accounts of life stories and 
interviews with various members of the al-'Eizariyah's former and current community and 
through the visual data of the changes in al-'Eizariyah and the areas adjacent to the 
Separation Wall an analysis of the Palestinian coping and survival strategies was 
undertaken. The thesis demonstrates how the reality of al-'Eizariyah was changed 
dramatically in the last two decades despite and in the opposite direction of the Oslo 
Accords of 1993. To be sure, al-‘Eizariyah, which is located two miles east of Jerusalem, had 
expanded to adjust to the economic boom of the early post-Oslo years coupled with the 
political expectations of it being part of the future Palestinian capital. This was disrupted by 
the failure of the Oslo Accords, and the construction of the Israeli Separation Wall in 2002, 
which served as an instrument of intimidation and harassment to make Palestinians leave 
Jerusalem, as this thesis demonstrates. The Wall did not only cut off al-'Eizariyah from the 
main road that used to connect East Jerusalem to Jericho. The Wall's  more sinister and 
long-term damage has been in the physical and psychological isolation of al-‘Eizariyah and 
in preventing its residents from being fully integrated in the economic, social, cultural, and 
political life of the East Jerusalem and of the West Bank. This two-sided effect of the 
Separation Wall started when most of the people who used to work in East Jerusalem and 
Israel lost their Jobs, students could no longer study in Jerusalem and had to change 
schools; the sick no longer could use the healthcare facilities, etc. Former residents of al-
'Eizariyah could no longer do any of these basic necessities neither their shopping and 
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entertainment in Jerusalem freely without being humiliated with denial of access to 
Jerusalem based on the persons' ability to present a Blue ID at the checkpoint, the only ID 
that is recognized by the Israeli regime. While some social capital forms helped in coping 
with the difficulties caused by this new reality it was the difference in the pre- and post-Wall 
situations that were examined in order to understand the impact of the adversity represented 
by the Wall on the social capital of the Palestinians. The purpose of this thesis is to 
demonstrate the implications of the construction of the Wall on the socio-economic life of al-
‘Eizariyah residents and to study the Israel-Palestine conflict from sociological lens using a 
case study setting and qualitative analysis approach. This thesis demonstrates positive 
impact of the Wall on social capital types by where the bonding social capital became 
stronger yet the trend got reversed. At the community level, the challenges were too large to 
be handled only by bonding social capital. Therefore, there is a combined effort between the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the local civil society associations and the private sector to 
overcome problems related to education, health care services, trade and labor in addition to 
social security caused by the Wall. It was found that bridging social capital and linking social 
capital were strongly present after the Wall was completed. Although civil society 
associations are strongly present in al-‘Eizariyah but because the Palestinian society is 
structured along patrimonial, familial, clannish, tribal and contradictory geographical 
cleavages, most of these associations work in a way that transformed the intended outcome 
of bridging social capital to some kind of bonding social capital as the beneficiaries and the 
participants are mostly from their family, clan members, or those who belong to the same 
political party, and not the community as a whole. However, observations and the empirical 
evidence show that bonding is stronger than bridging social capital. The social fragmentation 
caused by several social forces such as the local-stranger relationship, between the locals of 
al-‘Eizariyah and the displaced residents, prevented efficient cooperation in solving 
community problems. Lack of the sense of belonging is not only because the locals always 
express superiority over the displaced, but also because the displaced themselves do not 
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want to lose their rooted original identity, especially the refugees who settled in the town 
after the 1948 war. This had a great overall impact on the unity of the Palestinian society 
especially that ‘the refugees’ communities constitute approximately 42 percent of the total 
population of the West Bank. 
The future challenge of the Palestinians in areas such as al-‘Eizariyah is to find ways of 
detecting defragmentation and manipulation policies and develop strategies that would 
prevent defragmentation of the Palestinians being orchestrated by the Israeli Wall policies 
and that only become apparent with a time lapse when it can be too late.  
 
Key Words: The Wall, the Oslo Accords, Jerusalem, al-‘Eizariyah, social capital, local 
development, socio-economic resilience. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
Close family ties play a crucial role in coping with political turbulence, the Israeli occupation, 
and the socio-economic situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Social capital 
provides a safety-net for improving people‘s chances and the quality of day-to-day survival, 
especially after Israel constructed the Wall to separate Israel and East Jerusalem from the 
West Bank. The social capital index that was compiled in 2007, and has been the basis of 
the majority of the social capital studies in Palestine, referred only to the existence of the 
Wall in the rural northern and southern parts of the West Bank, as the Wall had only been 
completed at the time of the social capital index compilation. The Study stated that the 
construction of the Wall had prevented access to agricultural land. Consequently, the family 
became a strategy for protection while solidarity between the extended family increased. 
Another study that used the same survey data found that bonding is stronger than bridging 
social capital, and suggested that the reasons for this can be traced to the peculiar context 
of Palestinian society. These conclusions raised some important questions. For example, 
about status of Palestinian social capital after the Wall has been completed. Also questions 
such as what is the impact of the Wall on social capital in urban settings and what are the 
characteristics of Palestinian society that make its context peculiar so that a certain type of 
social capital is dominant? This research examines the impact of the Wall on Palestinian 
social capital dynamics in urban areas, using East Jerusalem and its neighborhood al-
'Eizariyah (Bethany) as a case study. The research used the life story method to collect 
personal data and in-depth interviews with key informants to collect community level data. 
This qualitative approach used in this research and the added value to social capital studies 
in Palestine, forms the difference in the method, which helps unearth through the in-depth 
analyses the forces within Palestinian society that determine the types and the strength of 
social ties. While most previous studies declare that social capital is relatively strong, it is 
notable that there are many social problems that could be solved by social capital forces. 
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Therefore, this research highlights the barriers to collective action that prevent social capital 
from reaching its ultimate goal such as  the local/stranger relationships, traditions, politics 
and gender inequality that are embedded in the Palestinian society. 
The case study method was chosen to study the relevance of the Palestinian conflict via 
sociological analysis of social capital; the case of al-'Eizariyah was selected not only 
because of its importance as it was seen to be part of "East Jerusalem", the future capital of 
the Palestinian state. Also it was chosen because of its demographics. Al-'Eizariyah‘s 
residents represent a cross-section of Palestinian social stratification, and they also share 
the different types of identification cards (Blue and Green ID cards), which define and control 
the Palestinians’ mobility, i.e. who can inter East Jerusalem and Israel and who cannot. And 
the third reasoning for the selection of this case study was due to the fact that in addition to 
the privilege being born and having studied in East Jerusalem, I lived parts of my life in al-
'Eizariyah and also abroad. Thus, I am playing the role of both an insider and outsider 
ethnographer in a way that has enriched the research methods’ abilities to explore and 
collect relevant information and give insightful data analyses. Al-'Eizariyah (Bethany) is one 
of East Jerusalem’s eastern neighborhoods located on the historic route between 
Jerusalem-Jericho, two miles from Jerusalem. The reality of al-'Eizariyah has changed 
dramatically in the last two decades. In the first period, after the Oslo Accords (1993), al-
’Eizariyah expanded to adjust to the new economic boom, coupled with the political 
expectations of being part of East Jerusalem, the future capital of the State of Palestine. 
Governmental associations, Palestinian banks and other economic institutions found an 
alternative to East Jerusalem in al-'Eizariyah, as the Palestinian Authority was not allowed to 
function in East Jerusalem. Al-’Eizariyah’s resident numbers doubled during this period as 
many Palestinians came from different parts of the West Bank and settled down there. They 
joined a local population who were already a combination of historic locals (from the town 
itself), refugees who had settled there after the establishment of Israel and the war of 1948 
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and the Jerusalemites1 who had tried to avoid the housing crisis in Jerusalem. All of this 
socio-economic growth has been disrupted by the failure of the Oslo Accords and the 
construction of the Wall that has disconnected the town from its center and historic capital. 
East Jerusalem is in a unique situation; when Israel took control of the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem following the 1967 war, the West Bank remained under military occupation while 
Israel annexed East Jerusalem and its nearest suburbs. They became part of Israel but 
without granting their residents equal Israeli citizenship (Kimhi, 2006). Instead, the roughly 
66,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites were given “Permanent Residence” cards which allowed 
them to work in Israel, enjoy health insurance and have social welfare benefits as provided 
to all Israeli residents (B’Tselem, 2006). Until the Wall was built, there was a residential 
continuum across the Palestinian neighborhoods and suburbs of East Jerusalem (Amir, 
2011). Although there are major differences in the legal status of the residents, the 
distinction between these towns, villages and neighborhoods that were “in” or “out” of 
Jerusalem was purely artificial: the social fabric of the residents did not correspond to this 
distinction. There are many instances where members of the same family have different civil 
statuses. Some hold Israeli residency (Blue ID) and others have a West Bank identification 
card (Green ID). Differences in civil status did influence entitlement to services and benefits, 
but these differences did not split the families themselves (Ibid). Although some family 
members and other West Bank Green ID card holders were formally forbidden from entering 
the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem during the closure policy from March 1993, “...this 
restriction was not enforced as a general rule. The construction of the Wall, however, 
provided the means for implementing this restriction” (Amir, 2011: 773). Even in its early 
phases, the Wall was just an obstacle that held back the flow of people and goods. People 
managed to find ways to get through and past it; either by squeezing themselves through its 
distant openings, or by climbing to the other side using large boulders as ladders. However 
in 2009 almost all of these passages or methods to get to the other side were brought to a 
                                                             
1 The term ‘Jerusalemite’ refers to the Palestinians of East Jerusalem. 
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halt, entry to East Jerusalem was restricted to checkpoints only (Ibid). The Wall has 
completely isolated al-‘Eizariyah and prevented its residents from entering East Jerusalem, 
with some exceptions; those who have an Israeli identity card (Blue ID) or a Palestinian 
identity card (Green ID) with an Israeli issued permit. They can cross to Jerusalem through 
only two controlled entrances (checkpoints); one pedestrian only and one for Israeli 
registered vehicles. Most of the residents who used to work in East Jerusalem and Israel 
have lost their jobs. Children who used to study in Jerusalem had to change schools; this is 
also applicable for health care, shopping and entertainment, in addition to the rupture of the 
social interaction between the communities on both sides of the Wall. The hardships that 
people face on a daily basis, because of the Wall, created a mass migration and dozens of 
al-'Eizariyah’s houses stand empty because most of the Jerusalemites moved back to East 
Jerusalem, despite poor living conditions, due to their concern of the possibility of losing their 
Israeli residency status. Others, who decided to stay, found themselves obliged to rent an 
additional house or apartment in East Jerusalem to prove that they live in the city and as 
such, protect themselves from Israel revoking their blue ID cards. The town also suffers from 
a high residential density coupled with few green spaces and a general sense of chaos; 
rubbish and other eyesores on the sidewalks at the main entrance to al-‘Eizariyah, 
unlicensed vehicles for public transportation, unpaved side-streets and unorganized, poorly 
designed and unfinished high-rise buildings. The research investigation shows that this is 
attributed to al-‘Eizariyah systematic loss of land over the years by Israel who has 
confiscated the town’s extensive surplus land and “green belt” in order to establish and then 
expand the settlement of Ma’ali Adommim. In addition to the categorization of al-‘Eizariyah 
as Area B in its center, it is also categorized as Area C at its eastern and western entrances 
and the areas surroundings them. These categorizations follow the stipulations of the Oslo 
Accords (1993). This means that some 27,000 of the town’s inhabitants are without National 
Security Forces, because the Palestinian police located in Area A where the Palestinian 
Authority has full civil and security control cannot interfere in Area B before getting the 
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approval of the Joint Security Coordination Office (Israel). This usually takes up to forty-eight 
hours to be convened, and of course, this is useless when dealing with cases of emergency. 
The town can rarely expand in Area C because it is under full Israeli control. The limited 
space and the absence of law and order have had a major impact on the security and local 
development. The implications of these obstacles, in addition to an actual imprisonment 
inside the Wall, became the main cornerstone of the inhabitants’ decision-making process; 
where to build a house, where to study, where to work and even who to marry. These 
implications influence al-‘Eizariyah residents’ survival strategies, while having the Israeli 
oppression as their constant backdrop. Looking into this case study in such circumstances, 
this research seeks to understand the impact of the Wall on the Palestinians’ social capital in 
terms of the main changes; what kinds of Palestinian social capital have been strengthened 
or weakened and why? What are the barriers to collective action, and what is the impact of 
the Wall on local development and socio-economic resilience? The thesis is organized into 
six chapters, starting from the Introduction Chapter which presents the thesis according to 
the sequence of thesis chapters. Following the introduction; Chapter Two presents, in detail, 
the research context and research problem and questions: 
 The Research Context and Research Questions Chapter 
 
The first part of Chapter Two looks into the historical, geopolitical and socio-economic 
factors that shaped the context. This is done in the belief of the importance in understanding 
the different components that have a role in determining the context. Therefore, a short 
historical review of the most important political events was necessary to connect the 
contemporary research problem with its roots and to better understand the behavior and 
attitudes of studied individuals and communities. This section starts from the exodus and 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and their loss of land in 1948 
following the establishment of Israel, to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip in 
1967, including the particular status of East Jerusalem. Then a section about the non-violent 
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uprising; the “first Intifada” in 1987, and the Oslo Accords in 1993, which led to the creation 
of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The chapter displays the 
reasons that led to the main research problem, that is, the construction of the Wall.  Then, a 
section concentrates on the segment of the Wall that separates East Jerusalem and Israel 
from the West Bank; its length and its route that severs the main roads between Palestinian 
areas plus other considerations. The chapter also tackles one of the most important political 
events affecting Palestinian contemporary history; the Hamas-Fatah conflict. The problem 
started after Hamas’ legislative victory in 2006 which led, a year later, to a physical split. 
Since then the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been governed by two different 
governments, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, while the West Bank remains under the control of 
the Palestinian Authority (Fatah). This led to a political polarization of the Palestinian 
population, mainly along this axis. The second section of this chapter gives an overview of 
the case study setting and focuses on the historical and political, and socio-economic factors 
that characterize the contexts where Palestinians live on both sides of the Wall; East 
Jerusalem and its suburb al- ‘Eizariyah. This section starts with a brief historical review of 
East Jerusalem to explain the complexity that led to the research problem. This is followed 
by a specific overview of the Separation Wall in the region of Jerusalem, to highlight the 
implications of the already built Wall, in the process of still being built and the final planned 
route, around al-‘Eizariyah itself. There is then a brief description of al-‘Eizariyah focusing on 
the research problem, which presents the four research questions: 
 
1- How did physical changes and spatial policies related to the Wall, influence local 
social networks? 
2- What have been the main changes in social capital since the construction of the 
Wall?  Which kinds of social capital have been strengthened, and which kinds 
weakened and why?  
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3- What are the particular characteristics of Palestinian society that makes its context 
peculiar so that a certain type of social capital is dominant? In addition, what are the 
barriers to collective action? 
4- What has been the impact of the Wall on local development and social resilience?  
 The Literature Review Chapter 
 
Chapter Three tackles first, the literature review on social capital to explore the concept in 
terms of its origin, definitions, measurements, types and its role in development. The idea of 
social capital is not new, but since the 1970s the concept has become one of the most 
influential and popular "metaphors" in social science research (Boari and Presutti 2004; 
Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). Social capital, similar to accumulation of other forms of 
capital; physical and human, accelerates growth and improves standards of living. It refers to 
the internal social and cultural coherence of a society, its norms and values that govern 
interactions between people and the institutions embedded within that society. Colman 
(1988) defines social capital as resources embedded in social relations that permit 
individuals and communities to achieve their desired goals. The World Bank also stated that 
there is growing evidence that social capital, under a variety of definitions, can have an 
impact on development outcomes — growth, equity, and poverty alleviation. The problem is 
that it is almost impossible to measure social capital directly; in this case, the use of proxy 
indicators is necessary. The section presents social capital theories starting with the social 
network theory of Granovetter (1973) and ends with the social resource theory of Lin (1982). 
The second section examines the specific literature on social capital within the Palestinian 
context starting with Naqib’s first study, the Social Capital Index study, the “Bonding Versus 
Bridging” study, the Corruption study and other studies of social capital in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. Naqib (2006) was the first to posit the importance of informal social 
networks among Palestinians generated by a common resistance; he introduced the idea of 
social capital as a substitute for market and state failure. The study concludes that there was 
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a decline in the infrastructure of social institutions as a result of the continuous weakening of 
Palestinian public institutions by Israeli political and military measures. In parallel, there was 
an increase in social capital as a result of the boost in solidarity among Palestinian citizens 
themselves, created by their common resistance. This section also sheds light on 
"Measuring Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories" study by Nasr & Hilal which was 
carried out in 2007 under the umbrella of The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute 
(MAS) with the cooperation of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). This was 
in order to design an index that reflects the multi-faceted nature of social capital in the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories (MAS, 2007). The third study “Bonding Versus Bridging” 
(2009) which was built on Nasr & Hilal‘s study of 2007 explores how social capital applies to 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories and identifies the main forms in which it manifests. The 
study concluded that bonding social capital is stronger than bridging social capital and that 
building a civic and viable society/country requires efforts to strengthen the bridging social 
capital. The chapters shed lights also on other studies such as the “Social Capital and 
Corruption Puzzle: Evidence from a Palestinian Survey” (2011) by Luca Andriani. The aim of 
the study was to critically analyze the relationship between social capital components and 
corruption in the Palestinian Territories. The study highlighted the roles and problems 
inherent to social capital and corruption such as Wasta2, nepotism and favoritism which are 
utilized to obtain personal gain. The section sheds light on other studies and discusses the 
methodology used in all of them which were mostly quantitative and points out that the aim 
of this research is to complement these findings with a quantitative method to answer some 
questions that arose from them. The third section of the Chapter deals with the notion of civil 
society; its origin and the progress of its definitions over time including the debate over its 
components that give birth to certain types of questions. A civil society which, according to 
the London School of Economics,  refers to ‘the arena of un-coerced collective action around 
                                                             
2 Wasta refers to the use of personal connections or influence in order to obtain things, such as, getting 
hired or promoted in a job, passport renewal, the waiving of traffic fines. 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 20 
 
shared interests, purposes and values, it reflects itself through the types of organizations 
formed such as registered charities, non-governmental development organizations, 
community groups, women’s organizations, faith-based organizations, professional 
associations, trades unions… etc. In theory, civil society institutional forms are distinct from 
those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries are often complex, 
blurred and negotiated. In the Palestinian context the argument was ‘Is there a Palestinian 
civil society?’ This question is logical in the Palestinian case, because review of the concept 
revealed that civil society has been always related to, or worked independently from the 
“State”. Therefore, the chapter discusses this issue and displays the three opinions in an 
attempt to answer the above question.  The first argues that a Palestinian civil society cannot 
exist before the formation of an independent state. The second opinion is that the 
Palestinian civil society exists. The third is that the Palestinian civil society is in transition. All 
these three opinions all well illustrated in the chapter. The third section includes a historic 
presentation of the civil society and a review of literature connected to it within the 
Palestinian context. 
The Research Method Chapter 
 
The chapter is organized in five sections, after the introduction, starts the methodology and 
research design section which shows that  this research is built on the results of the existing 
quantitative studies on social capital in the Occupied Palestinian Territories; mainly the 
Social Capital Index of 2007 and the “Bonding Versus Bridging” study of 2009.  These 
results are examined and then they are exposed to further investigation by the case study 
qualitative method, using in-depth key informants’ interviews and the life story interviews; the 
first to collect community data, and the second to collect personal data. The third section of 
the chapter presents the research limitations, then the data and data collection tools. Section 
four shows the data collection process and the challenges in the field work. The last section 
deals with the data analysis. 
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The Empirical Research Chapter 
 
This chapter first illustrates the research’s main problem and explains how the reality of al-
'Eizariyah has changed in the last two decades. It shows, at first, how al-’Eizariyah 
expanded to adjust with the new economic boom coupled with the political expectations of 
being part of the future capital of the State of Palestine, according to the Oslo Accords. 
Second, how the Wall completely isolated al-‘Eizaryah which has prevented its residents 
from entering East Jerusalem since mid-2004. This section presents the situation before the 
Wall and how al-‘Eizariyah depended on East Jerusalem in almost all aspects of life. The 
chapter discusses the direct and indirect effects of the Wall; the direct effect includes 
displacement and the loss of access to services such as education, health care and the 
interruption of the public transportation system. While the indirect effects differ among 
various groups some were adapted to the new reality and reorganized their lives around the 
Wall. They learned to co-exist with the hardships that came with it. Thus, the majority 
adapted their lives to the new reality but in a way that normalized the existence of the Wall. 
They accepted the fact that East Jerusalem is no longer the center of their social and 
economic activities, and they organized their lives accordingly, the Wall became invisible. 
Others had to find solutions, which disperse and wasted their personal resources; many had 
to have two houses; one in al-‘Eizariyah and the other one in East Jerusalem. The general 
absence of the sense of aesthetics in building control is also discussed here. The section 
demonstrates the invisible effect of the Wall that changed the social relation map and offers 
to explain the pattern of marriage changing during the past ten years linked to the existence 
of the Wall. It also shows how the Wall also had raised the political awareness and 
frustration among the young generation, and how the Palestinians view the Palestinian 
Authority after twenty years of the Oslo Accords. 
In the second section, and in order to understand the impact of the Wall on Palestinian social 
capital dynamics, types and characteristics in the case study setting, requires an 
understanding of the geopolitical environment that changed the desirable status of al-
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‘Eizariyah from quasi ‘Capital of the Palestinian State’ to an ‘Arab Ghetto’, and an 
understanding of al-‘Eizariyah’s social structure and the macro-social forces that influence 
social capital in the town. Therefore, this section starts with a discussion on the Oslo 
Accords and its categorization of the town as Area B in the center and Area C for the 
surroundings. Then it tackles al-‘Eizariyah’s social structure and gives a detailed explanation 
of its residents. Generally, the population of al-‘Eizariyah is divided into two main categories; 
the locals, who are originally from the town itself, and those who came to settle there from 
other parts of Palestine. These groups differ in their place of origin, and when and why they 
were displaced, and whether it was for political, economic or personal reasons. The section 
sheds light on various groups, and then discusses the structural macro-social forces that 
shape social capital; the focus here is on social fragmentation, which is a result of various 
political, socio-economic and cultural factors. This section also discusses the notable strong 
bonding social capital on the family level alongside the weak bridging social capital on the 
community level. The question here is why? And what are the barriers to collective action? 
To answer these two questions, the chapter analyses the local/stranger relationship and 
explains the Palestinian refugees’ feelings of displacement. It also analyses how the lack of 
a sense of belonging to the receiving community is not only because the locals always 
express superiority over them, but also because the refugees themselves do not want to 
lose their original identity, rooted in the historic place of birth of their ancestors. The other 
barrier that the chapter highlights is the social structure itself, where 'tribalism' or 'clanism' is 
deeply embedded and influences relationships. It explains the Arab culture which addresses 
security through "balanced opposition" which enhances feelings of unity amongst one’s own 
tribe, and normalizes antagonism against outsiders. The third barrier is related to the change 
in traditions, political forces, culture and religion. It explains how the first Intifada created a 
new role for the young generation, “Al Shabab”, and how they became the reference point of 
the society. This section also discusses gender inequality from an educational and religious 
perspective; it shows how women’s rights to education and work are viewed by males and 
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females. It shows also women’s inheritance rights and explains why Palestinian women used 
to accept a consolation amount of money instead of their full share. Other barriers to 
collective action are also discussed such as the increase in Islamic beliefs and practices 
amongst the Muslim population thereby influencing certain positive and negative social 
behavior. 
The sixth section of the Empirical Chapter discusses the role of civil society associations and 
explains their special case; how the Palestinian Government, supported by the International 
Community, extends into all facets of civil society and promotes specific agendas, funds 
certain programs and monitors associational activities. The section sheds light on al-
‘Eizariyah’s twenty two social associations, which can be categorized according to the type 
of services they provide or by their target group. It also explains why most of these 
associations’ community services are limited and ineffective. The section tackles the effect of 
the Wall on social capital at different levels; from family and extended family level, to the 
community and social organization level. 
The last section of this chapter looks first at the Wall as a physical intervention shock and 
discusses the socio-economic resilience in terms of the time it took the community to 
rebound from this man-made hazard and its implication on local development. Then it 
tackles adaptation and adjustment strategies which cover education and health care in 
addition to economics. Second it discusses the challenges that al-‘Eizariyah is facing and will 
face in the future as the recovery is partial and the continuity is not guaranteed especially 
when the eastern Wall will be completed. In this case and in the absence of planning 
prospects the community response would be random, not organized, repeating the same 
mistakes and adaptation would be more like surrender to faith. 
This empirical research is followed by the conclusion chapter that presents the research 
findings and answers the research questions. 
 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 24 
 
CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH CONTEXT AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS  
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
        
The main objective of this chapter is to look into the historical, geopolitical and socio-
economic factors that characterize and influence the Palestinians types of social capital in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In the belief of the importance of understanding the 
different components that have a role in determining the context, this chapter attempt to give 
a holistic picture of the research context. The observations had highlighted the existence of 
the main research problems. First: the construction of the Separation Wall3 which Israel 
started to construct in 2002 to separate Israel and East Jerusalem from the West Bank. The 
Wall in the area that the case study covers has completely isolated al-‘Eizaryah and 
prevented its residents from entering East Jerusalem with some exceptions. Unless the 
residents of al-‘Eizaryah have the Israeli identity card (Blue ID) or a Palestinian identity card 
(Green ID) with a permit  to reach Jerusalem through only two controlled entrances. Those 
two checkpoints are; al- Zaytoon “Olive” checkpoint entry for pedestrians, and the other is for 
al- Za’ayyem checkpoint for Israeli vehicles only. 
Secondly the implications of being categorized as area B and C according to the Oslo 
Accords that divided the West Bank into three administrative divisions: areas A, B, and C 
with different civic and security authorization for each area, this has its own implication as 
well as the Wall.4 Therefore, this chapter focuses on the analysis of the general historic, 
political and socio-economic environment that led to the current situation; it starts with an 
                                                             
3      “Separation Fence” (or sometimes “Security Fence”) is the term generally used by the Israeli 
government and media. According to Peter Lagerquist in his article "Fencing the Last Sky; the term is 
misleading insofar as the barrier complex’s primary effect is less to separate or secure than to enclose and 
expropriate. Others call it the “Separation Barrier”. 
4The distinct areas were given a different status, according to the amount of self-government the 
Palestinians would have over it through the Palestinian Authority, until a final status accord would be 
established. 
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overview of the periods from the 1948-1967 wars to the first Intifada, then to the Oslo Accord 
in 1993 and to the second Intifada in 2000 explaining its consequences including restrictions 
on movements represented by the checkpoint security system and the construction of the 
separation Wall and, then to the contemporary political environment in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.  The second section of this chapter presents the research problem, 
the justification of the choice of this specific case study followed by the research questions. 
The last section will focus on the specific historic, political and socio-economic environment 
of the case study setting; East Jerusalem, al-’Eizariyah and the Wall between them to shed 
light on the area covered by this case study; East Jerusalem and its particular geopolitical 
and legal status, then the story of the Wall as that of an obstacle to a border. 
2.2 HISTORIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW OF THE 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
 
 
Since sociological concepts are produced in relation to a socio-historical context (Passeron 
1991; Kalberg 1994)5, it is important to trace back the influential historical events that 
shaped the contemporary political and the socio-economic status in the Palestinian context. 
Starting with the roots of the Israeli Palestinian conflict:  
 
1- Palestine from the Ottoman rule to the British Mandate  
 
The Middle East was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for nearly four centuries before it was 
replaced by the French and British colonial rule. All of these rules had their influence on what 
Palestine is today, including the latest European rulers despite their relatively short period. 
The relations between Ottoman state and its provinces had a certain pattern; Palestine was 
dominated by autonomous peasantry in the country side and by urban mercantile in the main 
                                                             
5 This quote was taken from (Beinin & Vairel, 2013: 8). 
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cities of the province; a tax farming system was implemented by the central government of 
Istanbul. There were a diverse culture between the urban mercantile and the rural communal 
organization of agricultural production (Tamari, 2008). Social organization and social 
perception were clearly localized and bound by kinship. The bounds between cities and 
villages were by ties of patronage and other feudal alignments (Ibid). Eisenstadt & Roniger 
(1984) argue that in order to construct a realm of trust or solidarity requires some kind of 
basic tension or contradictions (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984). The Ottomans administrative 
regime used the powerful local elites and their families in the cities and appointed them as 
provincial governors and bureaucrats on one hand. On the other hand, individuals outside 
these elites were given long-term or lifetime tax farms (Sluglett, 2008). Therefore, a degree 
of tension between these two groups was created. Furthermore, the urban notables played a 
vital role but they did not enjoy “autonomy” from the state, because they were dependent 
upon it for confirmation in their official positions (Ibid). And they did not enjoy unity among 
themselves either, because they were divided into groups who fought each other for control 
over local resources; and while the city or region “paid something approximating to its 
prescribed tax liabilities to the central state, the state would rarely interfere in the details of 
the city’s economic activities” (Sluglett, 2008:7). The same strategy was used for cultural and 
religious activities; the state usually nominates members of the local religious notability to 
senior posts such as mufti and naqib al-ashraf, and minor posts such imams in mosques or 
teachers in madrasas (schools). Those religious notabilities were legitimators of the 
Ottomans political power and the social order (Sluglett, 2008).  
The Palestinian elites (or notable families) who assumed leadership during Ottoman times 
over the quasi-feudal society, continued to control the organized religious, political and social 
life of the Arab community under the British Mandate (Peretz, 1977). They developed new 
contacts with the colonial administrations and with a new generation of “national” politicians 
(Sluglett, 2008). The British mandatory government made efforts to improve many sectors 
and public service such as health, where malaria that had claimed many victims during the 
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Ottoman times was eliminated. Government hospitals were constructed, networks of child-
welfare centers and clinics were established, in addition to road networks (Ibid). On the other 
hand, “the mandatory power did little to foster a widespread educational movement, and the 
state schools were remarkably poor in quality and quantity” (Zahlan, 1974: 46). Although 
there were efforts in expanding education at the village level, elementary education was 
limited, leaving a high percentage of the population illiterate (Ibid). More than half the 
villages had no elementary schools and 95 percent had none for girls (Peretz, 1977). 
Secondary education was concentrated mainly in Jerusalem, and there were no public 
schools that provided education beyond secondary in Palestine during the first fifteen years 
of British rule, with the exception of the Arab College in Jerusalem (Ibid). Moreover, there 
was a large difference in the number of elementary school students attending schools in the 
rural areas compared to those in the urban centers (Zahlan, 1974). Most of Palestinian 
education was private; some were under Arab jurisdiction, others were under the 
administration of foreign religious groups (Ibid). “Until the end of the mandate there was no 
higher education available for Arabs in Palestine. The Jewish universities used Hebrew as 
the language of instruction, which was an effective barrier to admission of Arabs. Those who 
were interested in university had to leave the country, and many studied at institutions such 
as the American University of Beirut in Lebanon” (Peretz, 1977: 54). After the catastrophic 
event of 1948, education became more important to the ordinary Palestinians as it 
compensated for their loss of the land especially that the UNRWA6 provided more public 
schools for boys and girls. The educated members of the family would work in the local 
market or abroad and support his displaced family.  
Although the Jewish migration to Palestine started during the Ottoman rule at the end of the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the British allowed the project 
                                                             
6 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), was created in 1949 to 
provide education, health care and social services to the Palestinian refugees from the 1948 and 1967 
wars in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and elsewhere. 
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of the Zionist movement7 to become realty by the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The Balfour 
Declaration pronounced the right for a Jewish homeland to be established in Palestine in 
1917 without the consent of the Palestinian people living in the lands of Palestine at the time 
(Khalidi, 1997). For the first time Palestine emerged as a separate country “at the end of the 
First World War with Britain’s conquest of the Ottoman districts of Jerusalem, Acre, and 
Nablus” (Longland, 2013: 216). The Hussein–McMahon correspondence8 of 1915 ‘promised’ 
Palestine as a future Arab state, and as an international zone in the Sykes–Picot agreement 
of 1916, and as a Jewish National Home in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (Longland, 
2013). The Balfour Declaration was in contrast with the previous two agreements. This had 
encouraged more Zionist settlers and the Jewish refugees to arrive in Palestine in large 
numbers since the 1920s (Pappe, 2007).  Many of the Palestinians leaders between 1905 
and 1910 felt the danger and discussed Zionism as a political movement aiming to purchase 
land, assets and power in Palestine but without the acknowledgment of the destructive 
potential, they saw it as part of the European missionary and colonialist motivations, which 
according to Pappe (2007) partially was, but it turned out to be a dangerous enterprise for 
the Palestinians (Ibid). The surrounding Arab countries “saw the movement of Jews into 
Palestine as irresponsible attempt on the part of Europe to transfer its poorest and often 
stateless people into the country, not as a part of a master plan aimed at the dispossession 
of the local people” (Pappe, 2007:12). As a result of the Jewish migration to Palestine, the 
indigenous Palestinians made up the two-third majority by December 1947, while they were 
ninety percent when the British Mandate started in 1917 (ibid). Longland (2013) argue that 
“The Balfour Declaration and its pledge to Zionism made Palestine unique among the Middle 
Eastern mandates for it precluded any real possibility of the majority Arab population being 
                                                             
7 Zionism emerged in the late 1880s in central and eastern Europe as a national revival movement, 
prompted by growing pressure on Jews in those regions either to assimilate totally or risk continuing 
persecution, … by the beginning of the twentieth century … (Zionism) was associated with the 
colonization of Palestine (Pappe, 2007: 10). 
8 The Hussein–McMahon correspondence promised the Arab independence movement control of the 
Middle East territories "in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca Hussein bin 
Abdullah" in exchange for revolting against the Ottoman Empire. 
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granted the independence anticipated in the Mandatory arrangement”. The initiate of the 
declaration that: ‘nothing shall be done, which may endanger the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine’ presents dual obligation to Jews and 
Palestinian communities (ibid). Some may say that this demonstrated British fair-
mindedness, others argue that this “in practice meant that colonial officials consistently 
switched their support from one side to the other, engendering anger from all quarters” 
(Longland, 2013: 216), violent clashes started and claimed the lives of hundreds of 
Palestinians and Jews by the end of the 1920s, which prompted the British to take an action 
to solve the flaming conflict, they proposed a political structure that would represent both 
communities on an equal balance in the state parliament and the government. The 
Palestinians who made up the majority of the 80-90% of the total population refused this 
arrangement, while the Jews endorsed it (Pappe, 2007). This has led to the Palestinian 
uprising of 1929, then the 1936 in which “the Palestinian rebellion fought with such 
determination that it forced the British government to station more troops in Palestine than 
there were in the Indian subcontinent” (Pappe, 2007:14).The cultural heterogeneity of the 
Palestinian society during the Ottoman rule has been unified by the ideology of Palestinian 
Arab nationalism to confront both Jewish nationalism and British colonialism (Tamari, 1982).  
In three year time the British military subdued the revolt, “the Zionist leadership had wasted 
no time in working out their plans for an exclusively Jewish presence in Palestine: first, in 
1937, by accepting a modest portion of the land when they responded favorably to the 
recommendation by British Royal Peel commission9 to partition Palestine into two states; 
and second, in 1942, by attempting a more maximalist strategy, demanding all Palestine for 
itself” (Pappe, 2007:14). “The violence of the Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936–1939 and the 
terrorism of Jewish paramilitary organizations in the 1940s were particularly significant for 
souring the British on their colonial possession. After first floating the idea of the partition of 
the country in 1937, an insolvent post-war Britain decided in 1947 to abandon the Mandate 
                                                             
9 See Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
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to the United Nations and its partition plan” (Longland, 2013: 216). In February 1947, “the 
Zionist policy was first based on retaliation against Palestinian attacks and it transformed 
into an initiative to ethnically cleanse the country as a whole in March 1948” (Pappe, 2007: 
xiii). Around 75000 Palestinian became refugees in the surrounding Arab countries and the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip as a result of the 1948 War10. Salim Tamari in his study on 
Palestinian society and culture suggests that “the unfulfilled modernity of Palestine is seen 
… as the product of the disintegration of pre-1948, the result of war and displacement rather 
than a result of underdevelopment” (Tamari, 2008: 3). 
 
2- The Period from the War of 1948- 1967 till the First Intifada in 1987 
 
The previous section presented the general roots and the wide picture of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This section illustrates the historic events that shaped the political and 
socioeconomic atmosphere of what was left of Historic Palestine after the creation of the 
state of Israel. Thus, what remains is the West Bank and Gaza Strip, starting from its political 
status after the 1948 up to 2014 when this research was conducted.  
After the 1948 war, the remaining Palestinian territories were under the control of the 
neighboring countries, the West Bank including East Jerusalem was annexed by Jordan 
while Egypt took control over the Gaza Strip. In June 1967, and as a result of the 6 Day 
War11, Israel occupied the West Bank including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai 
Peninsula of Egypt, and the Golan Heights of Syria. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip in June 1967 shaped a new political and economic order in the territories 
(Hilal, 2007). While the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained under military occupation, Israel 
annexed East Jerusalem and some 64 square kilometers of its suburbs that were considered 
part of the West Bank to build 12 Jewish neighborhoods (B’Tselem, 2009). Resident status 
                                                             
10 The 1948 Arab–Israeli War (al-Nakba) was fought between the State of Israel and a military coalition of 
Arab states and Palestinian Arab forces.    
11The war of 1967 also called al- Naksah.  
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(Blue ID) was given to the Palestinian Jerusalemites, which allowed them to work in Israel, 
enjoy health insurance and social welfare benefits provided to all Israeli residents (B’Tselem, 
2006), and committed to pay all municipal and governmental fees and taxes which were in 
many cases used as an instrument to force them to leave the city and immigrate 
(AbuZayyad, November 1, 2013). 
The Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza were given an Orange color ID to 
differentiate them from the residents of Jerusalem. And they were not given any of the rights 
that were given to the Jerusalemites12. The Orange ID was replaced by a Green color one 
after the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1993.  In the West 
Bank, and while the Palestinians did not practice national self-administration or self-
determination through the Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967, they however, administered 
their own affairs within the context of the Jordanian political system (Heller and Nusseibeh, 
1993).The Jordanian government actually provided a horizontal "roof" or umbrella  for the 
Palestinian self-administration. Following the 1967 war, this umbrella was replaced by the 
Israeli military authority to some extent. Palestinian personnel in several Jordanian 
government departments such as health, education, and social welfare departments fell 
under the control of the Israeli military governor, later named the head of the "civil 
administration" (Ibid). In this sense we may say that there were no major changes when it 
comes to administrative issues. Israel controlled the population movement by a complicated 
and strict permit system required for crossing the new borders between Israel and Jordan 
(the Open Bridge policy). On the other hand, the borders between Israel and the West Bank 
and Gaza were opened, and the people in the Occupied Territories13 could move almost 
freely in Israel14.  
                                                             
12  This expression (Jerusalemites) is used to distinguish the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem from 
other Palestinians who lives somewhere else such as the West Bank, Gaza Strip or Alshatat (diaspora).   
13   The Occupied Palestinian Territories refers to East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza strip that 
have been captured in the 1967 War. 
14 “The policy of "open bridges" referred solely to the decision to allow movement from the West Bank to 
Jordan via the bridges crossing the Jordan River, the "open bridges" policy became a prong in a greater 
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Since the beginning of the occupation, Israel has taken control of hundreds of thousands of 
dunams15 throughout the West Bank, with the primary objective of establishing Israeli 
settlements16 and reserves of land for their future expansion (Bimkom & B’Tselem, 2002). 
Settlements range in character from farming communities and frontier villages to urban 
suburbs and neighborhoods. The four largest settlements, Modi'in Illit, Ma'ale Adummim17, 
Beitar Illit and Ariel, gained the city status.  Importantly, all settlements are considered illegal 
under international law, which prohibits the establishment of settlements in Occupied 
Territory (B’Tselem, 2009). One hundred twenty one official settlements and some one 
hundred unrecognized settlements, referred to as “unauthorized outposts”, have been 
established in the West Bank (Ibid). 
 
During this period education became one of the key Palestinian social values, for both 
genders.  “Over the last few decades, school enrollments have risen markedly throughout 
the region [MENA]18. Primary education is nearly universal in most countries and the gap 
between boys’ and girls’ enrolments in secondary school has disappeared in many 
countries” Glick & Sahn, 2000:4). However, the gap in Palestine is in favor of females, as 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
political program designed to eliminate barriers and integrate the Palestinian and Israeli economies” 
(Gross, 1999: footnote 1550). 
15 Every four dunams= 1 acre 
16Since the beginning of the occupation, Israel has taken control of hundreds of thousands of dunams 
throughout the West Bank, with the primary objective of establishing settlements and providing reserves 
of land for their expansion. It has done this by means of a complex legal-bureaucratic mechanism whose 
central element is the declaration and registration of land as "state land." In addition, Israel uses three 
complementary methods to seize control of land: requisition for military needs, declaration of land as 
abandoned property and the expropriation of land for public needs. In addition, Israel has also helped its 
Jewish citizens to purchase land on the free market for the purpose of establishing new settlements. Using 
these methods, Israel has seized control of some fifty percent of the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem. 
(Lein, 2002) these settlements are illegal according to the International Law. See 
https://www.btselem.org/download/200205_land_grab_eng.pdf 
17 This settlement was established on the land of al-‘Eizariyah eastwards in the year 1975, a community of 
40,000 people, see Allegra, 2012. 
18 [MENA] is the abbreviation of Middle East and North Africa. The West Bank and Gaza Strip were 
included in the study 
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shown below in the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics for the academic year 
2013/2014, referring to the three types of schools; the Government, UNRWA, and private 
schools. 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of male and female students in Palestinian schools. Source: PCBS (2014). 
 
Although education is a virtue for both boys and girls, and Islamic teaching encourage 
education for both sexes, a close look at the chart above shows that the only schools where 
male students out-number their female counterparts are in private schools. This reveals that 
Palestinian parents have been and are more willing to invest in the education of their sons, 
rather than their daughters. This is because of the male obligations towards his family, which 
do not apply to women or girls of the family.  
Economically, the Occupied Territories became dependent on the Israeli economy; the 
Palestinian markets became restricted to Israeli goods and commodities, a significant portion 
of the Palestinian labor force became dependent on the Israeli labor market for employment 
(Hilal, 2007). There were two main causes; firstly, the high unemployment rates in both West 
Bank and Gaza Strip after the 1967 war, and secondly, the Israeli urgent demand for working 
hands, mainly in construction and agriculture during the economic boom that had started in 
Israel at that time, especially, the construction of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied 
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Territories. The economic integration that was implemented by force between both entities; 
Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories, started in 1967 and ended with the beginning 
of  the first Intifada in 1987 (Gross, 1999). “The shaping of such relations was almost entirely 
a matter for Israel. The Palestinians had not played a significant role in that context and did 
not have a say in any decision-making processes … the huge economic gaps between the 
two peoples were marked by a one-sided dependence of the Palestinian economy on Israel 
… Furthermore, these relations were not based on a voluntary arrangement between two 
parties of relatively equal bargaining power and leverage; instead, Israel unilaterally shaped 
their contours” (Gross, 1999: 1551). The outbreak of the “first Intifada”, in December 1987 
led to a subsequent decrease in the number of Palestinian workers employed in the Israeli 
labor market as a consequence of the Israeli security measures (Hilal, 2007). More on the 
first Intifada in the next section: 
 
3- The First Intifada 1987-1993  
 
The four Palestinian workers who were killed at an Israeli checkpoint in Gaza on December 
1987 sparked the First Intifada19; King& Carter (2009: 1) described the scene:  “In the next 
few weeks, seemingly unorganized protests by Palestinians erupted across the occupied 
territories, blocking roads and impeding Israeli army. Israel deployed thousands of soldiers 
to suppress the revolt which afterwards they organize general strikes and boycotts of Israeli 
civil administration institutions in both; the Gaza Strip and the West Bank”. They practice civil 
disobedience in the face of the Israeli army orders, and they refused working in the Israeli 
settlements (Afflerbach & Strachan, 2012). The demonstrators throw stones towards the 
Israeli army and they remained in the front line despite the tear gas and the rubber-coated 
bullets used by the Israeli soldiers against them (King& Carter, 2009). Lustick (1993: 560) 
argued that any Palestinian outbursts would die down after the army opened fire if it 
                                                             
19 The word “Intifada” in Arabic means “the uprising”. 
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happened during the past twenty years. He explained: “From the beginning of its occupation 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel outlawed almost all forms of political activity 
by the Arab inhabitants of those areas since the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip in 1967”. However, the demonstrations of the first Intifada expanded, drawing such 
large numbers of protestors into the streets that Israeli units were overwhelmed. Lustick 
(1993: 561) further noted: “Within weeks there emerged a clandestine coordinating 
committee that helped sustain an uninterrupted series of commercial and general strikes and 
mass demonstrations”. The first Intifada was not only a different nonviolent mean of struggle 
against the Israeli occupation but as King& Carter (2009: 1) wrote: “The intifada constituted 
for the Palestinians major shift in organization, thinking, leadership, and purpose. The 
Palestinians determined in essence to discard a tradition of armed struggle … in favor of 
civilian, nonmilitary measures of struggle”. Allegra (2010: 17) also pointed out that “… the 
first Intifada had put an end to that system of informal mediation that had developed in 
Occupied Territories between the Israeli administration and the Palestinian notables”. This 
genuine civil rebellion has created a new form of Palestinian leadership; Al-Shabab (Young 
Men) became also the new social reference point instead of the head of the clan or the head 
of the extended family in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (AbuZayyad, November 1, 
2013). 
The First Intifada, for many observers and politicians, was one of the most important 
collective nonviolent resistance actions that the Palestinians had in the twentieth century 
besides the revolution of the 1936-3920. Heller and Nusseibeh (1993:161) saw the 
spontaneous uprising as “a revolution of mass consciousness, underlining the need for 
embodying the idea of self-determination in tangible structures in reality”. This 
consciousness, in addition to the Jordanian disengagement21 decision in the mid-1988, and 
                                                             
20The 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine was a nationalist uprising by Palestinian Arabs in Mandatory 
Palestine against British colonial rule, as a demand for independence and opposition to mass Jewish 
immigration 
21 In the mid of 1988 Jordan decided to disengage legally and administratively from the West Bank. 
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the Palestinian Declaration of Independence22 in November of the same year, all worked 
towards concluding peace with Israel and to establish a Palestinian government in the 
Occupied Territories. The First Intifada gave birth to the peace process and the two-state 
solution (Smith, 2010); it lasted until the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993. 
4- The Oslo Accord and the Administrative Divisions of the West Bank 
 
The Oslo secret peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO)23 were concluded with the announcement of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 
199324, which formed the basis for further negotiations concluded by the Israeli-Palestinian 
“Interim Agreement”25 of 1995, and the creation of “Palestinian Interim Self-Government 
Authority”26, which was supposed to end in 1999 when a permanent agreement would be 
reached27. It was agreed to postpone a number of issues known as the final status issues till 
the third year of the process. Jerusalem was one of these issues.  Though the DOP did not 
define the outcome of the process, it was understood that it will end by the creation of a 
Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel (Shihadeh, 1993). However, the 
implementation of the “Interim Agreement” was not easy, many obstacles delayed its 
implementation, including the suicide attacks carried out by Hamas28,  the assassination of 
                                                             
22
The statement proclaimed by Yasser Arafat on 15 November 1988 in which he assumed the title of 
“President of Palestine”. 
23 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is an organization founded in 1964 with the purpose of the 
"liberation of Palestine" through armed struggle. It is recognized as the "sole legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people". It has enjoyed observer status at the United Nations since 1974. The PLO was 
considered by the United States and Israel to be a terrorist organization until the Madrid Conference in 
1991. In 1993, the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist in peace, accepted UN Security Council 
resolutions 242 and 338, and rejected "violence and terrorism"; in response, Israel officially recognized 
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. 
24  See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements on  www.cfr.org/israel/oslo-
accords.../p9674 
25See “The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (“Oslo 2”— 
9/28/95)” https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interimtoc.html 
26 he situation is the same since then till the time being. 
27  See Shlaim, A. (2005). The rise and fall of the Oslo Peace process; International relations of the Middle 
East, 241-61 
28  Hamas is a Palestinian Islamic organization; it was founded in 1987 (during the First Intifada) as an 
offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
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the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish right-wing activist and the election of 
Binyamin Netanyahu as prime minister in 1996 (Pundak, 2001). 
According to Oslo Accords  the West Bank, excluding the Jewish settlements and military 
locations, was supposed to be transferred to the Palestinians in three portions one every six 
months under the arrangement of redeployment. To facilitate this process, it was agreed that 
it will be divided into three criteria: A, B, and C. Area C was supposed to be transferred to B, 
then B to A, until the whole area becomes A under the control of the Palestinian Authority 
(AbuZayyad, November 1, 2013). However, the implementation of the process was halted in 
the middle, and the West Bank remained divided into three administrative divisions: the area 
A, B, and C with different civic and security authorization (Jamal, 2009). First: area A, 3 % of 
the West Bank, with a full civil and security control by the Palestinian Authority, it includes 
the Palestinian cities29 and their surrounding areas. Second: area B, 24% of the West Bank 
with a Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control, such as East 
Jerusalem suburbs. And finally area C, the remaining 73% of the West Bank, with a full 
Israeli civil and security control. By 2000, following a series of agreements, the relative 
distribution of the areas had changed; area A covered 18% of the West Bank, area B 
covered 22% and area C 64%30. The areas in which the Palestinians had full control were as 
Gordon (2008: 36) described "like an archipelago of sorts, while the areas controlled by 
Israel were strategic corridors that interrupted the territorial contiguity of the West Bank”. 
The categorization of area A, B, and C was built on the Palestinian population density; all 
Palestinian cities with high population density were given to the Palestinian Authority with full 
civil and security control. After the redeployment of Israeli military forces, and the transfer of 
responsibility to the Palestinian Police, defined as the only Palestinian security authority, 
their purpose was to act systematically against all expressions of violence and terror. The 
Palestinian Authority was expected to prevent violence and terror against Israel, and to 
                                                             
29 The cities of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jericho 
30The Agreements were Wye I, II and III and Sharam I. 
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assume responsibility for the personal security of the Palestinians under its sovereignty. In 
area B the Palestinians implemented civilian authority while Israel continued to be in charge 
of security (Shlaim, 2005). There was a different interpretation of the term “joint Israeli-
Palestinian security control”. For the Israelis: security means only the security of Israel, not 
the Palestinians’ security, Israeli security forces actually interfere in area B only when there 
is a threat to its own security, but it will not interfere when it comes to the Palestinian security 
(AbuZayyad, October 20, 2013), he further explained: when a car accident occurs between 
two Palestinian cars, for example, the Israelis do not interfere.  On the other hand, 
Palestinian police cannot move freely from Area A to B because they have first to coordinate 
with the Joint Security Coordination office, which usually takes up to forty-eight (48) hours to 
be convened within according to the Cairo Protocol. This is useless in case of emergencies. 
This classification of A, B, C, was supposed to be temporary whereas area C would-be 
gradually transferred to area B, and B to the area A in 18 months until all the West Bank, 
except for Israeli military bases and settlements, would become area A with Palestinian full 
control of civilian affairs as well as security. All this was not carried out by the end of 1999, 
the designated time-frame according to the Oslo Accords. Prime Minister Ehud Barak was 
against the transformation, and suggested to postpone it to the final status agreement 
(AbuZayyad, October 20, 2013). Gordon (2008) argues that the overarching logic of the 
Oslo Accords could be summarized with “Israel transferred all responsibilities 
relating to the management of the population to the Palestinians themselves while 
preserving control of Palestinian space” (Gordon, 2008: 35). 
Economically; the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles and  the conclusion of the 
Paris Protocol in April 1994, as Gross (1999: 1556), put it “were to signify the dawn of an 
old-new era. This era was "old" in the sense of a return to the format of economic integration 
before the First Intifada; that is from 1967-1987, but "new" insofar as that integration was 
based on a consensual, rather than unilateral, understanding”. Fischer et al. (2001) 
presented the assumptions for a vibrant Palestinian entity done by a group of Palestinian, 
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Jordanian, Israeli, and American economists31 in 1993, before the Oslo negotiations had 
reached them or the public. They recommended that the Palestinian economy would be 
dominated by the private sector and markets will decide the allocation of resources. Free 
trade in goods and capital among the Palestinian entity, Israel and Jordan and at least, some 
100,000 Palestinian workers would be again allowed to work in Israel, since the number was 
reduced for security reasons during the First Intifada.  In addition to a Palestinian economic 
administration that would be created to manage the financial system, including the chartering 
and supervision of new banks; and some arrangements regarding taxes that would be spent 
on Palestinian infrastructure. And finally, foreign aid, that would have to play a major part in 
the economic development of the new Palestinian entity. Fischer et al. (2001) further argued 
that some of the conditions above were met; some of the greatest important were not. 
Support from the donor community, for example, has been generous, and it is definitely not 
responsible for the inadequate growth performance. But the freedom of trade in goods and 
services between the Palestinian economy and Israel, and with Jordan, expectations were 
not valid, Fischer et al. (2001: F264) explained: 
 
“…indeed the Palestinian economy has not only suffered from lack of adequate access to world 
markets, but also, and probably more importantly, from restrictions on the movement of goods 
and people between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and at times even among cities and 
villages in the West Bank. This negative environment has been the result of the permits system 
and the intensification of controls; including periods of closure which Israel has imposed often in 
response to security incidents or at times when the risk of security incidents was perceived to be 
high”. 
 
The Israeli restrictions on the free movement of Palestinians since 1993 reduced the number 
of Palestinians who were allowed to work in Israel. Fischer et al. (1994) argued that 
                                                             
31As presented by Stanley Fischer, Patricia Alonso-Gamo, and Ulric Erickson von Allmen in their article 
“Economic development in West Bank and Gaza since Oslo” in 2001. 
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sustained large labor flow from the West Bank and Gaza to Israel would be essential for the 
Palestinian economic development, especially in the beginning; the Palestinian economy 
needs time till investments increase and so does the demand for labor. However, the 
political situation worsened in the years 1995-6, because of the Israeli closure policy which 
reduced the number of working permits.  Consequently, the employment of Palestinians in 
Israel and the settlements deteriorated causing a deep recession in the Palestinian economy 
(Fischer, Alonso‐Gamo, & Von Allmen, 2001). Both Parties in signing the Oslo Accords did 
not fulfil their promise; Israel promised there would not be any more settlements on 
Palestinian land; Palestinians promised there would be an end to violence. While well-
intentioned, the Oslo negotiations eventually fell apart (Smith, 2010).  The failure of the 
peace talks led to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, a wave of violence and 
counter violence on both sides had started. More on the Second Intifada in the next section: 
 
5- The Second Intifada  
 
In September 2000, the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon made a visit to al-Aqsa Mosque 
(The Temple Mount)32.This visit, which was seen by the Palestinians as highly provocative, 
was the match that exploded the powder barrel, which had threatened to explode for years 
(Pundak, 2009). Various characteristics of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip deepened rather than weakened throughout the period between1993-2000, 
(Pressman, 2006). Palestinians expected improvement in their daily life activities such as the 
freedom of movement and the economic conditions for improved living standards; when both 
worsened, noteworthy resentment started to feed the anxiety and unrest in the Palestinian 
society (Ibid). The frustration along with Sharon’s visit started the Second Intifada. Unlike the 
                                                             
32The Temple Mount, known in Hebrew as Har Ha-Bayit and in Arabic as the Haram al-Sharif is one of the 
most important religious sites in the Old City of Jerusalem. At least four religions are known to have used 
the Temple Mount: Judaism, Christianity, Roman religion, and Islam. The present site is dominated by 
three monumental structures from the early Umayyad period: the al-Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of the Rock 
and the Dome of the Chain. 
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First Intifada of 1987, the Second Intifada was violent; one of the reasons was that the new 
generation of the Palestinian militants believed that force would improve the peace 
negotiation outcomes. Pressman (2006) argues that the Israeli and Palestinian responses 
during the early protests led to escalation. The Second Intifada witnessed numerous bomb 
attacks, including suicide bombing by the Palestinians; tank and gunfire and air attacks, 
targeted killings, and harsh reactions against demonstrations by the Israelis. 
 
An important dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is Israel’s control over the 
movement of the Palestinian people, goods, and resources (World Bank, 2010).The control 
over Palestinian mobility has relaxed and tightened since 1967. Over time, however, the 
apparatus of control has gradually become more sophisticated and effective. During the 
Second Intifada, the extensive and multilayered apparatus of control included permit system, 
physical obstacles known as closures and restricted roads. The tactic of military "curfew"33 
was used extensively by Israel throughout the Second Intifada. Late in the year 2001, 
widespread sieges on Palestinian population centers were imposed resulting in virtual “town 
arrest” for most people in the West Bank. As shown in the map below34, checkpoints and 
roadblocks were erected inside and between Palestinian cities, subjecting all people and 
vehicles to security inspection as an attempt to stop militants and limit the ability to move 
weapons around.35Ajluni (2003: 67) argue that “the main economic effects of widespread 
violence and movement restrictions during the Second Intifada were the disruption of 
production and circulation of goods and services and, therefore, a rapid reduction in national 
income”. The World Bank estimates that the real GDP and GNI36 each fell by a further 20 
                                                             
33Long-term lockdown of civilian areas 
34Checkpoints map all over the West Bank (www.lcurve.org). 
35  Some Palestinian, Israeli and International observers and organizations have criticized the checkpoints 
as excessive, humiliating, and a major cause of the humanitarian situation in the Occupied Territories.  
36 GNI is the broader measure of national income 
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percent in 200237. Unprecedented levels of unemployment, which increased from 11 percent 
in 2000 to more than 41 percent in the third quarter of 2002. The siege served further to 
diminish economic activity, employment, and income, affecting negatively the Palestinian 
poverty rate (Ajluni, 2003)38. Israel, which reoccupied the Palestinian territories, started 
building a Wall in 2002 to separate Israel and East Jerusalem from West Bank.  
 
6- The Wall 
 
Following a series of Palestinians attacks within Israel during the Second Intifada, the Israeli 
government’s Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs decided to construct a 
barrier “to hinder, disrupt, and prevent the penetration of terrorist activity from Judea and 
Samaria39 into Israel.”40The idea to erect a barrier that would physically separate the West 
Bank from Israel in order to limit unmonitored entry of Palestinians into Israel is not new 
(B’Tselem, 2002). It was first proposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1992 
(Dickey & Dennis, 1995). The suicide bombing at a nightclub on the Tel-Aviv promenade on 
July 2nd 2001 that claimed 22 victims created the political opportunity for the Israeli Knesset41 
to move forward with the idea (AIC, 2007). 
 
The Wall route is long and convoluted as shown in the map below, and is not being built on 
the pre-1967 boundaries. Eighty-five percent of the Wall is located within the West Bank 
territories, mostly in areas in which Israeli settlements are located, leaving them on the 
“Israeli” side of the Wall. The route approved by the Israeli government in February 2005 
                                                             
37 See World Bank Group, West Bank and Gaza update, August 2002. 
38See United Nations Special Coordinator’s Office (UNSCO), “The Impact on GDP and GNI are taken from 
the IMF and the Palestinian Economy of the Confrontations, Border Closures, and Mobility Restrictions,” 
various issues, 2000–2002 at www.unsco.org. 
39 Judea and Samaria are the Hebrew name for the West Bank. 
40Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs, Decision No. 64/B dated 14 April 2002. 
41 The” Knesset: is the Israeli parliament. 
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leaves sixty settlements (twelve of them in East Jerusalem) west of the Wall, separated from 
the rest of the West Bank and adjacent with Israel (Bimkom & B’Tselem, 2005).The length of 
the Wall, whether already built, under construction or in planning, is 709 kilometers, 
practically it is double the length of the Green Line 42(B'Tselem, 2012).  
 
43The Wall includes a system of fences 
that are in effect the high-technology 
and military intelligence inspired 
constructions (“warranting”, “preventive”, 
“warning”, and “delaying” systems): an 
anti-vehicle component, patrol roads, a 
trace path on each side to disclose the 
footprints of infiltrators, plus warning and 
surveillance systems (B'Tselem, 2012). 
The total width ranges between 35 and 
100 meters. It takes the form of an 
eight-meter- high concrete Wall, 
primarily in urban areas such as East 
Jerusalem, Qalqiliyah and Tulkarm. The 
Israeli government also built 14 
alternative “fabric of life” roads to 
facilitate 
Figure 2: The Wall, checkpoints and Arias A, B and C in the West Bank. Source: Applied Research Institute, www.arij.org 
movement of the Palestinian between their cities and towns instead of the direct roads that 
were connecting them before the construction of the Wall. “Fabric of life” roads are usually 
                                                             
42 The Green Line refers to the 1949 armistice line between Israel and the West Bank. The name derives 
from the green ink used to draw the line on the map. 
43The map source: Applied Research Institute, GIS&RS Unit, www.arij.org 
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longer than the original roads; they are time consuming, in addition to the extra cost. The 
Wall has turned the West Bank into a fragmented set of social and economic enclaves cut 
off from one another (World Bank, 2010).  About 12 percent of West Bank Palestinians are 
now living in a closed military zone along the Jordan Valley region, or encircled by the Wall 
in their villages and towns, or isolated between the Wall and the Green Line (Grassroots 
Palestine, 2010). 
 
The sections of the Separation Wall that have not yet been built will encompass the 
settlement blocks deep within the West Bank – “fingers” reaching far into the West Bank to 
reach and include Kedumim, Ariel, Ma’ale Adummim and Gush Etzion settlements. Notably, 
the construction of the Kedumim and Ma’ale Adummim “fingers” to the east of al-“Eizariyah, 
are frozen for the time being due, most probably, to the opposition of the American 
government.44  
 
Contrary to many Israeli government explicit declarations that the Wall is a temporary 
security measure and does not designate a border, political or otherwise, and that the 
intentions when determining the route of the barrier were not solely security related 
B’Tselem (2012: 7) argues that “an examination of the barrier’s route shows. That the aim 
was to encompass as many settlements and settlers as possible, so as to enable their de 
facto annexation to Israel”. The Second Intifada continued, practically, till the death of Yaser 
Arafat in November 2004 (Smith, 2009). On the 8th of February 2005, in the Sharm el-
Sheikh Summit, the new Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and the Israeli Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon officially agreed to stop all acts of violence against Israelis and 
Palestinians. Although the Second Intifada was finished, the checkpoint regime was not, 
neither was the construction of the Separation Wall. 
                                                             
44 See Arrested Development: The Long-Term Impact of Israel’s Separation Barrier in the West Bank, 
October 2012. 
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7- The Contemporary Political Context in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
 
The violence between the main Palestinian political parties Hamas and Fatah came as a 
surprise to many observers as the Palestinians have conventionally been viewed as 
upholding a unified front (Schanzer, 2008). The focused only was on the conflict between 
Israelis and Palestinians. A review of the Palestinian history, mainly over the last twenty 
years, reveals that the Palestinians are a house divided, manifested by sharp political 
variances and irregular political violence (Ibid). 
The name Hamas is the abbreviation of the name in Arabic for the Islamic Resistance 
Movement.  It was officially created in 1987/1988 at the beginning of the First Intifad; it was 
an offshoot of the Muslim Brothers movement with the objective of liberating Palestine (Berti-
2013). This Islamic vision combined with its nationalist claim and militancy operations 
against Israel opposed the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process which promotes the two state 
solutions. Hamas, in fact, bars recognition of Israel (Ibid). On the other hand, Hamas’s 
heritages and its record since its formation, according to Mishal & Sela (2006) reveal that it 
is fundamentally a social movement. They argue that Hamas has directed its energies and 
resources primarily toward providing services to the community especially responding to its 
immediate hardship and concerns. Hamas, as a religious association very much involved in 
most types of social activities, it is deeply embedded in the Palestinian society in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip and thus is conscious of the society’s worries, sharing its concerns, 
articulating its aspirations, and give attention to its needs and problems (Mishal & Sela, 
2006). On the other hand, Fatah; the leading Palestinian national movement was founded in 
1958 in Kuwait by Yasser Arafat, along with seven other Palestinian activists.45Their 
objective was to defeat Israel by arm struggle to free Palestine that had been conquered in 
1948. Fatah was the largest faction of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO).  It is generally considered to have had a strong involvement in 
                                                             
45 Khalil Wazir, Salah Khalaf, Khaled al-Hassan, Adil Abdel Karim, Mohammed Yusuf al-Najar, Khalid al-
Amira, and Abdel Fatah Lahmoud 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 46 
 
revolutionary struggle in the past and has maintained a number of militant groups. Fatah as 
the main factor leading the PLO concluded the Oslo agreement with Israel in 1993 and later 
established the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The fact 
that Arafat was the Chairman of the PLO and the Head of the Palestinian Authority reflected 
on the Fatah and converted it de facto from an armed resistance movement to a political 
party. The mismanagement and corruption of the PA was attributed to the Fatah and caused 
a lot of damage to its image in the eyes of its own people. The PA became a highly 
centralized regime under Arafat leadership where his followers were rewarded and his 
defectors were sanctioned (Jamal, 2007). After Arafat's death in 2004, factionalism inside 
the ideologically various Palestinian movement has become more obvious. In 26 January, 
2006 parliamentary election, the party lost its majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council 
(Parliament) to Hamas which won a large majority. Hamas claimed the majority of the 
parliamentary seats, 76 of the 132, giving the party the right of forming the next cabinet 
under the Palestinian Authority's president, the leader of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas.  The 
Fatah Party which dominated the first legislature elections and the Palestinian cause for long 
won only 43 seats. The rest were claimed by other parties; nationalist, leftist and 
independent parties. Usher (2006) wrote “whatever the eventual consequences of this event, 
two are already apparent: the Palestinian national movement is going to be dominated by 
two political forces, not one, and the movement’s nationalism is going to be laden with a 
greater religious, Islamist content”. However, the Hamas legislative victory led to a conflict 
between the two parties, Fatah and Hamas. Steven Erlanger wrote on January 26, 2006 in 
the New York times “Hamas which considered to be a terrorist group by Israel, the United 
States and the European Union, became in charge of the Palestinian political future”46  This 
has its immediate political and economic implications; the Israel's acting Prime Minister, 
                                                             
46 See “Victory Ends 40 Years of Political Domination by Arafat's Party” the Washington Post/ Foreign 
Service /Friday, January 27, 2006 by Steven Erlanger. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/26/international/middleeast/26cnd-
hamas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 47 
 
Ehud Olmert, announced: "The state of Israel will not negotiate with a Palestinian 
administration if even part of it is an armed terrorist organization calling for the destruction of 
the state of Israel”.47 On the 7th of April 2006, the United States of America and the 
European Union suspended their aid to the Palestinian Authority.  By the Hamas legislative 
victory in 2006, the Palestinian political field faced a basic change since the establishment of 
the PA, which is the transition from a field dominated by one party, Fatah, to a field 
dominated by the two parties; Fatah and Hamas (Hilal, 2006). But this political challenge did 
not last long. A year later, in 14th of June 2007, Hamas took over the Gaza Strip from Fatah 
in a series of battles. The political split between the West Bank controlled by Fatah and the 
Gaza Strip controlled by Hamas was finalized. This political split has its own implication on 
the Palestinians in both West Bank and the Gaza strip. Broun (2010: 1) noted that “The 
Palestinian division, however, prevents the Palestinians from speaking with one voice, much 
less acting in a coherent manner. This rift would vitiate any diplomatic breakthrough that 
might occur between Israel and the Palestinians in resolving, or even managing, the 
conflict”. Hilal (2010: 26) pointed out “Since then, Gaza has been subject to Israel’s total 
blockade; even as Israel’s punitive operations were stepped up, culminating in Operation 
Cast Lead in winter 2008–2009. All the attempts to reconcile the two parties—undertaken by 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt, among others—have failed”. In April 24, 2014, Hamas and 
Fatah announced they've agreed to reconcile, few weeks after they form a unity government 
with elections possible by early 2015. This was a development that could see the Palestinian 
territories under a unified leadership for the first time in years (CNN, April 24, 2014). 
2.3 OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY SETTING 
 
The main objective of this section is the analysis of the historical, political and socio-
economic factors that characterize the context of the case study location, that is the East 
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Jerusalem and its neighborhood al_’E’zariyah. This section starts with a brief historical 
review of the city of Jerusalem from separation to unification till its expansion at the expense 
of its West Bank neighborhoods, trying to explain the complexity that led to the research 
problem, then a specific overview of the Separation Wall in the area of Jerusalem, and finally 
al-‘Eizariyah as one of the affected neighborhood of Jerusalem coupled with the analysis of 
the Separation Wall route around al-‘Eizariyah and the implications of the already built, in 
process, and planed on its inhabitants. This preface will enable us to confront this context 
with the analysis of the conducted research in the empirical chapter. 
1-  East Jerusalem  
 
Both Israelis and the Palestinians want Jerusalem to be their capital, and the multitude of 
holy sites in the city—for the three major monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam and 
Judaism)—have contributed towards making the city’s politics extremely impulsive (AIC, 
2007). Jerusalem was to be internationalized as a corpus separatum – a separated body – 
and placed under a special international regime to be administered by the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council, under the partition plan of 1947, of the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 18148. However and as Derejko (2009: 33) wrote “rather than through 
the political will of its residents, the dictates of the international community, or the principles 
of international law, the fate of Jerusalem was determined through military conquest”49. “The 
traumatic events between April and July of 1948 turned the 60,000 Palestinians into 
permanent exiles and refugees prior to that evicted from their homes, neighborhoods and 
villages in what came to be known as ‘Jewish West Jerusalem’.” (Matar, 2011: 214). As 
result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the city of Jerusalem was divided into a western side 
under Israeli control, and an Eastern side, including the Old City, under Jordanian rule 
                                                             
48UN General Assembly, Future government of Palestine, 29 November 1947, A/RES/181 
49 See “Urban Planning and the Displacement of Palestinians within and from Occupied East Jerusalem” by 
Nathan Derejko (2009). http://civiccoalition-
jerusalem.org/system/files/documents/aggressive_urbanism.pdf 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 49 
 
(Safieh, 2010) which came to be known as East Jerusalem. The city was crossed by an 
inter-state border separating Israel and Jordan called the Green Line (Allegra, 2010). 
Nineteen years later, by war in 1967, Israel took control of the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem. While the West Bank remained under military occupation, Israel annexed East 
Jerusalem and became part of Israel. Equal Israeli citizenship was not granted to the 
residents of East Jerusalem (Kimhi, 2006). Instead, the roughly 66,000 Palestinian 
Jerusalemites50 were given “Permanent Resident”. This status allowed them to work in 
Israel, enjoy health insurance and social welfare benefits provided to all Israeli residents 
(B’Tselem, 2006). On the other hand, East Jerusalem Palestinians lose their permanent 
residency status, under Israeli law, if they leave Jerusalem for seven years or more 
(B’Tselem, 2009). In fact, the East Jerusalem Palestinians are stateless: they hold an Israeli 
residency permit known as “Blue ID “, and a Jordanian travel document, and are not citizens 
of either (AbuZayyad, Schenker & Ross, 2013). Any absence from the city, for study, work, 
marriage, as well as the holding of any other citizenship can lead to a withdrawal of the 
residency status. Since 1967, about 15,000 Palestinians have lost their residency right, with 
many more at risk of losing it (Ibid). 
 
The annexed area to East Jerusalem included, however, not only the original municipal area 
of the city which was 6 square kilometers prior to 1967 war, but an additional 64 square 
kilometers that were part of the West Bank51. Allegra (2010: 15) pointed out that “the new 
municipal boundaries were dictated by strategic and demographic considerations and 
designed to allow future expansion of Jewish communities in the open space around the city, 
making it by far the largest municipality in Israel”. 
                                                             
50 See “From Partition to Reunification to…? The Transformation of the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem 
since 1967”: Palestine-Israel Journal. Special Issue: Jerusalem Vol. 17, No. 1, 2, Dec. 2010. 
51 See “The Planning Crisis in East Jerusalem” United Nations : 
www.ochaopt.org/.../ocha_opt_planning_crisis_east_jerusalem_april_20 
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Figure 3: Jerusalem map before 1967 War                                Figure 4: Jerusalem map now 
Source: BBC News, Key Maps/ Middle East Facts/http://www.mefacts.com/cached.asp?x_id=10930 
 
The de facto annexation of East Jerusalem was formalized in 1980 when the Knesset 
enacted the ‘Basic Law’, which stated that ‘Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of 
Israel’. Israel has shown characteristic disregard for the United Nations declarations against 
the annexation and for the international law that consider the annexation illegal52, 
concentrating instead on creating geographic and demographic facts on the ground in order 
to establish exclusive Jewish hegemony over the city (Dolphin, 2006) and to prevent any 
future division.  Amir Cheshin, the advisor on Arab Affairs to the former Israeli Mayor of 
Jerusalem declared; “Israel’s leaders … adopted two basic principles in their rule of East 
Jerusalem. The first was to rapidly increase the Jewish population in East Jerusalem. The 
second was to hinder growth of the Arab population and to force Arab residents to make 
their homes elsewhere” (Cheshin,1999: 10). For that purpose, Israel has employed 
governmental techniques of spatial control and population management, in a manner that 
discriminates against the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem in many aspects of life 
                                                             
52 Worth mentioning that most countries in the world, including the United States, have never recognized 
Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem. 
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(Dolphin, 2006), like the unpredictable bureaucratic tools, the fragmentation of space and 
regulation of movement, complicated fabric of law and regulations (Ophir, Givoni & Hanafi, 
2009). Since then till the time being, the situation of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem 
reflects the consistent policies of negligence, discrimination and expropriation exercised by 
the Jerusalem municipality and the different Israeli government agencies (Amir, 2011). 
Housing policy and urban planning, for example, have been used in a biased partisan 
manner to manipulate and limit Palestinian demography and urban geography in Jerusalem 
(Bollens, 2000). One third of the area annexed in 1967 was expropriated from Palestinian 
landowners, and was used exclusively to build 12 Jewish neighborhoods, encircling the 
Palestinian annexed areas, populated by some 192,000 people53 (B'Tselem, 2006), while 
Palestinian building is only allowed in 13 percent of East Jerusalem, mostly in existing 
Palestinian neighborhoods and they will generally not get permits to expand their houses 
when needed, this drove many to build without permits, and live in fear that one day their 
home may be demolished (UN-OCHA, 2009), others moved to the suburbs, even at the risk 
of losing their residency status (the Blue ID) and the social security and other benefits that 
comes with it, hoping it will improve their life quality and afford them a dignified existence. 
Even if Israel had previously declared the annexation of East Jerusalem, as long as the city 
was open, people were not aware of the consequences (Yousef, 2011) and it never occurred 
to them that this might ever happen. For that reason, following the construction of the Wall 
which cuts off the suburbs, many of the same people who moved out of the city are moving 
back, because of the requirement of crossing the border and passing through checkpoint 
inspection has proven too disruptive to their daily working routine and the concern over the 
possibility of losing their residency status. All this, combined with restrictions on building in 
East Jerusalem, led to an increase in the population density, rising housing prices and 
growing feelings of discomfort as well, forcing many Palestinians to live in crowded inhuman 
                                                             
53Under international law, these neighborhoods have the same status as Israeli settlements built in other 
parts of the West Bank, they are illegal. 
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conditions because they need to stay in Jerusalem, in order not to lose their jobs, business 
or property (UN-OCHA, 2009). 
It is worth mentioning that; the Jewish population in East Jerusalem has increased from 0 in 
May 1967 to 181,457 in 2006 (42% of the East Jerusalem population), when the encircling 
East Jerusalem by Jewish settlers was completed (AbuZayyad & Schenker & Ross, 2013). 
The Master Plan54for Jerusalem objective was and still is, to maintain a Jewish majority 
population in Jerusalem, with a ratio of minimal 60% Jewish and maximal 40% Palestinians 
in the city by 2020. AbuZayyad et al. (2013) identified some of the major tools that being 
used by the Israeli Ministry of Interior to achieve this objective: first by revoking the 
Jerusalem Identity Cards (the Blue ID) from Palestinians by using all kinds of excuses not to 
renew them; second by restricting and complicating the process of granting building licenses 
to Palestinians, to force them to seek housing outside the city, leading to the subsequent 
revocation of their Identity Cards;55 and third by the establishment of new Orthodox and 
secular neighborhoods to attract Jewish Israeli migration. 
Economically, East Jerusalem played a key role in strengthening the ties between the 
Occupied West Bank and Israel, as it was strongly tied to the Palestinian cities of 
Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Jericho and beyond. Jerusalem became a gate through which 
Palestinians from the West Bank could enter Israel almost freely, until the checkpoint regime 
of the 1990s prevented that free movement (Gazit, 1985). However, there are now main 
differences in the legal status of the Palestinians; the Jerusalemites have an Israeli 
residency status (the Blue ID), which allows them to move freely in Israel and the West Bank 
                                                             
54 The Jerusalem Master Plan is a comprehensive and authoritative Israeli Planning Scheme that serves as 
the mandatory legal guide for all zoning and planning within the Jerusalem Municipality. See Aggressive 
Urbanism @ http://civiccoalition-jerusalem.org/system/files/documents/aggressive_urbanism.pdf 
55  The Israeli Interior Ministry implemented the “center of life” policy, which allows for the revocation of 
a Palestinian Jerusalemite’s residency status if the interior minister determines that the individual’s 
“center of life” has moved beyond Jerusalem municipality borders.  See ArdiImseis, “Facts on the Ground: 
An Examination of Israeli Municipal Policy in East Jerusalem,” (2000). 
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besides other benefits. In contrast, the residents of the West Bank have (the Orange56 or the 
Green ID) identification card which allows them to move freely, only in the West Bank. They 
are not allowed to enter Israel, including annexed East Jerusalem, without a permit. 
 
2-  The Wall in East Jerusalem 
 
Prior to 1967, Palestinians could move freely between East Jerusalem and its surrounding 
areas. Their familial, economic and cultural bonds extended throughout the entire West 
Bank. No barriers blocked the flow of people and commercial goods or social engagement 
and exchange. Since 1967, the Palestinian reality, in Both East Jerusalem and the West 
Bank, has witnessed what, can be called, a reflective change. The East Jerusalem is now 
almost completely disengaged from the surrounding Palestinian areas in The West Bank. 
The closure procedures started in March, 1993 with the checkpoint regime to be followed by 
the construction of the Wall57.  In June 2002, the Israeli government approved Stage A, as 
part of the whole Separation Wall project, which included one section north of Jerusalem that 
extends from the Ofer army base on the west to the Qalandiya checkpoint on the east. The 
second section was south of Jerusalem which runs from the Tunnels Road on the west to 
Beit Sahour (south of HarHoma) on the east. Both sections were about 10 Km each, and 
were completed in July 2003 (B’Tselem, 2011)58.  
 
On September 11th, 2002 the Israeli cabinet approved the “Jerusalem Envelope” plan—e.g. 
surrounding the city with walls from the south, east and the north (Hever, 2007). In 
September 2003, the Political-Security Cabinet approved the Wall's route except for the 
section near the Ma'ale Adummim settlement. One section extends from the eastern edge of 
                                                             
56 The Orange ID that was given to the Palestinians in the West Bank after the 1967 war was replaced by a 
Green one after the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority.  
57See Lagerquist, P. (2004). Fencing the last sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel's “separation wall” 
58 See B'tselem Website (1 Jan 2011): http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier/jerusalem 
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Beit Sahour on the south to the eastern edge of al-'Eizariyah on the north, the length of this 
section is seventeen kilometers. The other section started from the southern edge of 'Anata 
to the Qalandiya checkpoint on the north with a length of fourteen kilometers. The third 
section is also fourteen kilometers and surrounds five villages northwest of Jerusalem (Bir-
Nabala, al-Judeireh, al-Jib, Beit Hanina al-Balad, and Nebi Samuel), which are situated near 
the city's municipal border (B’Tselem, 2011). 
 
The Jerusalem Separation Wall is approximately 90 kilometers long (Cohen, 2005). In built- 
up urban areas, thus affects the daily lives of schoolchildren, workers, families and whole 
communities (AIC, 2007). Separation has been achieved via a concrete Wall in general, but 
in some rural areas they used electronic fence. Most of the Wall in Jerusalem is six to eight 
meters high with twelve official gates in the Wall. Only four of which are open to Palestinians, 
and the rest are reserved for the settlers’ use only (Aronson, 2006). The Jerusalem Wall 
follows the 1967 annexation border, with two major exceptions: the Ma’ale Adummim59  
enclave60  (not yet constructed) which stretches deep into the West Bank, and the exclusion 
of two Palestinian neighborhoods: Kafr A’keb and the Shua’fat refugee camp (AIC, 2007). 
Some 220,000 Palestinians now live in these annexed areas, this route of the Wall leaves 
those Palestinians on the "Israeli" side of the Wall (B’Tselem, 2011). Some argue that Israel 
excluded the Palestinian neighborhood Kafr A’keb and the Shua’fat refugee camp, although 
they are inside the Jerusalem annexed boundaries, for a territorial swap with Ma’ale 
Adummim enclave (where a Jewish majority lives outside the Jerusalem annexed 
boundaries) in future negotiations regarding the position on East Jerusalem. Others argue 
that this policy is for reducing the number of Palestinians and increasing the number of 
Israelis in Jerusalem. 
                                                             
59The Ma’ale Adummim settlement was built on al-‘Eizariyah and other Palestinian villages extended land. 
60Enclaves are a result of two walls, one separating the area from Jerusalem and the other separating it 
from the West Bank, mostly for the beneﬁt of the settlers ( AIC, 2007). 
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Figure 5: The Separation Barrier in the West Bank, Source: B’Tselem, 2008   
In April 2006, in the Ma’ale Adummim area, the government approved an amended route 
that breaches the West Bank by some 14 kilometers east of the Green Line, and 11 
kilometers east of Jerusalem’s post-1967 municipal border61. It leaves on its “Israeli” side 
most of the jurisdiction area of Ma’ale Adummim settlement, this includes E1; Kfar Adumim, 
Almon, Nofey Prat, Alon, and Qedar settlements; and the Mishor Adumim industrial zone 
(B’Tselem, 2009). The planned route will create a 6,400-hectare enclave, which, in addition 
to the settlements, includes the Palestinian village of az-Za’ayem (3,500 residents) and 
3,000 Bedouins from the al-Ka’abaneh, as-Sawahrah, and Jahalin tribes (Ibid). This means 
that thousands of Palestinians will find themselves within the so-called “seam zone” i.e. 
trapped between the Green Line and the Wall and they will be obliged to require permits to 
continue to live in their homes and villages62. In addition to the fact that the area of Ma’ale 
Adummim is the narrowest part of the West Bank; the distance between Israel’s border with 
Jordan in the east and the Green Line in this region is only 28 kilometers. The eastern 
border of the Ma’ale Adummim city limits is only some 13 kilometers from the border with 
                                                             
61 Israeli Government Decision No. 4783, “Amended Route of the Security Fence”, April 30, 2006. 
62 Relatives living outside the “seam zone” will have to obtain a one-time permit from the Israeli Civil 
Administration in order to visit them. 
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Jordan, it cuts off about one-half of the total width of the West Bank in this area. Therefore, 
the location of Ma’ale Adummim is responsible for infringement of the Palestinian people’s 
right to self-determination within the framework of a viable state that has reasonable 
territorial contiguity (B’tselem, 2009). 
 
3-  Al-'Eizariyah 
 
 Al-'Eizariyah (Bethany)63 is one of East Jerusalem's eastern neighborhoods located in 
Jerusalem-Jericho historic route; less than two miles from Jerusalem (3.2 km). Some 43 
hectares from the land of al-'Eizariyah became included within the new city boundaries when 
Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967 (B’Tselem, 2009). But most of the village, however, 
was left outside the boundaries and is part of the West Bank so that the demographic 
balance of Jerusalem does not tilt to the Palestinians’ favor (Safieh, 2010). Al-‘Eizariyah 
remained connected to Jerusalem with all aspects of daily life with strong commercial, social 
and familial ties, many of al-‘Eizariyah residents use to work in East Jerusalem.  In 1975, an 
appreciable part of al-‘Eizariyah land was expropriated to establish the settlement of Ma’ale 
Adummim. The borders of Ma’ale Adummim were first defined in an order that the military 
commander issued in 1979 encompassing some 3,500 hectares. In 1981, the municipal 
boundaries were expanded to cover approximately 3,700 hectares. In 1982, tens of hectares 
more of al-‘Eizariyah land, which lie north east in E1, were declared government property. In 
1991, they were again expanded, this time mainly to the west, toward Jerusalem. In 1994, in 
the midst of the Oslo peace process, 120 hectares were added to the city, in order to 
connect with Jerusalem’s municipal borders in E1. Ma’ale Adummim’s jurisdiction area now 
covers some 4,800 hectares. Some 647 hectares are from al-‘Eizariyah land (B’Tselem, 
2009). Allegra (2010) pointed out that “while the administrative boundaries of the settlements 
were expanded, the so-called “demarcation plans” were approved by the Israeli Civil 
                                                             
63 Commonly identified as the site of the Biblical village of Bethany 
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Administration for Palestinian communities such as ‘Anata, Abu-Dis and al-‘Eizariyah, 
effectively restricting their growth to already built-up areas (Allegra, 2010: 17). 
 
As a result of the 
establishment of Ma’ale 
Adummim and its expansion, 
the land reserves available to 
al-‘Eizariyah diminished 
greatly. Consequently, a 
pattern of dense construction 
emerged in the town.  
Figure 6: The land of al-‘Eizariyah and the special out line plan. Source: B’Tselem, 2008   
 
Almost every plot available for construction is utilized for tall buildings, and inside the town 
there is little open space left. As shown in the map above, the brown line defines al-
“Eizariyah land area during the British mandate period, the blue line defines the present 
area.  Al-‘Eizariyah was left with only 445 hectares, some 39 percent of its land area during 
the British mandate period. 
The Interim Agreement of 1995 administratively has divided al-‘Eizariyah into area B and 
area C. The Palestinian Authority planning powers were only on area B, while in the 148 
hectares that were classified as area C, the situation remained as it had been, and only the 
Israeli Civil Administration is empowered to approve planning schemes and issue building 
permits for Palestinians. This means that the Palestinians’ chances of obtaining building 
permits are very small (B’Tselem, 2009). 
During the Oslo Accords (1993) period, al-’Eizariyah expanded “vertically”, after using most 
of the land available horizontally, to adjust with the new economic boom coupled with the 
political expectations of being part of the future capital of the State of Palestine. Palestinian 
banks, governmental associations and other economic institutions found in al-'Eizariyah an 
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alternative for East Jerusalem as the Palestinian Authority was not allowed to function in 
East Jerusalem.  
The anticipated economic boom after signing the Oslo Accords was not the only cause of the 
prosperity of al-‘Eizariyah, actually, it was a gradual shift through time. Many Jerusalemites 
were encouraged to buy land and build houses to solve the housing crisis in East Jerusalem, 
as it costs much less, and al-‘Eizariyah is very close to Jerusalem. Many Palestinians from 
north and south of the West Bank moved to live in al-‘Eizariyah because of its location close 
to East Jerusalem and Israel where they can search for work, others moved because of 
some rumors that al-‘Eizariyah will be annexed to East Jerusalem and they might be 
considered as Israeli residents and benefit from the Israeli social services.  This ongoing 
movement continued till the construction of the Wall between East Jerusalem and al-
‘Eizariyah was completed (AbuZayyad, November1st, 2013). 
 
Figure 7: The Wall Map. Source: B’Tselem, 2012   
The first section of the Wall (the 
continued red line in the map below) 
surrounds al-‘Eizariyah from the west 
moving towards the north disconnects 
it completely from East Jerusalem. 
Only those who have an Israeli 
identification card (Blue ID) or a 
Palestinian identification card (Green 
ID) with a permit can go to East 
Jerusalem through the only two 
controlled entrances: one is for pedestrians; al- Zaytoon “Olive” checkpoint. And the other is 
for Israeli vehicles only; al- Za’ayyem checkpoint. The Wall severs the main road and trade 
route that used to connect East Jerusalem with Jericho in the east. This route used to pass 
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through al-'Eizariyah, giving it enormous amounts of trade. Now many shops have closed as 
they are inaccessible both to shoppers from East Jerusalem, and passing trade via travelers 
going to the Ma’ale Adummim settlement or to the city of Jericho (Michael, K., & Ramon, A. , 
2004). The second section of the Wall (the non-continuous red line on the map) is supposed 
to continue from north to the north east heading towards the east cutting the same main road 
that use to connect East Jerusalem with Jericho, but from the eastern entrance of al-
’Eizariyah. This Wall, which is under construction, will affect tens of thousands of 
Palestinians who live not only in al-‘Eizariyah, but also Abu Dis, ‘Anata, and as-Sawahrah 
ash-Sharqiya. These communities will be trapped between the western Wall (“the Jerusalem 
envelope”) and the eastern Wall in Ma’ale Adummim. The western Wall has already severed 
long-lasting ties with Jerusalem that go back generations, and has prevented development 
of these Palestinian communities westward (B’Tselem, 2009). The eastern Wall will prevent 
them from building, development, and even the possibility of farming in the eastward 
direction. Moreover, the disruption of the existing road system in the area will render access 
to Ramallah, in the north, and Bethlehem, in the south, difficult and prevent direct access to 
Jericho (Ibid). These three cities are the substitute of East Jerusalem for supplying vital 
health and education and other services to the residents of this area. In addition, most of the 
Jerusalemites either living in Jerusalem or in al-Eizariyah are worried about not being able to 
use the highway that connects Ma’ale Adummim with Jerusalem; the only path for them 
remains through- Zaytoon “Olive” pedestrians checkpoint. 
2.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
             
In the Palestinian Occupied Territories, close family ties play a crucial role in coping with 
political turbulence, the Israeli occupation, and the socio-economic situation. Social capital 
provides a safety-net for improving people‘s chances and the quality of the day-to-day 
survival, especially after Israel had constructed the Wall to separate Israel and East 
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Jerusalem from the West Bank. The Wall has turned the West Bank into a fragmented set of 
social and economic enclaves cut off from one another (World Bank, 2010). This includes 
over 200,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem, who are totally isolated from the rest of the 
West Bank (Dolphin, 2006). And while many studies have been carried out on the impact of 
restrictions on mobility and the construction of the Wall on Palestinians in the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem, these studies have been mainly conducted from an economic perspective 
rather than a sociological perspective. However, the social capital index that was compiled in 
2007 and has been the basis, of the majority of the social capital studies in Palestine, 
referred to the existence of the Wall in the rural northern and southern parts of the West 
Bank where the construction of the Wall began and was completed. These studies stated 
that the construction of the Wall has prevented access to agricultural land. Consequently, 
the family has become a strategy for protection and solidarity between the extended family 
has increased. This conclusion raises the question about the status of Palestinian social 
capital now that the Wall has been completed along the majority of the border between the 
West Bank and Israel including urban arias? And what are the characteristics of Palestinian 
society that makes its context peculiar so that a certain type of social capital is dominant?  
Therefore, this research examine the impact of the Wall on the Palestinian‘s social capital 
dynamics in urban areas using East Jerusalem and one of its neighborhoods, al-'Eizariyah, 
as a case study. 
Until the Wall was built, there was a residential continuum ranging across the Palestinian 
neighborhoods and suburbs of East Jerusalem (Amir, 2011) including al-‘Eizariyah. Although 
there are main differences in the legal status of the residents of both areas under study, the 
distinction between these towns, villages, and neighborhoods that were -in or out- of 
Jerusalem was purely artificial: the social fabric of the residents did not correspond to this 
distinction. Often, members of the same family have different civic statuses. Some hold 
Israeli residency status (Blue ID) and others have a West Bank identification card (Green 
ID). Differences in civil status did influence entitlement for services and benefits, but these 
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differences did not split the families themselves (Ibid). And although family members and 
other “West Bank identification card holders were formally forbidden to enter the municipal 
boundaries of Jerusalem; this restriction was not enforced as a general rule. The 
construction of the Wall, however, provided the means for implementing this restriction” 
(Amir, 2011: 773). In its early phases, the Wall was just a complication that held back the 
flow of people and goods. People managed to find ways to get through in various ways, 
either by squeezing themselves through its distant openings, or by jumping to the other side 
using big stones as ladders. In 2009 almost all of these passages or ways to get to the other 
side were closed, entry to East Jerusalem was restricted to six checkpoints (Amir, 2011). 
One is the “Olive” checkpoint north of al-‘Eizariyah in which only a blue ID holder or a green 
ID holder with a permit can go through. 
The residents of East Jerusalem and al-'Eizariyah responded to the shock of the physical 
obstruction of the Wall and all the restrictions that resulted from it on a day to day basis, 
including restrictions on access to work, housing, health facilities, education, services, and 
family and social life.  Most of al-’Eizariyah residents hold a West Bank ID (Green ID). They 
are a combination of those who are from the town itself, the refugees of the 1948 war, those 
who moved from different parts of the West Bank and settled with their families for business 
or personal reasons, and those who have Israeli residency status (the Jerusalemites). 
Before Oslo (1993), many of the al-‘Eizariyah population used to work in East Jerusalem and 
Israel and they have strong social ties with East Jerusalem and its suburbs. This free 
movement did not last long. On 28 of March 1993, the Israelis announced a full closure on 
the Occupied Territories prohibiting the Palestinians from entering Israel including East 
Jerusalem. In the 1995, with the implementation of the Oslo Accords, there was little change 
in these restrictions of movement (B'tselem, 2007). The situation became even worse later 
as Oslo created enemies of peace from both sides; several suicide attacks carried out by 
Hamas, and the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish right-wing 
activist. This caused severe economic and social consequences on the residents of al-
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‘Eizariyah. According to the Oslo Accords al-‘Eizariyah was classified as area B in the 
center, which means with a Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security 
control. And area C in its west entrance and the surroundings, which means: a full Israeli 
civil and security control. This classification has its complications when it comes to personal 
security of its residents.  After the constructions of the separation Wall most of the 
Jerusalemites, who came to al-'Eizariyah because of the housing crises in East Jerusalem, 
have moved back into the city because the requirement of crossing the border (the Wall) and 
passing through checkpoint inspections has proven too disruptive to their daily working 
routine, and many were also concerned about possibly losing their Jerusalem residency 
status. The unemployment rate has risen as many of those who used to work in Jerusalem 
lost their jobs due to not being granted an Israeli work permit. The hospitals of East 
Jerusalem, which were within walking distance from the town, became out of reach. The one 
small clinic positioned in al-‘Eizariyah cannot meet the needs of the residents. Women in 
labor, and those requiring advanced medical care, have to drive to the next nearest 
municipal hospitals in the West Bank, either in Jericho (an hour’s drive), or Ramallah (an 
hour and a half’s drive away). The same problems arise with schooling. The question, of 
which side of the Wall one is living on, working on, has a family on and so on, has become 
crucial. The Wall paralyses the social life. The Jerusalemites who live in al-‘Eizariyah were 
the most affected class, reverse migration began, spacious houses were left empty, leading 
to a notable decrease in real estate prices in al-‘Eizariyah. The Jerusalemites who did not 
move out of al-‘Eizariyah; are now living in suspension (monitoring mode) worrying about the 
possible closure of the eastern entrance of the town. When this happens, Jerusalemites will 
not be able to enter al-‘Eizariyah by cars, or public transportation. The town also suffers from 
the high residential density coupled with a general sense of chaos; rubbish and other 
eyesores on the sidewalks at the main entrance of al-‘Eizariyah, unlicensed vehicles for 
public transportation, unpaved side-streets and unorganized, poorly designed and unfinished 
high-rise buildings. This is attributed to al-‘Eizariyah systematic loss of land over the years 
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because Israel has confiscated the towns’ extended land to build and expand the settlement 
of Ma’ale Adummim. In addition to the categorization of al-‘Eizariyah as Area B in the center, 
and Area C in its east and west entrance and the surroundings according to the Oslo 
Accords in 1993. This means that some 27,000 inhabitants are excluded from the National 
Security Forces, because the Palestinian Police located in Area A, where the Palestinian 
Authority have a full civil and security control, cannot interfere in Area B before the approval 
of the Joint Security Coordination Office. Such approval, usually takes up to forty-eight hours 
to be convened, and this is useless in case of emergencies. The residents of the town hardly 
can expand in Area C because it is under full Israeli control. The limited space and the 
absence of law and order have had a major impact on both social security and local 
development.  Looking into this case study in such circumstances,  this research seeks to 
understand the impact of the Wall on the Palestinians social capital dynamics by looking at 
the case of East Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah as one unit to address the following research 
questions: 
 
1- How did physical changes and spatial policies related to the Wall, influence local 
social networks? 
2- What have been the main changes in social capital since the construction of the 
Wall?  Which kinds of social capital have been strengthened, and which kinds 
weakened and why?  
3- What are the characteristics of the Palestinian society that makes its context peculiar 
so that a certain type of social capital is dominant? And what are the barriers to 
collective action? 
4- What has been the impact of the Wall on local development and social resilience?  
 
With the context depicted in this chapter in mind, the next chapter will focus on the literature 
review of the concept of Social Capital and Civil society in general, then in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.  
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The Wall by itself is a consequence of the political events, the link between the Wall and the 
concept of social capital comes from the idea that the Wall is an obstacle, and that social 
capital was one of the instruments to overcome this obstacle. The "Studies on Social Capital 
in the Palestinian Territories" series published during the period 2006-2009, stated that the 
construction of the Wall that has been completed only in the north and the south of the West 
Bank have had positive impact on the Palestinian social capital. These studies explained 
that the Wall prevented access to agricultural land; consequently, the family became a 
strategy for protection and solidarity between the immediate and the extended family 
members increased. This was only in rural areas; these studies did not examine the impact 
of the Wall in urban areas as it did not start there yet at that time. Therefore, and now that 
the construction of the Wall is nearly complete in both areas rural and urban, this 
research investigates the impact of the Wall on Palestinian‘s social capital in urban 
areas. For this purpose and to be able to build on the previous studies on social capital in 
Palestine, it is important to explore the concept of social capital in terms of its origin, 
definitions, measurements, types and its role in development. And because the notion of 
social capital became entangled with that of civil society, the literature review chapter also 
presents the origin and the definitions of the civil society concept and its capacity to produce 
certain types of social capital.  
The chapter is organized into three sections. The first deals with the concept of social capital 
and measurements, it examines social networks: negative social capital, types of social 
capital (Social Network Theories); strong versus weak ties, bonding versus bridging and 
linking social capital. The second section examines the specific literature on social capital 
within the Palestinian context starting with Naqib’s first study, the Social Capital Index study, 
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the “Bonding Versus Bridging” study, the Corruption study and other studies of social capital 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The third section deals with the notion of civil society; 
its origin and the development of its definitions over time along the debate over its 
components that raise certain types of questions.  These questions and some others 
regarding the civil society within the Palestinian context are discussed in this section, in 
addition to a historic presentation and literature review of the Palestinian Civil Society. 
  
3.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL: CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENTS AND CRITICS 
 
From a sociological perspective, people are often defined by those whom they know. Bonds 
among people serve as central building blocks of the society (Field, 2003). Emile Durkheim, 
one of the nineteenth-century founder of sociological thought, observe that society "…..does 
not become a jumble of juxtaposed atoms… rather the members are united by ties which 
extend deeper and far beyond the short moments during which the exchange is made" 
(Durkheim, 1993: 266). 
Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and 
values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are 
embedded. Social capital is the glue that holds societies together and without it can be no 
economic growth or human wellbeing (Grootaert, 1998). The World Bank stated that there is 
growing evidence that social capital, under any of different definitions, can have an impact 
on development outcomes — growth, equity, and poverty alleviation (Ibid). The idea of social 
capital is not new; Trigilia (2001) points out that “earlier references to Weber show how this 
theme was already visible in the early development of economic sociology. …with the move 
to forms of more organized capitalism, the interest in social capital – understood as networks 
of social relations, which facilitate economic exchanges – disappeared or weakened and 
became marginal. …The processes of bureaucratization of the firm and of re-politicization of 
the economy through the growing role of the state and industrial relations began to dominate 
the stage (Trigilia, 2001: 430), however, since the 1970s the concept became one of the 
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most influential and popular "metaphors" in the social science’s research (Boari and Presutti 
2004; Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). 
Social capital, similar to accumulation of other forms of capital, physical and human, 
accelerates growth and improves standards of living. An increasing number of researchers 
have used the concept of social capital to answer questions related to their own specific 
fields of study in line with the idea that social phenomena can influence economic activities 
(Moran and Ghoshal, 1997). These fields of study are ranging from the impact of social 
capital on local development projects (World Bank, 2004), poverty (Moser, 1996), 
employment (Sabatini, 2005), economic prosperity (Rubio, 1997), and peace-building 
(Capmbell, 2008; Schafft, 1998; Varshney, 2000).  
 Most researchers in the field agree that there are three traditions concerning the conceptual 
definitions and measurements of social capital (Adam and Ronvcević, 2003). The first school 
of thought is based on the work of Bourdieu (1986: 284) who defines social capital as "the 
aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and 
recognition". Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of social networks in conceptualizing 
social capital. 
The second school traces its origin to the work of Coleman. In a series of investigations of 
educational attainment in American cities, Coleman was able to show that social capital was 
not limited to the powerful, but could also convey real benefits to poor and marginalized 
communities (Field, 2003). He defines social capital as resources embedded in social 
relations that permit individuals and communities to achieve their desired goals (Coleman, 
1988). He argues that distinct from other forms of capital, "social capital inheres in the 
structure of relations between actors and among actors" (Coleman, 1988: 8). 
The third tradition is associated with the work of Putnam who according to John Field (2003: 
40) "stretched the concept further, seeing it as a resource that functions at societal level". 
Putnam, in his research on citizen engagement in community affairs, Putnam took an 
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institutional approach to the study of social capital, focusing on the performance of public 
policy actors in northern and southern Italy. He defined social capital as "the features of 
social organization such as trust, norms, and networks that improve the efficiency of society 
by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putman, 1993: 167). He concluded that the successful 
institutional performance of the northern region was due to the mutual interrelationship 
between government and civil society. 
The original definitions of social capital have been further elaborated by others. For example, 
Portes (1998:8) defines social capital as "the ability to secure benefits through membership 
in networks and other social structures". For Woolcock and Narayan (2000), social capital 
refers to the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively, while Lin (1999:35) 
defines it "as resources embedded in social structures which are accessed and/or mobilized 
in purposive actions". Trigilia (2001) points out that “social capital can be considered as a set 
of social relations of which a single subject (for instance, an entrepreneur or a worker) or a 
collective subject (either private or public) can make use at any given moment. Through the 
availability of this capital of relations, cognitive resources – such as information or normative 
resources such as trust – allow actors to realize objectives, which would not otherwise be 
realized or which could only be obtained at a much higher cost” (Trigilia, 2001: 430).  The 
World Bank in its motive to fight poverty defines social capital as "the institutions, 
relationships, attitudes, and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to 
economic and social development" (Grootaert & Bastelaer, 2002). 
Despite several attempts to define social capital, its definition has remained elusive (Durlauf 
& Fafchamps, 2004). Lack of a clear definition and the complexity of the concept have left its 
mark on attempts to measure it, with divergent notions of what constitutes social capital 
thereby hampering efforts to adopt specific indicators to appraise it, or compare it between 
countries (MAS, 2007) . As it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure social capital directly 
the use of proxy indicators is necessary. Years of education and years of work experience 
have a long tradition as proxies for human capital and have proven their value in empirical 
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studies. No such acquired consensus yet exists for the study of social capital, and the 
search for the best proxy indicator continues. Furthermore, social capital indicators differ 
both geographically and by sector (World Bank, 2002). The SCI64 in their case studies on 
social capital in different countries around the world found that measures of membership in 
formal associations were found to be a relevant indicator of social capital in Indonesia, 
Kenya, and countries of the Andean region, but not in India and Russia, where informal 
networks are more important, that means that they used different indicators to measure 
social capital: membership in formal association in some case studies, and membership in 
informal networks in others. Here, the selection of the proxy variables, in these case studies, 
was inspired by the specific manifestations of social capital in each study area. 
Review of the literature has, however, shown that there are two approaches upon which 
many empirical studies have been conducted. The first focuses on behavioral variables and 
attitudes including trust, norms, and values, while the second emphasizes measuring the 
position of individuals in networks (Adam and Roncvic, 2003). These two approaches reflect 
unsettled theoretical issues. Given the conceptual and measurement problems of social 
capital, Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2001) draw a distinction between structural and 
cognitive forms: structural refers to the objective and externally observable structures such 
as networks, associations, and institutions, while cognitive consists of subjective and 
intangible elements including attitudes, norms of behavior, shared values, reciprocity, and 
trust (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2001: 3). The two forms of social capital are intertwined. 
The literature suggests a need to consider social norms and trust as a byproduct of 
structural social capital. In Durlauf & Fachamps's (2004) review, the central premise is that 
emerging shared trust, norms, and values arise from informal associations based on social 
networks. They conclude that the study of social capital should start from a network-based 
                                                             
64 The Social Capital Initiative (SCI) was launched in 1996 by the World Bank to assess the impact of 
social capital on the effectiveness of development projects, and to contribute to the development of 
indicators for monitoring social capital and methodologies for measuring its impact. 
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approach where positive externalities might emerge through norms and trust. Putnam (1993) 
argues that the level of associational activity and informal networks are determinants of trust 
and cooperative norms. People in these networks ‘trust’ each other, resulting in high levels 
of civic behavior that will lead to positive outcomes for individuals and society as a whole 
(John, et al,2009).  
Social capital can be analyzed at three levels: micro, meso, and macro. The micro level is 
associated with the work of Putnam (1993) in his study on civic associations in Italy, involves 
observations being made on networks of individuals or households. Coleman (1990) 
expanded the unit of observation by introducing a broader, or “meso” interpretation of social 
capital which included vertical as well as horizontal associations while considering 
relationships between groups, rather than individuals.  
 
At the macro level, the focus is on institutions at a national level and within a political context 
(Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2001). This focus on institutions draws on the work of 
Douglas North (1990) and Mancur Olson (1982), who argued that such institutions have a 
critical effect on the rate and pattern of economic development. This macro view of social 
capital includes, in addition to the largely informal horizontal and hierarchical relationships of 
the micro and meso levels, the political level of formal institutional relationships and 
structures, such as the political regime, the rule of law, the court system, and civil and 
political liberties that shape social structure and enables it to develop. 
There is a strong degree of complementarities between horizontal and hierarchical 
associations and macro institutions, and their coexistence maximizes the impact of social 
capital on economic and social outcomes. For example, macro institutions can provide an 
enabling environment in which local associations can develop and flourish (World Bank, 
2002). The figure below shows the schematic summary of the forms and scope of social 
capital. 
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Figure 8: Forms of Social Capital. Source: Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2002. 
 
The figure provides a conceptual and methodological basis for research and practice in 
social capital.  The best approach for measuring it includes all four quadrants. In practice, 
however, the state of the art has not advanced to that stage (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 
2001: 27).  Consequently, scholars in the field have focused on one or several dimensions of 
social capital that they find relevant to their analytical concerns and research problems 
(Kinyanjui and Khayesi, 2006). Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) argue that it is more feasible 
for empirical analysis to step back from "grandiose approaches" and focus on specific 
components of social capital. 
Most of the empirical research relies on the idea that social capital exists in the social 
networks and that these facilitate expectations and trustworthiness among the 
participants/players in the network (Coleman 1988). Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004:5) 
indicated that the study of social capital is a network-based process that generates beneficial 
outcomes through norms and trust. Similarly, Lin (1999, 35) points out that social capital is 
rooted in social network and social relations and must be measured relative to its roots. The 
World Bank declared through the Social Capital Initiative (SCI) project "Understanding and 
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Measuring Social Capital” that it is possible to measure social capital and its impact, and that 
methodological diversity is both; strength and a challenge of research on social capital. The 
strength of the quantitative studies is that they can determine a confidence interval within 
which the results hold. As they are usually based on representative data sources, they can 
say more about the geographic area or the groups of people for which these results are 
more valid than can qualitative studies. The quantitative studies excel at investigating the in-
depth causal processes that lead to certain outcomes, although they often leave open 
questions about the statistical validity of the results. Of course, this interplay and 
complementarity between quantitative and qualitative methods is not limited to the study of 
social capital. However for the analysis of social capital, the SCI project concluded that it is 
essential to draw on both methods and multidisciplinary approaches to reach valid 
conclusions (World Bank, 2002). 
3.2.1 TYPES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: BONDING VERSUS BRIDGING; STRONG 
VERSUS WEAK TIES AND LINKING SOCIAL CAPITAL. 
         
Social networks of an individual comprise relationships within the family, friendship, work, 
and informal. Social networks influence life chances and outcomes since they connect 
individuals with people not only in their immediate neighborhood, but also beyond the 
neighborhood, through contacts of friends and acquaintances. Social capital research 
advocates the positive role of social networks in economic efficiency, but some researchers 
argue that social networks can have a ‘downside’ (Meagher 2005). Dasgupta (2000), for 
example, indicated that social networks can either facilitate or hinder economic efficiency 
depending on their uses. Meagher (2005) points out that though social networks can provide 
informal support for better economic performance, they can also function as mechanisms of 
"parochialism or conspiracy". Moreover, Collier (2002) argues that social networks are not 
always good, pointing out that … “the control of free riding by clubs and hierarchies can 
produce rent seeking institutions like Mafias" (Collier, 2002: 34). The institutional analysis of 
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mafias has found that, instead of serving as a means of economic efficiency, social networks 
can act as a medium of "corruption and opportunism" (Gambetta 1996; Meagher 2005). In 
fact, the advantages and downsides of social networks depend on the culture and 
socioeconomic environment that facilitates or hinders the development of economically 
efficient networks (Meagher 2005). As Woolcock further explains: 
 
 Where communities or networks are isolated, parochial, or working at cross-
purposes to society's collective interests (in ghettos, gangs, drug cartels, and so 
on), productive social capital is replaced by what Rubio (1997) —in discussing 
Colombia—calls perverse social capital, which greedy hinders development 
(Woolcock, 2000: 229). 
 
Coleman’s (1990) idea that certain territorial contexts represent “a greater emphasis on 
social networks as the basis of social capital rather than on shared culture, trust and 
civicness” (Colmeman, 1990, 300), Robert Putnam (1993) and Francis Fukuyama (1995) 
studies on social capital identify social capital with a cooperative culture rooted in the past 
history of a territory. This according to Trigilia (2001) leads to two kinds of risks: First that the 
culturalist explanation is rather vague with regard to the origins of the phenomenon, and it 
underestimates the role of political factors65. Second, that “the consequences of social 
capital for local development are not always positive; and it is precisely the under evaluation 
of politics, which makes it more difficult to distinguish under which conditions social capital 
can have favorable impact for local development, instead of generating collusion, patronage, 
political dependence or even corruption and criminal economies” (Trigilia, 2001: 434). 
Granovetter (1973) developed the social network theory in his work "Strong and Weak Tie 
Theory", suggesting that strong ties create closed networks whereas weak ties enable 
access to social circles beyond the actors‘ own direct network. Strong ties are linked with 
                                                             
65  See (Tarrow, 1996; Mutti, 1998; Bagnasco, 1999) 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 73 
 
people who interact frequently. Links with infrequent interactions, the ‘weak ties‘, tend to 
bridge individuals across social groups of close interpersonal relationships. He argues that 
new information flows to individuals through ‘weak rather than strong ties, because close 
friends tend to move in the same circles and the information they receive overlaps with what 
they already know’. In social capital literature, strong and weak ties are referred to as 
bonding and bridging social capital (Woolcock, 2001).  Putnam (2000) also highlights the 
importance of distinguishing between bonding and bridging (strong and weak ties). Bonding 
social capital can result in closed social circles and reduce the degree of sociability beyond 
these boundaries. It limits the diffusion of information and the building up of inter-group 
networks, facilitating rent-seeking and self-interested behavior (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 
2004; PRI, 2005; Sabatini, 2005) which can lead to exclusion and sectarianism (Rubio, 
1997). However, bonding social capital plays a positive and crucial role in society. It can be 
the source of precious services - for example emergency cash - and, in poor societies, can 
play an important role helping to cope with poverty (Kozer & Parker, 1998). Some families in 
poor countries have a share budget for meals; they buy food in large quantity (wholesale) 
then divided between them to save some cash for example. On the other hand, bridging 
social capital has a number of positive externalities: it reduces the cost of information 
transmission and information asymmetries, it builds trust and civic engagement, and it 
facilitates collective action (MAS, 2007). Woolcock (1998) and Narayan (1999) suggest that 
a positive correlation exists between efficient state functioning and high levels of bridging 
social capital, while the sociological literature emphasizes the positive effects that bridging 
social capital can have on conflict resolution (Schafft, 1998; Varshney, 2000) and on the 
development of trust and cooperative behavior in society (Stolle, 1998). 
The network view argues that communities can be characterized by their endowments of 
these two dimensions of social capital, and that different combinations of these dimensions 
account for the range of outcomes associated with social capital (Woolcock, 2000), 
Granovetter (1995) argues that economic development takes place through a mechanism 
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that allows individuals to draw initially on the benefits of close community membership. 
However this also enables them to acquire the skills and resources to participate in networks 
that transcend their community, thereby progressively joining the economic mainstream. 
Following Granovetter, Burt (1992) extended and reformulated the ‘weak ties‘ argument by 
claiming that what is important is not the quality of the ties but rather the way different parts 
of the networks are ‘bridged‘. 
The social resource theory of Lin (1982), taking a hierarchical view of social structure, 
argues that the success of an action in a network depends on two issues. These are the 
presence of a high social position contact in a network, which enables access to crucial and 
good quality resources and the status diversity of a network, which increases the likelihood 
of accessing appropriate resources. This is related to the third type of social capital, i.e. 
linking social capital, which describes ties that connect individuals to people or groups in 
positions of high status. This means that linking social capital enables groups’ access to 
leverage resources and ideas and information from formal institutions, beyond the 
community (Woolcock, 2001).    
An examination of the above three theories shows that each theoretical stance is not 
complete by itself and efficient structure of a network depends on the activities and 
challenges that an individual is facing (Klyver and Schøtt, 2011). 
3.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL WITHIN THE PALESTINIANCONTEXT 
 
  Overview         
 
It is widely understood that Arab culture is collective rather than individual-based (Naqib, 
2006), meaning that, at its center it is a family-based society and not one based on the 
individual. Thus family ties are stronger than community ties. This view of the Arab culture is 
even clearer in the Palestinian society because of the dismemberment of the community in 
both the 1948 and 1967 wars (Hilal, 2011).  In the Palestinian Occupied Territories, close 
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family ties play a crucial role in coping with political turbulence, the Israeli occupation, and 
the socioeconomic situation of the nation. Since the second Intifada, Palestinian livelihoods 
have deteriorated, yet Palestinian social resilience66 remains strong. The World Bank (2003) 
concurs, stating: 
 
“What is quite remarkable is the continued cohesion of Palestinian society. Despite violence, 
economic hardship, and the daily frustrations of living under curfew and closure, lending and 
sharing are widespread and families for the most part remain functional. Palestinian society is 
absorbing levels of unemployment that could well have fractured the social contract in 
industrial societies” (The World Bank, 2003: 33). 
 
This testimony by the World Bank gives a clear general look of the Palestinian social 
coherence in times of crises. Specific studies on social capital in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories were carried out; the following are the most important:    
1-  The First Study of Social Capital in Palestine 
 
Although the concept of social capital is not new as explained earlier and it became famous 
in the West in the 1970s, in the Arab world it was Naqib (2006) who was the first to posit the 
importance of informal social networks among Palestinians generated by a common 
resistance, introducing the idea of social capital as a substitute for market and state failure. 
The study sets out to articulate such a definition that satisfies two criteria. The first is to 
define social capital within the context of economic growth. The second criterion is to 
produce an operational definition capable of measuring the level of social capital of a country 
at a given time, and of changes in it over time. Guided by these two criteria, the study used 
                                                             
66 Social Resilience is measured by the time it takes for a community (or organization) to rebound from a 
natural (or man-made) hazard. The longer it takes a community or organization to “bounce forward after 
a natural or man-made hazard, the greater the risk of damage to the social fabric that holds a community 
or organization together. Similar to the notion of “broken families”, the effect of psychological or 
relationship dysfunction reaches beyond the economic impact of that lack of functioning (Sapirstein, 
2007). 
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the definition: Social capital is created by the externality effects of informal social networks. It 
creates public goods that complement those produced by the market or the state, or 
compensate for market or state failures. 
The study “distinguishes between social capital and social infrastructure. The latter is 
concerned with the impact of the public sector on economic growth. It is defined by Romer 
(2001) as ‘the institutions and policies that encourage investment over consumption and 
productive activities over rent-seeking activities.’” (Naqib, 206:1). Naqib points out that “there 
are various kinds of groups that produce social capital (bonding groups and bridging groups, 
or horizontal and vertical groups) but all of them transfer social capital through three 
channels. The first is the information channel, through which information is passed between 
members of the group regarding employment, trade, and investment opportunities. The 
second is related to the formation of group identity. This identity encourages individuals to 
substitute group preferences for individual ones, leading to an optimal behavior. The third is 
concerned with one of the most important aspects of market failure, which is coordination 
failure. Synchronization among the members of the group compensates for a lack of 
coordination in the market” (Naqib, 2006: 1). 
The methodology of the study was the survey. The survey questions were designed in order 
to capture three features of group interaction: inputs, expectations and outputs. The first is 
concerned with the characteristics of the group, the second with “the expectations of 
members, in terms of what they hope to accomplish in relation to compensation for state or 
market failure. It is also concerned with the expectation of individual members of the group 
towards the other members, regarding trust and solidarity. The third is concerned with the 
achievements of the group and the feelings of its members about them.  A weighted average 
of these three indicators was used as a proxy indicator of social capital” (Naqib, 2006, 2).  
The study concluded that there was a decline in the infrastructure of social institution as a 
result of the Israeli continuous weakening of Palestinian public institutions67by Israeli political 
                                                             
67   Such as the closure of the Palestinian cultural institution "Biet Al Sharq" in Jerusalem by Israel in 2001 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 77 
 
and military measures. In parallel, there was an increase in social capital as a result of the 
boost in solidarity among Palestinian citizens themselves created by their common 
resistance (Naqib, 2006). The study recommended the construction of a suitable measure of 
social capital in Palestine. 
2- The Second Study of Social Capital in Palestine 
        
In 2007, the study "Measuring Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories" by Nasr & Hilal 
was carried out under the umbrella of The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute 
(MAS) with the cooperation of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). This was 
in order to design an index that reflects the multi-faceted nature of social capital in the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories (MAS, 2007). “This study adopted the definition of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which views social 
capital as a multi-dimensional concept, reflecting social networks and the shared norms, 
values, and understandings that facilitate cooperation within or between various groups” 
(Nasr & Hilal, 2007:1). This study was the first to measure social capital not only in Palestine 
but also in the Arab World as a whole (MAS, 2009). The study covers the three Palestinians 
regions: The West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. “Based on OECD definition, 
but tailored to the specific Palestinian context, 26 survey questions were designed to inquire 
into four principal dimensions of social capital: political, civic, and professional participation; 
informal networks and social engagement; trust in institutions and other individuals; and 
shared values and norms. The questionnaire also elicited personal and demographic 
information. It was administered to a representative sample of 2,500 Palestinian households 
in June and July 2007” (Nasr & Hilal, 2007: 2). On the basis of the responses to the survey 
questions, the study established a framework that allows the various dimensions of social 
interaction and engagement in the Palestinian Territories to be measured (MAS, 2007). The 
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ensuing statistical analysis produced a number of interesting results (Ibid); here I will display 
some of these results68 of as follows: 
 “The overall Social Capital Index in the Gaza Strip was higher than the remaining 
West Bank69, while the latter was higher than that of Jerusalem.  … The highest level 
of confidence in political institutions was found in the West Bank, followed by East 
Jerusalem and then Gaza. Results were similar for participation in informal social 
networks and activities” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:1). 
 “Gazans were found to have the greatest trust in local and international organizations 
and also the strongest adherence to behavioral and social norms, followed in both 
cases by West Bankers and East Jerusalemites. Meanwhile, Jerusalem scored the 
highest in terms of social, civic and political participation, with Gaza and the West 
Bank following” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:2). 
 “People in rural areas had the most trust in political institutions but the least when it 
comes to local and international organizations. This situation was reversed in refugee 
camps70. In terms of social, civic, and political participation, camps lag behind urban 
and rural areas. Urban areas scored highest in the dimension of social norms and 
attitudes, followed by camp dwellers and people in rural areas. However, there was 
no significant discrepancy between the various population types in terms of 
behavioral values, and when it came to the overall Social Capital Index; differences 
between the residences of various areas vanish” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:3). 
 “Regarding gender differences, the survey revealed that men scored higher than 
women on the overall Social Capital Index” (Naser&Hilal, 2007:3). 
  Regarding age, the elderly had the most trust in political institutions, while the young 
had the highest level of confidence in local and international organizations. “The level 
                                                             
68 These notes were chosen from Nasr & Hilal study of   2007, page 2 to 4. 
69 The authors excluded East Jerusalem because it was part of the West Bank before the 1967 war. 
70 Refugee camps are usually considered to be urban areas. 
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of political, social, and civic participation declines with age, while involvement in 
informal social networks had the opposite effect” (Ibid). “Education level was 
inversely correlated with trust in political institutions” (Ibid). “The overall level of social 
capital tended to increase until the level of the medium diploma was reached and 
then started to decrease, reaching its lowest point with holders of Master‘s degrees 
and above” (Naser&Hilal, 2007: 3). 
 
In addition to the statistical analysis, the study derived various conclusions from other 
individual aspects of the survey. Here are the most important71: 
 
 “The presence of strong political networks with widespread membership contrasted 
with the much weaker networks related to civil society, such as trade unions and 
community organizations. Likewise, the study revealed the importance of religious 
ties compared to membership of charitable or other associations” (Naser & Hilal, 
2007:4). 
 “There are discrepancies within the West Bank in the way that social capital is 
manifested through membership of different types of networks. The more affluent and 
better-connected central of the region has more active membership in community 
and social organizations, as well as in sports clubs, youth associations, internet 
networks and trade unions. Likewise, politically-active people were more 
concentrated in this region, probably due to the presence of the main governmental 
and political institutions in the Ramallah / Al-Bireh area. However, engagement with 
religious organizations was lowest in the center, while the southern governorates 
took the lead in this respect” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:4).  
 “High levels of involvement in political rallies and demonstrations throughout the year 
that preceded the survey reflected the level of politicization of Palestinian society. 
                                                             
71 These notes were chosen from Nasr & Hilal study of 2007, page 4 to 8. 
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Rural areas participated more than towns and refugee camps, which reflects the fact 
that they are worst affected by the erection of the Wall, ongoing settlement activities, 
and land confiscation” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:5). 
 “The frequency of social communication through visits, phone, and email contacts 
with relatives in the Occupied Palestinian Territories was quite high, greatest of all in 
rural areas and among people under the age of nineteen.  25 percent of West 
Bankers invited their friends to visit at least once a week, and although the pattern is 
more prevalent in the center than the north or south, in Jerusalem the figure is less 
than 20 percent” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:5).  
 “Three-quarters of the participants, in the sample mentioned, had between one and 
five intimate friends, whilst only a third of these, a quarter overall, had only one or 
two. It is striking that more than half of the rural participants said they had either no 
friends or just one or two, as did 45 percent of camp-dwellers and 40 percent of 
urbanites. This relative lack of close friends indicated, instead, the importance of 
kinship and neighborly ties, collegiality and, inherited affiliations” (Naser & Hilal, 
2007:6). 
 “More than three-quarters of the sample in the West Bank and a higher proportion in 
Jerusalem stated that one should not trust other people in general. Trust in religious 
leaders, politicians, and work colleagues falls as the education level of respondents 
rises” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:7).  
 “The survey revealed low levels of trust in the Hamas/Fatah national unity 
government in power during the period when the study was conducted.  … The lack 
of trust extended to other bodies and political factions; local councils, popular camp 
committees, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the Palestinian Authority (PA), 
the Presidency, the judicial system and the police, NGOs, donor countries and 
international organizations. …The only categories which were generally well trusted 
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overall were religious and educational institutions and the local press and TV.” 
(Naser & Hilal, 2007:7).   
  12.5 percent Jerusalemites, 20 percent West Bankers and 33 percent Gazans said 
that they had thought about emigrating during the previous year (” (Naser & Hilal, 
2007).  
 
 
3- The Third Study: “Bonding Versus Bridging” Study of Social Capital in Palestine 
 
 
The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) (2009) points out that “in light of 
the prospect of building an independent state, social capital in Palestinian society could be 
exploited in order to empower state building, civic cooperation, and economic prosperity” 
(MAS, 2009: 3). Therefore, MAS contributed by publishing Cavatorta, et al (2009) study 
“Bonding Versus Bridging” in the "Studies on Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories" 
series. This study was built on Nasr & Hilal‘s study of 2007 and explores how social capital 
relates to the Palestinian Territories and pinpoints the main forms in which it demonstrates 
(MAS, 2009). Bonding social capital relates to ‘strong ties’ between people who share similar 
characteristics; such as family ties and small circles of close friends with similar experiences. 
On the other hand bridging reflects ‘weaker ties‘; that is the connection between individuals 
from different backgrounds who have different experiences and different sources of 
information, concluding in looser and more diverse networks (Ibid). The Figure below 
presents the Bridging vs. Bonding connections in which Andriani (2011) demonstrates “the 
connections between two members belonging to the same circle (e.g. C-B or L-P or T-S) 
represent bonding connections (or strong ties) while connections between two or more 
different circles (e.g. R-B R-H or M-S or A-N) represent bridges (or weak ties)” (Andriani, 
2011: 4). 
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 Figure 9: Bridging Versus Bonding. Source: Andriani (2011)  
 
The goal of the “Bridging Versus Bonding” study was to formulate a synthetic indicator for 
bonding and bridging social capital to test its effects on building and strengthening trust and 
civic-behavior, which are two central elements in the formation and governance of a 
sustainable society (Cavatorta, et al, 2009). One criticism of Nasr & Hilal‘s measure of social 
capital was that it remained insensitive to the important distinction between bonding and 
bridging as was used by the OECD‘s (2001) broad definition of social capital. This includes 
trust, norms, values, attitudes, and networks. In this case, many variables were used as a 
proxy for social capital, so although this approach is comprehensive, it limits preciseness 
and risks the danger of becoming ‘everything to everyone’ (PRI, 2005). Building on this 
important distinction between bonding and bridging social capital, the study proposes 17 
composite indicators of social capital based on the 26 questions of Nasr & Hilal‘s study 
(2007). They aggregate questions whenever needed, such as when they ask, ‘Are you a 
member of any sport club?’ and ‘Are you a member of any cultural institution?’ Both of which 
are variables. The “Bridging Versus Bonding” study combines these two questions into a 
single ‘associational activity variable because their interest was the attitude of people. 
Hence, the type of association is irrelevant (Cavatorta, et al, 2009). 
 According to the study, the new composite indicators reflect different manifestations of 
social capital including indicators of associational activity, frequency of connections with 
family and friends, trust, volunteering attitudes, and political engagement. These 17 
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indicators were the input variables in the empirical analysis (Ibid). Annex 1 describes these 
indicators. In addition, the principal component analysis (PCA) was used to detect ‘latent’ 
relationships among a set of variables and its distinct underlying dimensions between these 
variables. “The PCA provides a method to differentiate the indicators across the various 
dimensions. It also provides a weighting scheme which reflects the extent to which each 
indicator contributes to each dimension. Technically, the PCA seeks linear combinations of 
the original variables which helps explain their variance. That is, most of the information 
contained in the original variables can be maintained in a fewer number of factors” 
(Cavatorta, et al, 2009: 13). The study pointed out that the first factor is related to ‘strong 
ties’, which is formed by relatives and friends. The variables, ‘family visits’, ‘family calls’, 
‘friend visits’, ‘friend calls’, and ‘friend invite’, depend on this first factor. Therefore, it was 
identified as ‘bonding social capital’. The second factor indicates weak networks, which 
includes indicators that relates to associational activity such as ‘political commitment’, 
‘discussion meetings’, and ‘donations-volunteering’ behaviors. These associational activities 
are related to networking between acquaintances that share common goals and voluntarily 
engage in the network. It represents different kind of involvement and commitment with 
respect to the relationships within the family and friends. Therefore, this dimension was used 
as an indicator of ‘bridging social capital‘. By comparing the two dimensions, the general 
conclusion was that the bonding social capital is stronger than bridging social capital in the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories (Cavatorta, et al, 2009). 
The study also, noted that there were a number of limitations in the approach used; the 
survey questions could not elicit the quality of the networks and hence the study could not 
assume any degree of satisfaction from those connections. Also, they did not indicate any 
information about the time that each respondent had spent in the community (ibid). The 
study concluded that the bonding social capital is higher in the north and south of the West 
Bank and lower in the center. This is explained by the authors that this “may be due to the 
fact that the north is largely rural, where livelihoods depend on the proceeds of family 
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farming. Thus, family networks are closer than in the center, where trade and third sector 
activities dominate. In the south, Bedouin traditions are relatively strong with large families 
and hence high levels of ‘bonding social capital’ exist” (Cavatorta, et al, 2009: 18). “Also, in 
the north and the south, the construction of the Wall has prevented access to fields which 
are now cut off, behind the Wall in the neighboring Israeli areas. These are also the areas 
where most land has been confiscated for illegal settlements and where disputes occur more 
regularly in regards to harvesting crops, access to water and deliberate contamination of 
land. Consequently, the family has become a strategy for protection, and therefore solidarity 
between the extended family has increased” (Ibid). 
Another reason for these differences between the north and the south of the West Bank and 
the Center (the city of Ramallah) could also be related to the pattern of internal migration. 
Ramallah attracts students and labor force from all over the West Bank, this creates kind of 
‘weak ties’ among those new comers, as they move away from their own families (Cavatorta, 
et al, 2009). 
In General, the conclusion was that bonding social capital is stronger than bridging social 
capital in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and that building a civic and viable 
society/country requires efforts to strengthen the bridging social capital. Moreover, 
Palestinian Territories suffers from a deceptive deficit in both civic behavior and community 
trust (ibid). Consequentially, policies should enhance the emergence of social capital in its 
bridging nature, ensuring the emergence of a fruitful synergy between the efforts to found a 
state and a greater bridging of social capital (Ibid). “Bridging social capital can enable 
citizens to develop forms of collaboration and partnerships between community and formal 
institutions. This may help to create a new form of social contract needed to support the 
construction of a Palestinian State after decades of occupation. The presence of a strong 
sense of family can empower the development of the bridging social capital” (Cavatorta, et 
al, 2009: 25). 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 85 
 
4- The Corruption Study 
 
In 2011, The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) published the study of 
“Social Capital and Corruption Puzzle: Evidence from a Palestinian Survey”, by Luca 
Andriani. The aim of the study was to critically analyze the relationship between social 
capital components and corruption in the Palestinian Territories. The study relies on the 
survey of 2007 by Nasr & Hilal, as well as surveys on the perception of corruption carried out 
by other independent Palestinian institutions. The study arrives at insightful and important 
conclusions which shed light on the roles and problems inherent to social capital and 
corruption in the Palestinian context. The following sections summarize these conclusions 
with the focus on the types of corruption in the Palestinian Territories and the reasons 
behind it. 
 
Types of Corruption in the Palestinian Territories:  
 
Andriani (2011) refers to “the poll conducted by AMAN72 (2009), “Wasta73, nepotism and 
favoritism represent the most prevalent forms of corruption in Palestinian society. 63% of 
respondents believe that these three mechanisms are the most common forms of corruption 
in the public sector” (Andriani, 2011: 14) (Figure 10). The poll also highlights that the peoples 
are still using these mechanisms to obtain personal gain in that Palestinians have 
confidence in the reliability of accessing public services through Wasta (Andriani, 2011).  
                                                             
72 The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity AMAN was established in the year 2000 upon an 
initiative by a number of Palestinian civil society organizations working in the fields of democracy, human 
rights, and good governance as a movement aims to combat corruption and enhance the values of 
integrity and principles of transparency and systems of accountability in the Palestinian society. 
73 Wasta refers to the use of personal connections or influence in order to obtain things, such as, getting 
hired or promoted in a job, passport renewal, the waiving of traffic fines. 
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      Figure 10: The distributions of forms of corruption in the public sector in 2009. Source: AMAN (2009)  
 
Andriani (2011) explains that Wasta is an indication of the darker side of the system of 
connections. “In these circumstances the aphorism “it is important who you know” receives a 
negative connotation. Like any other forms of corruption, Wasta bases its strength on 
personal relationships” (Andriani (2011: 13). 
  
Regulatory Capacity explains corruption: 
 
Andriani (2011) refers to the same ‘poll conducted by AMAN (2009)’, to highlight the two 
main reasons for corruption stems from two factors; first the Israeli occupation (32.8%), 
second is the absence of law and accountability (20.9%). Andriani (2011) have constructed 
an indicator of “regulatory capacity” based on the absence of the rule of law, the insufficient 
punitive legislation and the insufficient monitoring institutions. Figure 11 shows the 
distribution of this indicator between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
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Figure 11: The distribution of ‘regulatory capacity’ indicator between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
 
The study pointed out that the main problem in the Palestinian “regulatory capacity” is the 
lack of clear and transparent institutional and legal framework to be able to combat 
corruption (AMAN, 2009). This inefficient “regulatory capacity” lead to “aggravated state of 
frustration among citizens… leading them to mistrust the PNA’s willingness to hold the 
corrupt accountable for their misdeeds or crimes” (AMAN 2009, p. 42). The AMAN report 
underlines that this lack of transparency is not a product of Palestinian culture; rather it is 
driven from the unfortunate geopolitical circumstances that have historically affected the 
institutional and legal framework in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In addition to the 
Occupation since 1967, the first Palestinian government in 1994 was established without a 
legislative authority as its governance mechanisms were inherited from the revolutionary 
resistance movement of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) where transparency 
and public administration were not priorities (Andriani, 2011).  According to Jamal (2007): 
 
“After 1994, the PNA was in charge of a social-political context where the rule of law 
needed to be implemented and “the judiciary and the executive branches of 
government were still highly integrated while a clear, coherent and accessible system 
of arbitration remained in its nascent stages” (Jamal, 2007: p. 23-24). 
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The hierarchic system consolidated during Arafat’s time in the office favored a system of 
vertical linkages between associations and the PNA had its roots. These associations 
needed to be recognized by the PNA in order to work. Therefore, Jamal (2007) argues that 
“this condition is likely to favor nepotisms and ‘clientelism’ between some associational 
leaders and public officers. In other words, the associations supporting the PNA receive 
better access to local resources, more security, prestige and legitimacy compared to non- 
supporting associations – no matter what” (Jamal, 2007: p. 21). This ‘clientelism’ or as it’s 
called the patron-client74 relationship had its roots in the Middle East history. Abou-el-Haj 
(1982) points out that during the Ottoman rule, which lasted nearly four centuries, the land, 
natural and commercial resources were exposed to exploitation by forms of fiscal 
administration both direct and semi-direct "feudal" arrangements. Abou-el-Haj (1982) 
declares that “the main beneficiaries of the Ottoman sovereignty were the administrators of 
the fiscal systems and their local allies, ranging from merchants to the clergy (Muslim ulama 
among others)” (Abou-el-Haj, 1982: 185).  
Although the presidential elections of 2005 and legislative elections of 2006 took place under 
the supervision of a neutral and impartial electoral commission, “AMAN concludes that 
transparency and integrity within the Palestinian democratic process are still at a very low 
stage. In fact, in 2007 the conflict between parties caused a geographic, political and 
institutional division between the “block” running Gaza and that one running the West Bank” 
(Andriani, 2011: 14).The political division between Gaza and the West Bank has led to the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) being suspended. “This “political dis-aggregation” has 
(and still does) favored the existence of Wasta, nepotism and quotas in the recruitment 
process of public officials…  the lack of “regulatory capacity” has been affecting different 
areas and institutional bodies, principally due to the lack of judicial independence and 
ineffective legal enforcement contribute to the sustainability of this uncertain situation”(Ibid). 
                                                             
74 Malla (2001) points out that numbers of people have described the patron-client relationships arising 
from unequal class, caste, and status of people. 
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5- Other Studies on Social Capital in Palestine 
 
The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) continued its contribution to the 
field and its importance in economic, social, and political development. Many other studies 
have been published on social capital from different perspectives such as food security, and 
schooling. It is worth mentioning that all of these studies covered the entire Palestinian 
Occupied Territories: the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Although they 
discovered that social capital is not homogenous in the three regions, they could only 
partially account for the differences. In the third study, for example, there were differences in 
the types of social capital within the West Bank but the study did not explain why. They also 
pointed out that bonding is stronger than bridging social capital and they explain the reasons 
by the peculiar context of the Palestinian society. These conclusions raise some important 
questions, such as what are the characteristics of Palestinian society that makes its context 
peculiar so that a certain type of social capital is dominant? This research tackles elements 
such as the social forces that influence the formation of social capital and determine its 
types. Thus it examines the role of social capital in shaping the Palestinians social resilience 
especially in front of the Israeli policies that aim to undermine the coherence of the 
Palestinian society, in addition to the highlight of barriers to collective action. 
3.4 CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
        
The notion of social capital became entangled with that of civil society.  Edwards & Foley 
(1998) concluded that both civic society and social capital have proven useful heuristics for 
drawing attention to neglected relationships and aspects of social reality. Minkoff (1997) 
argued that “civil society organization plays a critical role in civil society and the production of 
social capital by providing an infrastructure for collective action”. Bridging social capital, in 
particular, builds trust and civic engagement, and facilitates collective action (MAS, 2007). 
Fox (1996) points out that “Social capital can also be coproduced by state and local societal 
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actors or by the interaction of local societal actors and external actors in civil society” (Fox, 
1996: 1089). 
The concept of Civil Society has been in vogue since the 18th and 19th centuries, but the 
1980s witnessed a revival of interest in it, in particular after the fall of Communism in Eastern 
Europe. According to the London School of Economics, civil society “refers to the arena of 
un coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its 
institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, 
the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and 
negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional 
forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often 
populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental 
organizations, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-based organizations, 
professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business 
associations, coalitions and advocacy groups”75.  
Kaldor (2003) argued that Civil Society concept is a modern concept but at the same time 
like all great political ideas, it can be traced back to Aristotle, but there was no clear 
difference between civil society and the state in the minds of early modern thinkers. Civil 
society was seen as a social contract; a society governed by laws, based on the principle of 
equality before the law. Kaldor (2003: 584) explained the notion of civil society as “a social 
contract agreed among the individual members of society. It was not until the nineteenth 
century that civil society became understood as something distinct from the state”. She 
points out that “it was Hegel76 who defined civil society as the intermediate realm between 
the family and the state, where the individual becomes a public person and, through 
membership in various institutions, is able to reconcile the particular and the universal. For 
                                                             
75 See http://www2.lse.ac.uk/LSECities/citiesProgramme/pdf/bankside123/16GlossaryAW20pgs.pdf 
76 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 –1831) was a German philosopher, and a major figure in German 
Idealism. 
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Hegel, civil society was “the achievement of the modern world, the territory of mediation 
where there is free play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and 
fortune and where waves of passion gust forth, regulated only by reason glinting through 
them”. Thus Hegel's definition of civil society included the economy and was to be taken up 
by Marx and Engels, who saw civil society as the 'theatre of history'” (Kaldor, 2003: 548). 
Kaldor, herself, defines civil society as: the process through which consent is generated, the 
arena where the individual negotiates, struggles against, or debates with the centers of 
political and economic authority. Through voluntary associations, movements, parties, 
unions, the individual is able to act publicly. On the Other hand, Foley & Edwards (1996) in 
their article “The Paradox of Civil Society” argue that “if we exclude the market, should we 
nevertheless include economic associations--trade groups, professional organizations, labor 
unions, and the like? What about political organizations? Does it make sense, following 
Antonio Gramsci, to distinguish "civil" from "political" society? If so, how are we to distinguish 
between political associations per se and the political activities of groups in civil society, from 
interest groups to religious bodies, which are intermittently mobilized in pursuit of political 
goals?” Foley & Edwards, 1996: 38). Yom (2005) on the other hand, tackles the question of 
the civil society in the Arab world, and argue that while the civil society theory assumes that 
the collective force of the associational sector can challenge authoritarian governments in 
order to enforce the political reform towards democratization. The Arab states, since the 
1980s, have set a strategy of liberalization-repression to control civic activism (Yom, 2005). 
As a result, the Arab civil society has signed not the retreat of autocratic regimes, but rather 
“their stubborn instinct for survival--despite suffering gaping deficits of economic resources 
and political legitimacy (Yom, 2005:14).  
 
These and other questions will rise in the next discussion of the civil Society in the 
Palestinian context.  
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3.4.1 CIVIL SOCIETY WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN CONTEXT 
Overview         
 
The formation of the Palestinian civil society is unique to its context, and its relationships to 
the state and market are formed through its historical and political environment (Weisman, 
2012). The previous review of the “Civil Society” concept revealed that civil society has been 
always related to or work independently from the “State”. Therefore, Hilal (2009) argues that 
“civil society organizations are usually defined in contrast to state or quasi-state institutions. 
And this explains, in the Palestinian case, why “the notion of civil society did not appear 
before the Oslo Accords which heralded the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA)” 
(Hilal, 2009: 3).   It is true that there was no Palestinian state before Oslo, and many would 
argue that the contemporary Palestinian Authority is not yet a ‘State; and while many 
researchers declared that most Palestinian civil society organizations “emerged and 
developed in the absence of the state, in the absence of national independence and in the 
absence of sovereignty over land and citizenship”77 (Costantini, et al. 2011: 7). Here arise 
the question is there a Palestinian civil society in the absence of a Palestinian state? Salem 
(2012) demonstrated the debate and presented the next three approaches to answer the 
question: First, the Palestinian civil society cannot exist before the formation of an 
independent state; this approach was adopted by the radical left and other independent 
thinkers (Salem, 2012). Musa Al Budeiri78 (1995), for example argued that the Israeli 
occupation and the social fragmentation of the Palestinians both prevented from forming a 
Palestinian civil society. While Adel Samara (2001) pointed out that in the process of 
developing the Palestinian civil society, the Non-Governmental organization “NGO-ization” 
have had adopted Western agendas which distracted the Palestinians’ attention from the 
                                                             
77 See “Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in the occupied Palestinian territory”  
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/projects/overview/index_en.htm 
78 The article “Challenges of the Transitional Period of the Palestinian society’ was published in Arabic in 
the Jerusalem Center for Media and Communication.  (1995) Jerusalem  
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task of liberation towards societal, communal and professional agendas within the 
framework of the occupation.  Salem (2012) pointed out that other thinkers even doubted the 
presence of Palestinian civil society because the society structured upon patrimonial, 
familial, clannish, tribal, which exist in a contradictory geographical cleavages and it was not 
able “to create a civil society based on the bond of citizenship, disregarding cliental affinities. 
They argued that a society first needs a level of civility as a prerequisite for the 
establishment of civil society” (Salem, 2012: 18).  
 
The Second approach, which is in contrast of the first one according to Salem (2012); 
Palestinian civil society exists. Salem presented Ziad Abu Amre (1995) argument that 
Palestinian civil society does exist in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in 1967; that is the 
West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. “Palestinian civil society has thus been 
defined as the bearer of the burdens of the Palestinian state in its absence, providing health, 
agricultural and educational services, among others” (Salem, 2012: 18). Dr. Mustafa 
Bargouthi (1995), who is leader of one of the NGOs in Palestine, considered that “the 
existences of democracy basis, pluralism, and the role of the civil society organizations, are 
not just a luxury or accessories that the Palestinian people can live without in the coming 
period, but it is a vital condition for the Palestinian people’s survival and continuation as a 
people that are eager to achieve their self-determination and national independence” 
(Bargouthi 1995:15). This point of view was based upon the fact that the NGOs were the 
resources by which the absent PLO “The Palestinian National Entity” could reach its people 
in the Occupied Territories. Therefore, the services were not only social but also political; 
they created trust between the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and their leadership 
abroad (Salem, 2012). Fuqaha (2012) confirms this opinion and argues that the definition of 
the World Bank is applicable within the Occupied Palestinian Territories in all aspects 
despite the absence of a Palestinian “State”, as it includes charitable organizations and 
nonprofit companies. Under these two categories fall wide groups of research and cultural 
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centers and social, agricultural, unionist organizations, in addition to youth clubs, women’s 
organizations and empowering organizations or those encouraging political participation. 
Sadiq (2012) also highlights that civil society “centers around the historic and philosophical 
context of civil society’s work, specifically in Palestine, where its institutions appeared before 
those of the government sector, because it acted for many years as a foundation for the 
national struggle, providing basic and important services as part of the Palestinian resistance 
and steadfastness” (Sadiq, 2012: 42). 
 
The third approach according to Salem (2012) is that the Palestinian civil society is in 
transition. This approach defines civil society as being “in transition” because both; the old 
domestic and the new civil organizations in reality do exist, and that there is a transition from 
one form to the other (Salem, 2012). The other explanation to the term “ in transition” has to 
deal with the transition from being occupied towards independence, in Salem (2012) words it 
is “the transformation of civil society from being in formation to being complete in the 
presence of a Palestinian state” (Salem, 2012: 19). 
1-  Historical Review: The Formation of the Palestinian Civil Society:  
        
The Palestinian civil society organizations started to develop in the early years of the 
twentieth century.  In 1907, the issued “Law of Associations” of the Ottoman Empire had 
guaranteed the right of association, but in a limited manner, in order to keep control on the 
formation of nationalist associations within its Arab provinces including Palestine. The 
groups first had to report to the Ottoman authorities concerning their intentions before 
receiving licensing (Sullivan, 1996). After the First World War and the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire, Palestine became under the British Mandate, since then “a vibrant civil 
society emerged in Palestine consisting of religious groups, clubs, labor unions, and 
women’s societies” (ARIJ, 2012:1)79.  During this period (1917-1948), the new law on private 
                                                             
79 See http://www.arij.org/publications/books-atlases/82-2012/250-social-capital.html 
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and non-profit making companies of 1922, laid 'the groundwork for the formation of many 
new organizations that were willing to escape' the control of the Ottoman law (Challand, 
2009:60).  Sullivan (1996) argue that the vast growth of these civil organizations probably 
have grown in parallel, or in response, to the growing Jewish Zionist movement (Sullivan 
1996). Because of the political expectations of the British Mandate coming to its end, both 
the Jews and Palestinians began preparing institutions, which would replace those of the 
colonial powers (Ibid). At that time the Palestinians were subject to British colonial rule and 
to a Settler-Colonialism that intended to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. This objective 
was recognized in 1948, upon which Palestinians were distributed comparatively in what 
was left of Palestine (i.e., West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the surrounding Arab states 
(Hilal, 2009). Therefore, and by “the creation of the State of Israel and the displacement of 
over 750,000 Palestinians, social networks became strained and began to break down” 
(ARIJ, 2012:1). 
As a result of the 1948, the West Bank came under the Jordanian rule and the Gaza Strip 
came under the Egyptian rule. During these years (1948-1967), civil actions in these two 
areas went separately but Gaza tended to be more independent than in the West Bank 
(Hilal, 2009).  The Parties that worked openly in Gaza worked secretly in the West Bank 
such as the Palestinian Communist Party, branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab 
Nationalist Ba’ath Party (Salem, 2012). “The only NGOs allowed to work in the West Bank 
were non-political charities, who established a federation in 1958 but had to follow Jordanian 
law, obtaining permits for every activity they undertook” (Salem, 2012: 20). 
In Diasporas (al-shatat) 80for example, the Palestinian civil society organizations, according 
to Hilal (2009), exist in two models; the first consists of political parties and mass 
organizations such as women, youth and workers and many professional unions to connect 
the scattered Palestinian communities. The second is the networking charities and human 
                                                             
80 Diasporas or (al-shatat) in Arabic was mainly in the neighboring countries such as Jordan , Lebanon and 
Syria in addition to other Arab countries an worldwide.  
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rights organizations that are devoted to defend civil rights of Palestinians and provide relief 
for those in need (Hilal, 2009). While civil society organizations continued to function post 
1948, the focus became more towards political and resistance movements (ARIJ, 2012).  
From 1964 on, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led the civil society focusing 
on, voluntary work throw youth organizations. In the 1970s and the ’80s, health and 
education NGOs were presented (Salem, 2012). 
After the occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the Palestinian Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) developed as an alternative to the Israeli occupation and tried to build 
a parallel infrastructure (AbuZayyad, 2012), enabling Palestinian self-determination with very 
significant political ties with the PLO (Pundak & Khoury, 2012). This last till the first Intifada 
in 1987 in which a new period emerged; a new political agenda for the OPT with new 
priorities such as defending human rights against the violations committed by the long, 
continuing Israeli occupation. Many traditional NGOs related to the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) started to lose ground in the field in front of the new grassroots 
organizations that emerged during the first Intifada, such as the ‘popular committees’ that 
constituted the main participants in the first Intifada81. This includes the Islamic charitable 
organizations that began to adopt a new role and understanding to “political participation”. 
This new role led to the emergence of Hamas as an active participant in the First Intifada 
(Costantini, et al., 2011). Following the Madrid peace conference82 in 1991, a considerable 
amount of funding was received from western donors with significant distributions to 
democracy promotion and civil society development (Brouwer, 2000; Carothers & Ottaway, 
2005; Challand, 2009; Hanafi & Tabar, 2005; Le More, 2008) in Palestine. However, the 
increased funding and the political openings between 1991 and 2001 did not lead to a 
                                                             
81 See the “Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. 
http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/civil-society-organisation-mapping-study-palestinian-
territories 
82 The Madrid Conference of 1991 was a peace conference, hosted by Spain and co-sponsored by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. It was an attempt to revive the Israeli–Palestinian peace process 
through negotiations, involving Israel and the Palestinians as well as some Arab countries. 
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stronger civil society. On the contrary, civil society became gradually elitist, characterized by 
professionalized NGOs with vertical linkages with the grass roots who were merely 
recipients of services and not active, engaged members (Jamal, 2012). The estimated 
number of civil society organizations after Oslo agreement in 1993 was some 1400 in the 
OPT; this number has since dropped to 600 (Costantini, et al. (2011). This is because the 
newly formed Palestinian National Authority (PNA) began absorbing many civil society 
organizations to serves as ministries. This move left room for the formation of new service-
providing organizations that weren’t associated with any political party (Hilal, 2009), 
Costantini, et al. (2011) pointed out that “the PA invited civil society organizations to become 
incorporated in its structures (this occurred with some NGOs, particularly closely linked to 
Fatah, such as the Health Service Council, that ran 62 clinics and merged into the PA). 
However, many CSOs refused to merge, and thus competition over funds and activities 
emerged as a new phenomenon. This created tensions between the PA and CSOs. In this 
framework, the PA began imposing control over the NGO sector and in 1997 a first draft of a 
law was presented to the Palestinian Legislative Council providing for the Ministry of Interior 
to “license” NGOs rather than simply “registering” them” (Costantini, et al. 2011: 22). Fuqaha 
(2012) argues that although theses NGOs and organizations main aim was delivering 
services, they also represented the priorities of the parties behind them whether they were 
the PLO or Western or Arab donors. After the formation of the PA, the relationship with 
NGOs changed, and the nature and fields of work of these organizations also changed, their 
work regressed in most fields in general, The PLO who signed the Oslo Accord with Israel 
and later formed the Palestinian Authority was established within the Palestinian territories, 
thus its duty became to offer the services required of any government, such as education, 
health, agriculture and social welfare. However, the PLO’s responsibilities were not as such. 
By Oslo Accords the PLO became an internationally recognized entity, “this motivated CSOs 
to concentrate more on socioeconomic development rather than political and national 
indoctrination. They moved more toward institutionalization and professionalism and away 
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from political funding, while veering toward funding from international donors, and later had 
to deal with their conditions” (Fuqaha, 2012: 32).  Sadiq (2012) argues that it was necessary 
for these civil society institutions to go through this transition in which “both old and new 
institutions started engaging in a construction phase to provide quality services with a high 
degree of professionalism” (Sadiq, 2012: 24). However, their increase in number enhanced 
competition among them, and they also competed with the PA in terms of roles and tasks 
(ibid). Fuqaha (2012) pointed out that competition over roles and tasks reduced some of the 
CSOs’ scope of work; but opened up other new fields such as democracy, governance, 
gender issues and empowerment, in addition to widening their scope to include the youth 
sector. 
 In 2000, the Palestinian civil society experienced a setback because of the outbreak of the 
second intifada. Political parties turned to armed struggle, and most of the NGOs focused 
only on providing emergency aid instead of their ordinary work” (Costantini, et al. 2011). 
Peace organizations also faced a setback because of the problem of ‘normalization83, only 
Islamic civil society organizations flourished during this period through their grassroots work 
and their reputation of being untainted by corruption (Salem, 2012). When Hamas won a 
majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006 and their takeover of Gaza in 
June 2007, the Palestinian civil society was divided into three fragments: one supporting 
Hamas, one supporting the PA in Ramallah, and the third comprising of liberal, democratic 
independent organizations (Ibid). “The Palestinian Authority (Fatah) in the West Bank carried 
out an intensive campaign against all Hamas CSOs, dissolving some of them and taking 
over their administration and properties, while Hamas in Gaza did the same with Fatah 
CSOs. “Both parties exploited the division as an “opportunity” to tighten their grip on civil 
society, take over its assets and limit its capability of influence” (AbuZayyad, 2012: 6). 
                                                             
83 Normalization is the participation in any project, initiative or activity, in Palestine or internationally, 
that aims (implicitly or explicitly) to bring together Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and Israelis (people or 
institutions) without placing as its goal resistance to and exposure of the Israeli occupation and all forms 
of discrimination and oppression against the Palestinian people.” 
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2- Foreign Aid Dependency 
 
Since the 1948 War, the Palestinian people, wherever they settled, became deeply 
dependent upon external aid. Up to the First Intifada, external aid to the WB&GS came 
primarily from Arab countries through the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in exile 
(De Voir & Tartir, 2009) and less from the West. During the First Intifada, many more 
Western International NGOs arrived to channel more money into the Palestinian NGO 
sector” (Challand, 2009:80) as NGOs and UN agencies were the only available channels for 
humanitarian aid to the Palestinian Occupied Territories (Brynen, 1995). After Oslo, 
“Western donors took the reins of financing Palestinian development” (Challand, 2009:59). 
De Voir & Tartir (2009) point out that “between 1999 and 2008, external aid to the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip increased by over 600% to 3.25 billion US Dollars per year” (De Voir & 
Tartir, 2009: x) as shown in the graph below. 
Figure 12: Total Donor Disbursements to the WB&GS (1999 – 2008) (Millions USD). Source: (De Voir & Tartir, 2009: 11)  
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The face of external aid and the work of NGOs dramatically changed during the Second 
Intifada (2000-2004); it shifted again from development to emergency assistance, between 
2000 and 2002; it also increased by over 250% (De Voir & Tartir, 2009). By the end of the 
Second Intifada aid began to shift back from meeting the immediate humanitarian needs of 
Palestinians to long-term development (Ibid). 
Hanafi & Tabar (2005) argue that the increase in funding from the West was coupled with, 
“their insistence upon prepackaged programs with pre-defined thematic concerns and 
sectors” (Hanafi & Tabar, 2005:54). This reflects, in line with Gramsci,84 the donor’s 
community hegemony over the Palestinians’ civil society organizations, in order to follow the 
donor’s political and economic views and polices. De Voir & Tartir (2009) pointed out that 
“Though external aid has acted as a constant buttress to Palestinians since the War of 1948, 
the manner, type and conduits have changed significantly over time… these shifts coincide 
closely with political realities here in Palestine and around the world, rather than local 
development needs” (De Voir & Tartir, 2009: 7). This is clear through the reaction of the 
donor community after certain political events; the international response to Hamas’ victory 
of the Legislative Elections in 2006, for example, which was to put a halt to state-building 
efforts because donor’s governments instituted financial sanctions against the PA.  Another 
clear-cut example was when fighting erupted between the two main rival political factions In 
June of 2007, Fatah and Hamas. The result was that Hamas took control over the Gaza 
Strip. In the West Bank, President Abbas appointed an emergency ‘technocratic’ 
government, who became known as the ‘caretaker government’ after exceeding its 60 day 
(De Voir & Tartir, 2009). According to the Palestinian Ministry of Planning (2008), the 
Caretaker Government is favorably viewed by the international community, and its 
appointment led to an immediate reversal of donor financial sanctions and no-contact 
                                                             
84 In Gramsci’s work; hegemony refers to how a class exerts influence over other classes in such a way 
that they will follow its political and economic project. http://marxisttheory.org/antonio-gramsci-
theories-of-hegemony-civil-society-and-revolution/  
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policies with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Donors reengaged with the PA in the West Bank 
on a development agenda (Ibid). 
 
              Figure 13: Type of External Aid Disbursed to the WB&GS (2002 – 2008). Source: (De Voir & Tartir, 2009:13)
 
 
 
3-  Literature Review: The Civil Society Studies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
 
There have been a number of studies that looked at CSOs in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. The study “Civil Society in Palestine: A Literature Review” by Jamil Hilal (2011) 
discussed the studies that have been carried out regarding the Palestinian civil society; the 
study found the following:  
 
1- A short study by Dr. Khalil Nakhla in 1990 in which he outlined basic facts about 
Palestinian NGOs within the Green Line (i.e., in Israel) and within West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. There were 170 Palestinian NGOs that were active among Palestinians 
inside the Green Line in 1989, and 49 workers trade unions in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip (Hilal, 2011). 
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2-  The study “Surveying Civil Society Organizations in West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. 
This sociological study of Palestinian civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip was published in 2001; some 1150 CSOs were counted (Hilal, 2011). The survey was 
carried out by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Palestine 
Economic Policy research Institute (MAS) in 2000. The study presented the following types 
of civil society organizations and their distribution (the numbers were updated by Hilal, 
2011): 
 
a- Political parties and movements 
 
Hilal (2011) points out that “at the end of 1990s there were a total of 18 different political 
parties or organizations in the WBGS85. Seven of them could be classified as secular 
Palestinian nationalist movements whose origins date back to the late 1960s and are 
factions of the PLO. Four could be classified secular Arab nationalist movements. Five are 
Islamist parties dating from the 1980s or early 1990s. One is a self-styled "democracy 
movement" formed in the mid-1990s. Two are special issue groups (an environmental group 
and a peace group)” Those with tangible membership or support did not exceed eight 
parties. Fatah as the dominant party in the PLO came to control the finances of the PLO and 
thus to manage the monthly budget that each of the political parties in the PLO receives, and 
also to determine the number of jobs these parties had in the PA institutions” (Hilal, 2011: 
16).  Hamas is the only political organization that has developed a mass support since the 
second Intifada (Hilal, 2011). However, both, Fatah and Hamas sustained a military wing 
during the second Intifada, and both still exercise control over a quite large security gadget 
in the areas each controls. This means Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in West Bank (Hilal, 
2011). Hamas, since 2007, have generated a host of active NGOs in education, welfare, 
                                                             
85 WBGS refers to “West Bank and Gaza Strip”. 
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day-care, health relief, and women’s movement. In addition to the strong youth movement 
who are well represented at the universities (ibid). The study noted that “the present decade 
saw the re-structuring of Palestinian political field round two major parties, both competing 
for control of the PA and the PLO at a conjuncture that saw the possibility of establishing an 
independent state disappear and the Palestinian national project reach a dead end” (Hilal, 
2011: 17). 
 The study also emphasized that the support for Left-wing political parties declined after 
Oslo. And all attempts to unify them have failed in addition to the failure of creating a new 
democratic left-wing federation (Hilal, 2011). 
 
 b. Unions within Civil Society 
 
The study identified different types of unions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip according to 
their main constituencies: 
         Labor trade unions 
Hilal (2011) points out that “since the establishment of the PA in 1994 two competing 
labor federations exist in West Bank and Gaza Strip: the first is based only in WBGS, 
and is called Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU), and the other 
is called the Palestinian General Workers Union (PGWU) that was established in the 
Diasporas and moved its headquarters to the West Bank with the establishment of the 
PA” (Hilal, 2011:19). “Both trade unions are dominated by Fatah and are described as 
highly bureaucratic and lack any real organized labor base” (Ibid). 
         Professional unions 
“There are a fairly large numbers of professional unions representing different 
professions ranging from dentists, artists, engineers, pharmacists, doctors, and 
accountants among others. Many of these unions were founded in the 1950s and 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 104 
 
1960s. The majority was involved in the national struggle and political parties compete 
to control their leading committees. Hilal (2011) points out that “since many of 
professional unions are self-selective, they represent rather narrow constituencies, at 
the same time; they are one of the few types of unions that have actively lobbied for 
their members” (Hilal, 2011: 20). 
          Occupational associations of manufacturers and contractors 
The fact that quarter of the employed labor force in WBGS is self-employed in small 
craft and business, therefore a significant group of union-type CSOs are present (Hilal, 
2011). 
         Umbrella Unions 
The large numbers of charitable organizations who provide some form of social 
protection in the absence of an effective social security system combined with high 
rates of poverty among the population in WBGS urged the establishment of special 
type of union called a higher or umbrella unions representing these organizations who 
are working in a similar field (Hilal, 2011). “There is also PNGO (Palestinian NGO 
Network) which represent a large number of the professional type of Palestinian NGOs 
that were established in the1990s” (Hilal, 2011:21). 
 
c. Grass-roots organizations 
The Mass organizations that were promoted by the PLO and its political factions since 
the early 1970s played an active and direct role in the national struggle. The most 
active among these were, and still are, university student unions. There are also a 
number of women's organizations which are affiliated to political parties (Hilal, 2011).  
d. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
The NGOs are the largest sector of Palestinian CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. They are heterogeneous group of associations and can be grouped either 
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according to their main agenda, size, area of operations, source of funds, and features 
of target group (Ibid). 
 
3- The “Mapping NGOs in the WBGS” Studies  
These studies of mapping NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were carried out by the 
Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) in 200086, and in 2007. The two 
surveys excluded other sectors of CSOs such as political parties, grass-roots organizations, 
trade unions, and social movements (Hilal, 2011). The studies criteria for defining a non-
governmental organization were that the NGO must be first institutionalized; that is with an 
administration etc. Second it has to be autonomous, non-profit organization, to depend, at 
least partially, on voluntary participation, not to have a representative character; and not to 
be aligned to a political organization or faction (Ibid). In contrast with 2000 survey the 
2007survey noted the following features and changes of Palestinian NGOs: 
 
“There has been a significant increase in the number of Palestinian NGOs after 
2000: The number of NGOs in the WBGS increased from 926 organizations in mid-
2000 to 1495 in early 2007 (that is an increase of 36.5%)” (Hilal, 2011: 28). 
 The majority of NGOs were founded after the establishment of the PA and 
majority are urban-based:  (60.3%) where formed after the establishment of the PA 
(1994) (Ibid). 
 More than half of NGOs are charities: (51.7%) of NGOs in the WBGS are 
charitable organizations, followed by clubs (19.2%), and “development” and “cultural” 
organizations (17.3%). In 2000 study the percentage of charitable NGOs was 40.4% 
(Ibid). 
 Many NGOs have more than one program which totaled 4581 programs in 2007. 
The survey noticed a decline in the proportion of “cultural, scientific and educational” 
                                                             
86 Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), Ramallah, May 2001. op.cit. 
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programs while charity programs rose to 39% of the total programs offered in 2006 
compared to 33% in 1999. This increase reflects the increase in poverty and 
unemployment rates (Ibid). 
 NGOs employ more women than men, and volunteer work has decline: 
“The average number of paid employees in the NGOs stood at 20 individuals per 
organization. Nearly 55% of the paid employees in NGOs are women. About a third 
(31.6%) of the total NGOs employees worked in health organizations, and nearly a 
fifth (19.2%) in charitable organizations. The survey reveals a decline (of 17.4%) in 
the number of volunteers in NGOs” (Hilal, 2008: 28).  
 NGOs have increased their dependency on external funding: 
           The distribution of funds received by Palestinian NGOs that completed the survey for 
the year 2006 was as follows; 60.9% were from external sources (compare to 46.8% 
in 1999); 21.5% from their own activities; 9.3% from the local community or 
institutions. The rest came from the PA (0.7%); from Palestinians within the Green 
Line (3.7%); from Palestinians in the Diasporas (3.2%); and other sources (0.7%). 
This reveals the very high rate of dependency of Palestinian NGOs on eternal 
funding and the danger this entails on their autonomy and sustainability” (Hilal, 2008: 
29). 
 The amount of funds received by NGOs doubled between 1999 and 2006 
         “The amount of revenues received by NGOs as recorded by the survey nearly doubled 
between 1999 and 2006 (from nearly USA $ 113 million in 1999, to $ USA 224 million 
in 2006). It reached $USA 257.5 in 2008 according to the Palestinian Ministry of 
Planning” (Hilal, 2008: 29). 
 Low budget local community NGOs is least dependent on foreign funding: 
Dependence on foreign aid differs by region and area: Gaza Strip showed a higher 
level of dependency than the West Bank (Ibid). 
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 More than two-thirds of NGOs’ operate at governorate and local level. Fund 
raising is the main preoccupation of most NGOs:  It appears that most NGOs’ 
concerns are focused on fund-raising. 95.6% of these organizations stated that their 
biggest need was raising funds (Ibid). 
 Donors and the Israeli occupation are the main sources of restrictions for 
Palestinian NGOs: “A majority (58.6%, compared to 43.5% in 2000) considered 
donors to be their main source of restrictions. Some directors of NGOs complained 
openly of donors treating NGOs receiving funds as “employees for the 
implementation of donors’ demands” (Hilal, 2008: 31). 
 Decline of the number of NGOs active in East Jerusalem 
The decrease in all sources of funding to Palestinian NGOs in East Jerusalem, 
especially foreign funding reflects the process of judaization87 of the city and the 
building of the Separation Wall around it, thus tightening its isolation from the rest of 
the West Bank, thus forcing many NGOs to move out of the city to surrounding 
areas, inside the Wall, particularly to Ramallah-al- Bireh88 area which witnessed a 
threefold increase in its share of Palestinian NGOs in the WBGS, that it an increase 
from 11.9% in 1999 to 36.4% in 2006” (Hilal, 2008: 32).  
 
The MAS mapping studies concludes that “NGOs have fortified the steadfastness of 
Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza Strip because of their positive role in the health, 
education, agriculture and other sectors. It also emphasized the NGOs’ active participation in 
drawing up development plans, providing relief services, and in their active participation in 
                                                             
87 Judaization of Jerusalem is a term used to describe the view that Israel has sought to transform the 
physical and demographic landscape of Jerusalem (especially East Jerusalem since its occupation in 1967) 
towards a fundamentally Jewish city under Israeli sovereignty. 
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the political struggle against the occupation. It noted that the NGOs responded to second 
intifada by increasing their aid and relief programs” (Hilal, 2011, 32). 
 
4-The Study: “Measuring and Developing Social Capital in the Democratization 
and Governance Process in Palestine CSOs”. 
 
The Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ) curried out the study “Measuring and 
Developing Social Capital in the Democratization and Governance Process in Palestine 
CSOs” in the year 2012. The ARIJ research team found out that the Palestinian civil society 
organizations have flourished in the 20 years since Oslo. The study declares that in 2012 
there were approximately 2,245 civil society organizations operating in the West Bank; a 
ratio of one CSO for every three square kilometers (ARIJ, 2012). The study also points out 
that “the profusion of CSOs, combined with a high level of international funding, has created 
a complex environment in which social relations are conducted, at times preventing the 
optimal utilization of social capital. As a result, the social capital that was so instrumental in 
establishing Palestinian networks and meeting community needs in the early twentieth 
century is increasingly vulnerable, and over the past sixty plus years social relationships 
have come under increasing pressure. The domestic context and political situation has been 
further compounded by an influx of and growing dependency on foreign aid – factors that 
play a determining role in program goals and management style. The interplay between 
international donors, CSOs and local communities creates a situation that must be carefully 
navigated by Palestinian CSOs in order to ensure worthy collaboration and to avoid project 
duplication” (ARIJ, 2012: 1). The study further explained that “the political situation in 
Palestine since the end of the First World War has greatly affected civil society and social 
relationships thus leading to a decline in social capital.  The ARIJ research team posits that 
in order for CSOs to enhance their social capital they must focus on strengthening their 
relationships with five key stakeholders; their communities, other CSOs, the government, the 
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private sector, and the media” (ARIJ, 2012: 1)89. Therefore, the study administrated a 100 
question survey to 20 organizations of the West Bank regarding the following: Codes of 
conduct, cooperation between CSOs, the efficiency of Palestinian NGO networks, partnering 
with the private sector, if these organizations have influenced government policies, and how 
these organizations employs the media (ARIJ, 2012).  The study used both quantitative and 
qualitative data to reach the conclusion that the primary steps that CSOs can take in order to 
enhance their social capital are focused around legitimacy and accountability (ARIJ, 2012). 
“Based on the results of the surveys and the historical background of Palestinian civil 
society, the study developed a comprehensive set of guidelines, in order to assist CSOs in 
strengthening their relationships with the five identified stakeholders. The recommendations 
are broken down highlighting best and useful practices for each stakeholder. A checklist has 
also been provided which can aid CSOs in assessing their organizational structure as well 
as how they engage with the identified stakeholders” (ARIJ, 2012:1). 
The study recommended that in order to enhance civil society organizations credibility and 
legitimacy, it is important to establish clear defined mechanisms, concentrated around 
accountability. Because when civil society organizations are seen as legitimate, civil society 
will be more willing to engage and participate (ARIJ, 2012).The study concluded that in order 
to  create lasting social change they should be valued and respected by their stakeholders. 
Therefore, taking active steps to improve their relations with the five identified stakeholders, 
they will strengthen social capital, to create a strong and vibrant civil society (Ibid). 
 
4- Other Studies and Reports. 
a- The study: “Civil Society and Political Elites in Palestine and the Role of 
International Donors: A Palestinian View” by Salah Abdel Shafi- Gaza Community 
Mental Health Program (GCMHP) in July 200490. 
                                                             
89 See http://www.arij.org/publications/books-atlases/82-2012/250-social-capital.html  
90  http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/media/paper33_final.pdf  
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The study focused on civil society before and after the Oslo Accords; the background of civil 
society before Oslo tackling political and professional activists of CSOs, the Islamic civil 
society and political elite. Then the period during the Oslo era focusing on the PA and the 
CSOs conflicting interests, the “de-politicization” of civil society organizations and the 
political elite.   The study also presents the types of political elites within the civil society. 
Finally, the study gives policy and CSOs recommendations. The following summary reflects 
the most important elements of the study:  
  
“The eruption of the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987 marked a turning point in the 
evolution of Palestinian civil society. Civil society organizations (CSOs) emerged as 
an instrument for political mobilization as well as necessary institutions for providing 
much needed services for the population. The CSOs that emerged during the first 
Intifada were mostly a product of existing political parties and closely associated with 
them. Accordingly, the elite of these organizations were political activists who were 
assigned by their political parties to take leading roles within the new institutional 
infrastructure. With the signing of the Oslo accords and the establishment of the PNA, 
CSOs and their elites started to distance themselves from their political bases and 
become independent entities. The new era was characterized by a deep crisis of the 
secular political parties, social polarization and heavy involvement of donor countries 
and international organizations. The focus of CSOs shifted from politics to service 
delivery. A process of CSOs and CSO elite “de-politicization” took place. Despite this 
process, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) saw in civil society a threat to its 
policy of centralizing power and controlling all aspects of public life. The influx of 
funds for Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from donor countries that started 
during the first Intifada and intensified after the establishment of the PNA accelerated 
the de-politicization process. The new elite realized that its power derived from its 
newly gained access to the international arena and the new sources of funding and 
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not from its affiliation with Palestinian political parties. CSOs not only provided an 
independent platform for the political elite, they also created new constituencies 
around them and provided them with access to the international community, the 
media and to political decision makers within the PNA. Islamic CSOs were 
established in the mid-seventies. Their main focus was welfare and providing 
services to the poor and marginalized in the society. When Hamas was created 
during the first Intifada, it relied on an extensive network of CSOs involved in social 
services. Islamic civil society elite emerged as a political elite associated with Hamas 
while the political elite of the national secular factions emerged as civil society elite 
that gradually disengaged from their previous political affiliation. Democracy’ remain 
one of the most crucial issues when it comes to discussing the role of civil society. 
The existence of an active and independent civil society is an important element of 
any democratic system. CSOs provide a necessary instrument to ensure the 
participation of people, widening their choices and thus empowering them. Civil 
society elites have been active in articulating principles of democracy, participation, 
empowerment, transparency, accountability and gender equality. They have also 
been very critical of the performance of the PNA and its inability to provide a model of 
good governance. This critique is legitimate given the negative record of the PNA in 
the areas of transparency, accountability and combating corruption. But the question 
remains regarding the extent to which CSOs provide a better model of governance 
and urged elites, donors and the community at large to answer the question:  Do the 
structures of these organizations allow for real participation of their constituencies 
and how accountable are they to their constituencies? It also highlighted issues 
relating to internal governance i.e., the role of the board of directors as opposed to 
the role of the executive branch membership, internal procedures, and financial 
accountability” (Abdel Shafi, 2004: 5). 
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The study criticized and pointed out that these issues did not have serious attention over 
the last decade. The first donors’ priority concentrated on the financial accountability and 
that the organizations have been able to fulfill their contractual obligations. Governance, 
for example have been ignored or was not taken seriously. This has allowed a patriarchal 
trend to evolve within the Palestinian civil society organizations. In addition to the 
absence of internal control mechanisms, which led to those leaders, managers and 
directors behaving as if they enjoyed unlimited powers, acting similar to heads of tribes. 
The study recommends in order to be effective and credible in their call for democracy 
within Palestinian society civil society elites have to abide by democratic principles within 
their own organizations (Abdel Shafi, 2004). 
 
B- The report “Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory”91 in 2011.  
 
C- Introduction and methodological framework 
 
The study aim at providing a comprehensive overview of CSOs in the OPT, including their 
capacity-building needs and recommendations for possible intervention areas to be 
supported by forthcoming cooperation programs. The study covered the three regions of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories: the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The 
study consulted 262 civil society organizations in order to have an adequate representation, 
at the national and local levels, of the dynamics and processes characterizing Palestinian 
civil society. 87 of these organizations were met with and interviewed and filled out 
questionnaires; 49 in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and 38 in the Gaza Strip. In 
addition, different tools for the collection of information to obtain information on different 
features of these organizations and also for the purpose of crosschecking gathered 
                                                             
91 See  http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/projects/overview/index_en.htm  
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information. 100 participated in focus groups; 73 in the West Bank and Jerusalem and 27 in 
the Gaza Strip, and they filled out questionnaires. 68 civil society organizations participated 
in feedback meetings and seminars, held in Ramallah and Gaza. These meetings and 
seminars served as a further tool for verifying the study findings (Costantini, et al., 2011). 
 
The study main issues and stakes for the Palestinian civil society  
 
The study pointed out that the Palestinian civil society organizations have a peculiar 
characteristic, unlike most civil societies and against the concept of civil society itself, most 
of these organizations were created out of an established “state framework”. This situation 
has changed following the creation of the Palestinian National Authority in 1993, a process of 
concentration of CSOs on service delivery activities became apparent, despite the fact that 
their engagement in the policy field was often marked by difficulties. 
The civil society organizations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories appear as a wide and 
vibrant set of actors that are managing a large variety of activities as over 90% of social 
services in the Territories are managed by CSOs which are working in all sectors, 
maintaining the Palestinian human resources and establishing and constructing a vital 
reservoir of information and knowledge, establishing the main channel between the OPT and 
the rest of the world. However, the study points out that some specific issues emerge when 
dealing with East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip: For East Jerusalem, the special context 
produces a two-fold set of challenges for civil society organizations. On one hand, their 
legitimate existence and activity are at risk; while on the other hand, the increasing social 
exclusion creates a growing demand for services and for human rights protection activities. 
For Gaza Strip; the Israeli siege seriously affects the CSOs. “There is a decrease of trust 
among the organizations, with constituencies and with political authorities. There is also little 
space for political dialogue and participation in governance, a lack of access for qualified 
human resources, equipment and materials, and a dependency on external donors and 
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resources. Despite all this, CSOs are sometime assuming the role of catalysts for change, 
fostering technological innovation and social change concerning gender and age, supporting 
active social integration of underprivileged groups, mitigating and reducing the long-term and 
structural effects of the “closure” of social space, supporting access to information and 
knowledge” (Costantini, et al., 2011: 8).  
 
The resources for supporting CSOs 
 
The Study declared that the CSOs supporting resources in the OPT have been considered, 
the focus was on the European donors and the international aid agencies, the international 
NGOs and national public authorities and non-state actors. The study pointed out that most 
of these resources are used to support project-based service delivery initiatives. However, 
they are rarely engaged in local and national governance and policy dialogue activities. This 
is also applicable for long-term programs. Moreover, the current allocation of resources risks 
adopting a further concentration of Palestinian CSOs on service delivery, which creates 
direct competition with public authorities and increases the competition among them 
(Costantini, et al., 2011). 
 
 5. The study operational recommendations 
 
The study defined recommendations, with main context in the setting of a general strategy 
for supporting CSOs in the OPT by adopting “the global objective to strengthen the position 
of civil society in public debate and in the elaboration and implementation of development 
strategies, complimentary with the Palestinian Authority’s strategy and actions. 
Finally, opportunities and options for supporting civil society development were identified as 
well as sector priorities” (Costantini, et al., 2011: 9).    
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Other studies were carried out such as “The Role and Performance of Palestinian NGOs in 
Health, Education and Agriculture” Study in December 2006 by Bisan Center for Research 
and Development and The World Bank Group, the study: “The World Bank and the 
Palestinian NGO Project” by Liana Lopes in 2011, and many more.  
 
Reviewing the literature on both social capital and the civil society reveals that both in the 
Palestinian context are considered to be “special case”, and that they need deeper 
understanding. Therefore, in-depth study for both concepts is addressed in the empirical 
Chapter. Social capital will be analyzed on its three levels; macro, meso and micro, in 
addition to the analyses of the factors that had influenced the Palestinian social capital.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
   
The general object and the overall preferred theoretical approach of the thesis is to look at 
current Palestinian social capital after the construction of the Wall, focusing on social 
resources and relationships. The importance and significance of this general approach is to 
study the relevance of the Palestinian conflict via sociological analysis of social capital. This 
is because social capital is not static but varies over time92, due to political and economic 
change. Therefore this research used the case study approach to answer the What, Why, 
and How questions regarding the case of East Jerusalem and one of its neighborhoods, al-
'Eizariyah (Bethany). Many studies have been carried out about the impact of the Wall on 
the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem that is; outside the Wall, but inside the Wall, such 
as al-'Eizariyah, has not been the focus of previous researchers. In addition, the 
demographics of al-'Eizariyah‘s residents represents a cross-section of Palestinian social 
stratification and is a good and complex example to study social capital dynamics and their 
effect on local development. This case study enables us to study social capital dynamics 
between two regions of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and deal with East Jerusalem 
and the West Bank as one unit, representing both sides of the Wall.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized in five sections. Section two presents the 
methodology and research design. The third presents the research limitations and the forth 
discusses the data and data collection tools; studies on the Palestinian social capital, 
observations, in-depth interviews, and the life story approach data. Section five shows the 
data collection process and the challenges in the field work. The last section deals with the 
data analysis. 
                                                             
92 Coleman and Putnam allow for change over time … they allow for the possibility that the volume of 
social capital may grow or diminish with time. ( Field, 2003) 
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4.2 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
  
This research builds on the results of the existing quantitative studies on social capital in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. Those are, mainly "Measuring Social Capital in the 
Palestinian Territories" that produced the Social Capital Index (Nasr & Hilal, 2007), and the 
“Bonding versus Bridging” (Cavatorta, et al, 2009) study. First the examination of the results 
of these studies was presented. Second, I exposed them to further investigations by the 
case study qualitative method; in-depth key informants’ interviews and the life story 
interviews. The preference of a qualitative approach in this research was selected for several 
reasons. First of all, the qualitative approach uses a practice approach that seeks to 
understand phenomena in context-specific settings, such as "real world setting [where] the 
researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest" (Patton, 2001, p. 
39). Unlike quantitative researchers who seek causal determination, prediction, and 
generalization of findings, qualitative researchers seek instead illumination, understanding, 
and extrapolation to similar situations (Hoepfl, 1997). Studying social capital via quantitative 
methods, such as surveys, measuring networks by simplifying social relations into numerical 
data and depicting ties as either absent or present, does not address the complex processes 
of human interaction in networks. Qualitative methods, on the other hand, allow 
researchers to focus on the creation, reproduction, and dynamics of social networks 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Edwards, 2010). The major objectives of qualitative research 
methods are to describe and analyze both the processes through which social realities are 
constructed, and the social relationships through which people are connected to one another 
(Miller and Dingwall, 1997). Therefore, and in order to answer the research questions and to 
better understand the social capital dynamics following the construction of the Separation 
Wall between Israel and the West Bank, a qualitative, analytical approach have been chosen 
and conducted in ‘the case study setting’ using the ‘life story’ approach, and the ‘in-depth 
interviews’. The case study method is "an empirical inquiry about a contemporary 
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phenomenon (e.g., a “case”), set within its real-world context—especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2009a, p. 18). 
Patton (1990) stressed on the importance of selecting “information-rich cases” for study in 
depth. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about 
issues of central importance to the purpose of the research. Indeed, the case study 
approach has the ability to investigate important topics not easily addressed by other 
methods, especially when the research involves either a descriptive question such as ‘What 
happened?’ or an explanatory question such as ‘How or why did something happen?’ 
(Shavelson & Townes, 2002). The strength of the case study methodology is its ability to 
examine, in-depth, a ―case within its ―real-life context (Yin, 2004).  The case study 
approach also illuminates a particular situation and helps to make direct observations and 
collect data in natural settings (Bromley, 1986). Therefore, the case study of “East 
Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah” is informative and capable of demonstrating the critical effect of 
the Wall on the Palestinian social capital. 
Researchers could analyze the data of a case study from a critical science perspective, or 
obtain one person’s “story,” hence combining narrative with case study (Merriam, 2002). In 
this sense, and within the case study of ‘East Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah’, the life story and 
the key informants in-depth interview qualitative method were applied; the first to collect 
personal level data and the second to collect community level data.  
 
This research is conducted with the awareness that the focus is on social capital and 
its dynamics among various groups of al-‘Eizariyah and how the political and social 
reality shapes its forms. The three months field work time started from first of October 
till the end of December 2013. 
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4.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
 
While this research was being conducted the author has been aware of its limitations. First 
of all, because the author can be considered what is referred to as a “native ethnographer” 
(as in Fournillier, 2009) who may have been too close to the subject matter to be an 
objective researcher herself or to be viewed as objective by those in the research field (i.e., 
interviewees, those who are observed, or gatekeepers to the research data). However, 
despite both of these characteristics that could have had their effects on the judgment and 
interpretations of the field data “my goal was to arrive at the paradoxical ethnographic 
moments of dialogue and Otherness”, if I was to use the words of Fournillier (2009). 
According to Madison (2005:184) “Communion with an ‘Other’ brings the self-more fully into 
being, and in doing so, opens you to know the Other more fully”. Besides, reading reports 
and studies by non-Palestinians and brainstorming with scholars and experts in research 
institutes and conferences helped to reduce the subjective or perhaps a little more biased 
view of the “native researcher” problem. This “other” and “otherness” have been used as the 
starting point for interviews to position the interviewer and the interviewees with a certain 
picture in mind, a certain understanding of conceptual language and the way the questions 
were asked. This was helpful in preparing the interviewees for conversing and being open to 
reach out to some very old and distant memories, history, and/or events. Also, process-wise 
there were limitations as to how much data and what data could be really collected in a short 
period of time. Most of the research field areas in Palestine in close proximity to the conflict 
zone, or rather the entire “Question of Palestine” remaining unresolved and stagnant in the 
policy arena, the movement is restricted, and thus the work related to research data 
gathering was constantly affected. Only three months of empirical research, which 
nevertheless, were complimented by the years of day-to-day life observation, oral histories, 
and anecdotal references well known in the particular milieu of Palestinian scholars or civil 
society activists) were enough to get a good sense of the situations that highlight certain 
aspects of the case study under construction. However, some of the time was wasted in 
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waiting for the travel permit to Jerusalem; the permit was obtained only for one week and 
came little bit late. The author had to turn to other alternatives like meeting some of the 
interviewees in alternative places to Jerusalem such as Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron.  
Traveling to these three cities was time consuming by itself because of the bypass roads 
and the checkpoints, in addition to the ever present dangers of being near the conflict areas. 
4.4. RESEARCH DATA AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
  
This research depends on two types of data; primary data collected by me and the study of 
other previous social capital studies. Several instruments to collect data were used such as 
observation, in-depth interviews with key informants and the life story interviews. 
1-  Previous Studies on the Palestinian Social capital  
 
This research builds on previous research, mostly quantitative studies such as “The Social 
Capital Index” of 2007 and the “Bonding Versus Bridging” study. First of all, on “The Social 
Capital Index” of 2007 that was carried out under the umbrella of The Palestine Economic 
Policy Research Institute (MAS) with the cooperation of the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics (PCBS). In this index the definition of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) had been adopted, which views social capital as a multi-
dimensional concept, reflecting social networks and the shared norms, values, and 
understandings that facilitate cooperation within or between various groups. The study 
covers the three Palestinian regions: The West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. 26 
survey questions were designed to inquire into four principal dimensions of social capital: 
political, civic, and professional participation; informal networks and social engagement; trust 
in institutions and in individuals; and shared values and norms. The questionnaire also 
elicited personal and demographic information. It was administered to a representative 
sample of 2,500 Palestinian households in June and July 2007. On the basis of the 
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responses to the survey questions, the study established a framework that allows the 
various dimensions of social interaction and engagement in the Palestinian Territories to be 
measured (MAS, 2007). 
 Secondly; the study “Bonding Versus Bridging” within "Studies on Social Capital in the 
Palestinian Territories" series compiled by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, 
(MAS) in 2009. This study was built on the Index of 2007 and explored how social capital 
applies to the Palestinian Territories and identifies the main forms in which it manifests. 
Bonding social capital relates to strong ties between people who share similar 
characteristics; such as family ties and small circles of close friends with similar experiences 
and information. On the other hand bridging reflects weaker ties that are connections 
between individuals from different backgrounds who have different experiences and 
information, culminating in looser and more diverse networks. The goal of the study was to 
formulate a synthetic indicator for bonding and bridging social capital and to test its effects 
on building and strengthening trust and civic behavior. The conclusion was that bonding 
social capital is stronger than bridging social capital in the Palestinian Occupied Territories 
and that building a civic and viable society/country requires efforts to strengthen the bridging 
social capital. Moreover, social capital suffers from an apparent deficit in both civic behavior 
and community trust. 
Studying the findings of these two quantitative social capital studies is important for my 
research from two perspectives. First; to what extent these findings are valid now after two 
major political events occurred since then; namely, the actual physical separation between 
Israel and the West Bank exemplified by the separation Wall and the radical political split 
between the Palestinian political parties; Fattah and Hamas in 2007. Second, the 
quantitative method used in these two studies; their findings construct a starting point for this 
research, in particular, those interpretations related to the presence of the Separation Wall in 
certain rural areas. Exposing these findings to a qualitative, analytical approach provides 
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more understanding and examines the validity of these interpretations in urban sittings now 
after the Wall is almost completed in Jerusalem and the West Bank.  
 
Other sources for information were also examined such as the Newspapers, the World Bank, 
the United Nation Agencies, and the Human Rights Organizations reports that cover many 
aspects of the contemporary life of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. 
There is an array of the Israeli polices, actions and assaults documented in those official 
information sources before, during, and after the construction of the Wall. 
2-  Observations  
         
 Patton (1985, p. 1) explains: Qualitative research “is an effort to understand situations in 
their uniqueness as part of a particular context and the interactions there. This 
understanding is an end in itself, so that it is not attempting to predict what may happen in 
the future necessarily, but to understand the nature of that setting—what it means for 
participants to be in that setting, what their lives are like, what’s going on for them, what their 
meanings are, what the world looks like in that particular setting.” Patton (2001) also 
supports the notion of researcher's involvement and immersion into the research. He 
emphasized that the real world is subjected to change and therefore, a qualitative researcher 
should be present during the changes to record an event after and before the change 
occurs. Using Ethnographic Methods which rely substantially or partly on “Participant 
observation” (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994) that is “establishing a place in some natural 
setting on relatively long-term basis in order to investigate, experience and represent the 
social life and social process that occur in that setting – comprises one core activity in 
ethnographic fieldwork … involves not only gaining access to and immersing oneself in new 
social worlds, but also producing written accounts and description that bring versions of 
these worlds to others (Robert et al. 2001: 352). Therefore first I had written field notes while 
I was conducting research because “writing field notes begins in the field, as ethnographer 
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participates in local scenes and activities in order to experience them directly and 
immediately and to accumulate a series of observations to be written up into field notes” 
(Ibid: 356), in addition to mental notes.  I followed the “linguistic turn” of Clifford and Marcus 
in their book “Writing Culture” (1987) which considered field work is not closed, completed, 
final text; rather they are indeterminate, subject to reading, rereading, interpreting, 
reinterpreting, and reopening the author accounts and analyses of the fieldwork (Atkinson et 
al , 2001). In this research, my personal involvement and observation are not related only to 
the time I spent in the field conducting research but it reached back to almost my entire life. 
In this research I played two roles; one as an insider ethnographer as I was born and studied 
in East Jerusalem, as well as had lived part of my life in al-'Eizariyah.  I witnessed most of 
the events in the area starting from the war of 1967 till 1978, then from the second Intifada in 
2000 till 2010. I was there before and after the Wall was built, I myself experienced the 
closure procedures between 2001 and 2005 while working at one of al-Quds University 
faculties in Jerusalem. My other role is that of an outsider ethnographer as I lived abroad for 
eighteen years from the year 1978-1996; fifteen years in Saudi Arabia and three years in 
Jordan having missed two of the most important events in the history of Palestine; the first 
Intifada and the Oslo Accords. In addition I spent five years in Italy for a post-graduate study 
and research motivation from 2010 till the time being. In this sense we might adopt AM 
Kusow (2003) opinion about the native ethnographers “the insider/outsider roles are 
products of the particular situation in which a given fieldwork takes place and not from the 
status characteristics per se of the researcher” (Kusow, 2003: 1). With this logic one might 
say that I used two eye glasses while observing; one as an insider ethnographer and the 
other as an outsider. As an insider ethnographer during the second Intifada (1999-2004) and 
like all others in al-‘Eizariyah who used to go to Jerusalem every day either for work, to 
school, to shop, or to seek health care, I used the historical main road that connect Jericho 
with Jerusalem and pass by al-'Eizariyah to go to work in one of al-Quds University faculties 
in East Jerusalem. But, with the closure procedures and restrictions on West Bank residents 
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from entering Jerusalem without a permit, al-‘Eizariyah residents, used other passages to 
avoid the permanent checkpoint on their way to Jerusalem. For me, the alternative was to 
climb up the hill through the old passage between the two Christian Monasteries in Mount of 
Olive that was 500 meters from my house 
in A-Khallah, north of al-’Eizariyah.  I used 
to walk up the hill and wait a little bit 
before the location of the temporary 
Israeli checkpoint. Few soldiers in a 
military Jeep used to be there in the early 
morning to prevent  
 
Figure 14: An Israeli force controlling the Mount of Olive passage to Jerusalem. Source: (B’Tselem, 2006: 22).  
 
Palestinian with a West Bank  Identification Card (Green ID) from entering East Jerusalem. I 
would wait till the temporary checkpoint left as I held a Green ID and I did not have a working 
permit93. Thereafter, I would walk for at least 200 meters away from that point before getting 
into the public transportation, pretending that I am a resident of the Mount of Olive (as if I 
was holding a Blue ID), otherwise the driver would not pick up a West Bank Palestinian with 
a ‘Green ID’, if the driver’s vehicle was stopped by the Israeli army for inspection, he would 
have had to pay a fine. By this policy Israel appointed the Palestinian Jerusalemites drivers a 
‘Police Officers’ mission to control who has the right to get into their transportation means 
and who has not. Sometime later, they closed all the passages that lead to Jerusalem by dirt 
or building materials junk and mud in winter.  
  
                              
                                                             
93 The Israeli authorities gave working permits to some Palestinian establishments such as hospitals but it 
is unlikely so for universities. 
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Figure 15: The early stages of the Wall. Source: (B’Tselem, 2006:2) 
During that period I witnessed the early 
stages of the construction of the Wall, the 
people used to squeeze themselves 
between the cracks to get to the other side 
or, sometimes, to climb up and jump to the 
other side. In 2004 this became impossible, 
all the cracks were sealed off, and jumping 
from some point became not possible. By 2005 the Wall was completed in the west and the 
north of al-‘Eizariyah, I had to be transferred to work at al-Quds University main campus in 
Abu Dis (outside East Jerusalem) as the University administration failed to provide me with a 
working permit94 to enter Jerusalem. The Wall blocked the main street in Ras Kobsa junction 
and cut off al-‘Eizariyah and the surrounding area from Jerusalem.  
 
Figure 16 &17: al-Zaytoon and al-Za’yyem checkpoints. Source: B’Tselem, 2012                                                          
The movement of al-‘Eizariyah residents to 
Jerusalem had been restricted. Only those who 
hold ‘Blue ID’ or ‘Green ID’ with permit could 
pass through the pedestrians al- Zaytoon “Olive” 
checkpoint (figure 16) or through al-Za’ayyem 
checkpoint on the ‘Israeli only highway’ which 
Israel has built to connect the settlements of 
Ma’ale Adummim with Israel (figure 17). Some 
of the settlers sued the Israeli government 
claiming that the new highway with the 
                                                             
94 The Israeli authorities gave working permits to some Palestinian establishments such as hospitals but it 
was not so for universities. 
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checkpoint regime is time consuming, and they were against the construction of the 
Separation Wall that cutoff the main Jericho-Jerusalem road they used to use to reach 
Jerusalem through al’-‘Eizariya.  
 
 
 
Figure 18: The Wall to the north of al-‘Eizariyah where it cuts the bypass road I used to take to Jerusalem through the Mount of 
Olive. Source: www.reynoldmainse.com 
 
In addition to the field observation during the three months, and my observation during the 
time I lived in the case study area, I referred to my ‘Diaries’ between the years 1997 – 2003 
and used them as another source of data, although my aim at that time was to release some 
emotions and thoughts rather than to document the social reality. However, the Diaries 
became like writing down social discourse which, as Greetz (1973) put it, “turns it from 
passing event, which exists only in its own moment of occurrence, into an account, which 
exists in its inscription and can be re-consulted” (Greetz, 1973:19). 
This personal experience and the observation of behavior, attitudes and discussions among 
the residents of al-‘Eizariyah were an important source of the research data collection 
whether occurred during the author life time or the specific three months of the empirical 
research that starts in Autumn 2013.  
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3-  In-Depth Interviews 
 
Dilley (2004) stated that interviewing helps to know the context of study subjects’ behavior 
and thus provides a way for a researcher to realize the meaning of that behavior. To reach 
this result, in-depth interviews were undertaken with “Key Informants” to collect data at the 
community level. A semi-structured interview guide was developed that consisted of four 
principal dimensions of social capital at the local level: political, civic, and professional 
participation; informal networks and social engagement; trust in institutions and other 
individuals; and shared values and norms. These interviews were supplemented and 
enriched by the data collected via the life story method. The key informants that were  
interviewed have had expert knowledge on the four principal dimensions of social capital at 
the local level such as representatives of the civic society, civic associations, political 
institutions, representatives of economic activities, and officials of the al-'Eizariyah local 
council, education and health care. Regarding the number of key informants, there was no 
predetermined number of participants in the beginning. This is because interviews usually 
require a flexible and pragmatic approach (Dörnyei, 2007). After initial interviews and 
records were completed and their responses tentatively analyzed, additional participants 
were included. This “iterative process” went on until the interview data reached a level of 
“saturation” (Dörnyei, 2007; Arthur et al., 2012). Following this process, five more key 
informants were interviewed. In addition, a national representative was interviewed to 
connect the local with the national level to get a more thorough overview. Heyl (2001) points 
out that “researchers in an ever-increasing number of disciplinary and applied fields have 
been turning to ethnographic interviewing to help gather, rich, detailed data directly from 
participants in social worlds under study” (Heyl, 2001: 369). Therefore, the Ethnographic 
interviewing method was used while interviewing the national representative by establishing 
respectful, ongoing relationship with him. This includes enough rapport for there to be a 
genuine exchange of views and enough time and openness (Ibid). The list below 
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summarizes the names and occupation of each key informant and the contribution of each 
interviewee’s accounts:  
 
1-  Ziad AbuZayyad a resident of al-'Eizariyah. Hi was an ex-minister for Jerusalem 
affairs, an ex-Legislative Council member of the Palestinian Authority, a lawyer and 
publisher and co-editor of a quarterly Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture. The 
contribution of the interview was to better understand the geopolitical environment 
and the social changes occurred after the Oslo Accords, and the construction of the 
Wall in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. 
2- The ex-Mayor of al-'Eizariyah Council. The contribution of the interview was to 
better understand the history and complications of the construction of the Wall 
between East Jerusalem and al-'Eizariyah, as this was built when he was occupying 
the mayoral position. 
3- The son of another ex-Mayor. The contribution being to better understand the 
history of the social relations and interaction between the various groups of al-
'Eizariyah residents: their social integration, their cooperation in serving the local 
community, and the strong or weak ties amongst different groups (in respect to their 
different origins, and their different civil status). Another aim was to gather an 
overview of how the community has evolved and adjusted to the transformation of 
the physical and spatial characteristics of the community. 
4- The son of another ex-Mayor notable. He still practices the role of his father in 
solving disputes; the aim being to better understand the mechanism of solving social 
problems in the absence of law and order, and to examine the change in norms and 
community values. 
5- Al-Quds University Academic and head of Montada al-'Eizariyah al Thakafi 
(Cultural Center) in al-'Eizariyah and a member of al-'Eizariyah Local Council. 
The contribution of this interview was to glean information on local civic networks 
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since this cultural center works across all the social layers of the community in order 
to better understand how the presence of the Wall and its restrictions on mobility, 
influence bonding, bridging and linking forms of social capital amongst individuals 
and associations within the locality are expressed. 
6-  The Headmaster of Muscat High School (al-'Eizariyah Boys School), who 
himself is a refugee and a member of al-'Eizariyah Local Council. The contribution of 
the interview was to shed light on educational opportunities and inequalities. The 
school‘s pupils represent male youth from all social layers within the community. 
Many students, who used to study in Jerusalem, moved to this school when the 
Separation Wall went up. Therefore the interview investigated if the number of 
students had risen since the erection of the Wall and discussed the problems they 
faced and may still be facing, in relation to their education, their aspirations and their 
social life. This interview covers also his personal feeling regarding his origin as a 
refugee whose family settled down in al-'Eizariyah after the 1948 war.  This interview 
also tackled sensitive personal feelings such as; whether he witnessed any sort of 
discrimination regarding his origin in his role as headmaster of the secondary school 
or in decision making process as a member of al-'Eizariyah Local Council. 
7- The Teacher of the “Nigrizia Suore” Italian kinder Garden who herself is a 
refugee lives in al-'Eizariyah. The contribution of this interview was to investigate 
the story of the Italian convent that is located in al-‘Eizaryiah and was excluded by 
the Wall and was left within the boundaries of Jerusalem. How this institution dealt 
with the new situation and how much the wall affected their mission and what forms 
of resistance they expressed and how they managed to keep serving the community 
while they became isolated behind the Wall. 
8- The Head of the Mothers’ Committee Council of Yusuf Al-Khatib High School 
for Girls. The contribution of the interview was to shed light on the impact the Wall 
has had on gender, and discuss issues and problems female students face, and how 
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the Wall affected their education, their aspirations and their social life. And to seek an 
explanation of the types of services that the Mothers’ Council provides to the 
students and what social capital instruments they use for fund raising. 
9- The Director of Al-Salam Medical Center. The contribution of the interview was to 
shed light on how the loss of access to local and specialist hospitals in East 
Jerusalem has impacted on the medical services the Center can provide and the 
challenges they face, both physically, financially and logistically, in serving the 
medical and psychological needs of the local community. 
10- The ‘Arab Bank’ Assistant Manager. The contribution of the interview was to 
discuss the bank economic scheme and plans since its establishment, and the 
challenges that the bank had faced after the construction of the Wall and to what 
extent the bank and his customers, from the two divided communities; East 
Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah, were affected. 
11-  Shops owners whose businesses location is very near to the Wall. The 
contribution of these interviews was to shed light on how the Wall impacted the local 
economy.  Al-‘Eizariyah is well known for its 4 km commercial street, the longest in 
the West Bank that starts from Ras Kobsa Junction in the West (the starting point of 
the western part of the Separation Wall), to the Ma’ale Adummim Junction in the east 
(The starting point of the eastern part of the Separation Wall (not constructed yet). 
This junction connects also the north of the West Bank with the south, it suffer always 
from traffic jam. The shops in these two points are the most affected economically by 
the Wall. For this reasons, I thought of randomly choosing another 5-6 persons to 
interview, I thought of the random-walk techniques after I consulted some informants 
and relevant documents from al-‘Eizariyah local council, and some relatives. Based 
on this consultation, I organized a two day tour to the first 500 meters of the Ras 
Kobsa Junction first. The random-walk sampling procedure resulted in a selection 
and then interviewing of five shop owners, two of them were perfectly suitable for a 
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life story interview. One I took on the same day; the other gave me an appointment a 
week later in his house where I also met his wife and children. The second tour was 
for the last 500 meters of the other end of the commercial street before the Ma’ale 
Adummim Junction. Further on, out of five randomly chosen interviewees were 
selected as follows: An Israeli customer of a shop, and the owner of the car’s spare 
parts workshop and carwash station. These two interviews out of the five that have 
been randomly selected were very important in terms of the general understanding of 
the case study itself. 
 
The total number of the in-depth interviews became eighteen. The draft questions for both 
the life story interviews and in-depth interviews were developed with my research supervisor 
at the University of Trento and a scholar from Al-Quds University, who was willing to help. I 
also consulted experts in the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), as they were the founders of social capital 
studies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
 
4- The Life story approach data 
 
Storytelling is a fundamental form of human communication (Atkinson, 1998). It can serve an 
essential function in our lives as we often think and speak in story form. Therefore it can 
bring meaning to our lives, thus giving a narrative account of an event, an experience, or a 
memory. “Life stories cross the embodied and emotional ‘brute’ with the rational and 
irrational ‘know self’. They make links across life phases and cohort generations revealing 
historical shift in culture. They help establish collective memories and imagined 
communities; and they tell of concerns of their time and place” (Plummer, 2001: 395). A life 
story research approach offers a template that can be applied to many research needs, from 
sociological to anthropological, to linguistic and literary. It usually ends up as a short or mini 
autobiography, full of information on research interests and questions. In this context, a life 
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story interview will probe deeper into the personal life and feelings of the interviewee, in a 
way that will help to understand certain social actions within the wider social/political context. 
The life story qualitative research method is also an appropriate way to better understand 
the past. The study of life histories looks at lives as a whole or at significant periods of a life 
(Atkinson, 1998). Using this logic, the life story interviews which were conducted focused on 
the periods before and after the construction of the Wall, covered all the population status 
categories in al-‘Eizariyah, those with a ‘Blue ID’, those who have a ‘Green ID’ with a permit 
and those who have a ‘Green ID’ without a permit. The name list was ordered on the basis of 
gender, age, and types of population origin. The four categories of population origin meant; 
those who were from al-‘Eizariyah itself, those who were refugees, i.e.;  who settled in al-
‘Eizariyah after the 1948 War,  those whose origin is from different areas of the West Bank, 
and finally those who have Israeli residency status. The aim of this variation in interviewees 
was to get under the skin of the social life of a‘l-‘Eizariyah community and discover the 
interaction between the various groups or categories, and to capture the level of cooperation 
amongst them and to assess their integration into the society as a whole. The interviewees 
were chosen from this list. 
The number of life story interviewees depended on the resources and time that was 
available. Ten life story interviews were conducted in different periods, I interviewed the first 
six life stories in al-‘Eizariyah during the first two months, while I managed to interview the 
four of the life stories in East Jerusalem during the last week in the third month of the data 
collection as it was not easy to get a permit for one week for me, the holder of the Green ID 
needing a permit from the Israeli civil administration.  The interview segments of each life 
story are used as data for social capital, social resilience analysis and interpretation. 
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4.5 THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS AND THE CHALLENGES IN THE 
FIELDWORK.      
       
At the beginning of October 2013 I left Trento to go back to conduct the West Bank to 
conduct the research transferring threw the Jordanian Capital Amman. Travel permits from 
both Israeli and Jordanian authorities are required to cross the king Hussein Bridge95 on the 
Jordan River that separates Jordan from Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It is 
currently the sole designated exit/entry point for West Bank Palestinians traveling in and out 
of the region. The destination between Amman and Jerusalem is 80 km; it takes one hour 
drive in normal situation without restricted borders and inspections.  Most times it takes four 
to five hours and all day in holidays and other occasions. I went through the Jericho city to 
al-’Eizariyah and few days later I started the data collection.   
The data collection was carried out by me personally, from arranging appointments to the 
explanation of explaining the research subject, to conducting the interview and recording 
process, to directing him or her to stay on the research-track of the conversation. All 
interviews were downloading on the laptop and were classified according to a selected 
pattern to be recalled and used later. At later stages, the interviews were transformed from 
the audio form to a written script form. Finally they were translated from Arabic to English 
ready to be analyzed. 
 Most of the interviewees had no idea about the concept of social capital, even those who 
have a high educational level; after explaining the concept, most of them later, needed an 
extra explanation for the relationship between the social capital concepts and the Wall as a 
reality. One of the most challenging life story interviews was with the family where the Wall is 
exactly out of their house windows. One of the interview objectives was to examine the very 
direct impact of the Wall on this specific category of the population in the case study setting. 
I proposed my willingness to visit this family and they welcomed the proposal being really 
                                                             
95 King Hussein Bridge is called the Allenby Bridge. 
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excited about it. The Palestinian father was married to a British woman in London seventeen 
years ago while he was a PhD student. She came to live with him in his father house in al-
‘Eizariyah, they have two girls; the eldest is fifteen and the youngest is thirteen. There was 
no chance to talk more about the research in details or about the social capital definition at 
that moment, the general understanding was that they were going to talk about their story 
before and after the Wall that was built on part of their garden separating them from their 
neighbors and its implications on their lives. The appointment was in the evening, one hour 
before the father called me and said to not come with your car as protesters closed the road 
by burning tires, the Israeli tanks were there, the air was loaded with tear gas and other 
types of gases96, it was dangerous and may be it was better if I would have later at night or 
just cancel the whole thing for that day. I preferred to proceed and examine their specific 
location at that specific time in order to capture the practical and the emotional aspects of 
this family. I was willing to take the risk despite the dangerous situation. 
Figure 19: The interviewee’s daughters talking to their friends through the Wall in 2008 before it was sealed in 2009. Source: 
The father.  
 At the beginning the father talked about troubles they 
faced and still facing on daily bases because of the 
house location; the protests are always at the entrance 
of their house, sometimes they have to wait for hours till 
the area is safe. The wife talked about living almost 
alone in this neighborhood, most of the neighbors moved 
to a safer place. She expressed her feelings regarding 
her daughters who’ve been separated from their friends 
who live next door and provides me with a picture in 
which the girls were talking to their friends behind the 
wall before it was completely sealed.  Although I explained perfectly well the objective of the 
                                                             
96 Tear gas is usually used by the Israeli army during demonstrations.  Recently they are using a type of 
gas that had a very bad smell just like the stink of swage as means of harassment. 
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interview when I arrived yet there was a misunderstanding as the father found some of the 
questions provocative. He is a conservative man; he did not like when his wife revealed 
some information on the personal level.  The tension started when the wife addressed him: “I 
want to rent a house somewhere else, your father’s house will stay here, our quality of life is 
more important, we can come and visit, or we could come back when the situation is better”. 
At that moment, the atmosphere was very tense between them. The father explodes later 
when I asked his daughter about her feelings and how she compared the life in al-‘Eizariyah 
with the life in London where they went every year to visit their grandparents. He shouted: 
“this question has nothing to do with the Wall” I do not like your questions”. I had to control 
the situation as much as I could, and explained again that the research is about the impact 
of the Wall on social capital in general and strong and weak ties in particular. The eldest 
daughter panicked out of fear for her father, she brought the machine to measure his blood 
pressure. I felt that I violated one of the most important interview ethics; ‘Non-maleficence’ 
which means that researchers should avoid harming participants97.  
 As for all the other interviewees, their reactions were smooth and easy going, but that does 
not mean it was easy all the way. One of the key informant interviews, for example, was 
carried out in 4 phases; two times at the interviewee house in al-‘Eizariyah, the third time 
over a diner in Ramallah, the last one at the interviewee office in Jerusalem. In order to enter 
Jerusalem I needed a permit to pass by foot through al- Zaytoon “Olive” checkpoint or by 
any public transportation through al- Za’ayyem checkpoint. At the time my traveling permit 
was not yet ready. Time was a crucial element in this case as I needed to interview the key 
informant as soon as possible before his travelling outside the country in a couple of days 
and he preferred his office as a meeting point. One of my Jerusalemite friends offered to 
smuggle me with her car, she said: usually they do not stop me, I am blonde and not 
wearing a veil, they usually think I am one of the settlers. At al-Za’ayyem highway checkpoint 
the cars are forced to drive in a very low speed, and then, at a certain point, the soldiers stop 
                                                             
97 See “The ethics of ethnography” Murphy, E., & Dingwall, R. (2001). 
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cars that they suspect. They would check identity cards of the passengers and driver and 
they could ask to search the car. The probability to be stopped was 50 percent, everything 
was legal with my friend; she held a ‘Blue ID’ and an Israeli driving license while also, driving 
a car with an Israeli plate number. The only problem was that if they stopped her with me in 
the car then all passengers in any means of transportation would have had to hold a ‘Blue 
ID’ or a ‘Green ID’ with a valid traveling permit to go through that checkpoint. Acting normally 
worked and the soldiers did not stop the car. This was a dangerous thing to do but 
fortunately I got a permit for one week from 7:00 in the morning till 7:00 in the evening. This 
was not enough to conduct other interviews in East Jerusalem. 
Another dangerous situation I had to face was when I came back from Ramallah late at night 
after an interview with the same key informant. Before the closure and the construction of 
the Wall, residents of al-‘Eizariyah used to go to Ramallah through Jerusalem. It used to take 
approximately half an hour to drive to Ramallah. Since the Wall was built the reality changed 
and people have had to take a longer route to Ramallah threw the road to Jericho, and at the 
Abu-George junction they turn north to Qalandia98 Junction and only then go to Ramallah.  
This new journey usually takes from one hour to two hours depending on how fast the 
inspection is at the Jaba’99 checkpoint. That night, while I was coming back from Ramallah to 
al-‘Eizariyah through the same route, I noticed a strange movement at Qalandia; the cars 
with Israeli plate numbers were turning back. The Qalandia checkpoint was closed because 
of confrontations between protesters and the Israeli army because one of the protesters from 
the Qalandia refugee camp was injured in clashes and died. Protesters from the refugee 
camp put old tires on fire and they were throwing stones to express their anger. I heard the 
shooting by the Israeli soldiers but decided to continue as my car was relatively far, about 
                                                             
98 Qalandia is the main checkpoint between the northern West Bank and Jerusalem. Most of the people 
who use the checkpoint are residents of East Jerusalem separated from the city by the Separation Wall. 
99 Jaba' village’s name is thought to have come from the Aramaic word ‘Jaba'’ (‘the high hill’). It is located 
on the way to Ramalla. 
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200 meters away from the clashes. I could have been shot accidently or my car could have 
been targeted by stones or bullets.  
Some of the interviews, especially with people that I already know, were very informative. I 
thought that I knew almost everything about the research problem but I needed to confirm it 
by others’ narratives. I discovered that my knowledge was limited to my own thoughts and 
observations and there is much more to learn. The trust that was developed between me 
and the people over the years served this research a great deal. The interviewees revealed 
some delicate information that I would never reach without this trust.  Other interviews were 
very long as they were conducted in the interviewee working place; have been interrupted for 
many reasons, but the waiting time has stimulated more practical observations of the 
environment where the interviewee was working and the type of work he or she was doing. 
One of the most interesting interviews was with a carwash workshop at his working place. 
While interviewing, an Israeli customer with his wife, the wife did not speak Arabic nor 
English and I did not speak Hebrew but we both managed to communicate in Italian, the 
Israeli's wife was born in Libya where she learned some Italian. They discussed general 
political and economic issues; this conversation opened other types of questions about his 
customers from the settlement of Ma’ale Adummim, and how the relationship was before 
and after the construction of the Wall. 
 During the ethnography period of my research, there were confrontations every day in the 
evening and demonstrations near the Wall which cut the main road in the western entrance 
of al-‘Eizariyah.  Young volunteers from the town created ways to warn the car drivers and 
direct them to other safer bystreets to avoid getting trapped in the areas where clashes 
were. 
4.6 THE DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH 
  
Review of the literature of social capital has, however, shown that there are two approaches 
upon which many empirical studies have been conducted. The first focuses on behavioral 
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variables and attitudes including trust, norms, and values, while the second emphasizes 
measuring the position of individuals in networks (Adam and Roncvic, 2003). In this research 
the focus is on the cognitive form of social capital. Therefore the data analysis will depend 
on the categorization of the data according to trust in general, and between individuals, 
norms and practices in addition to values. The analyses of social capital include three levels, 
namely macro, meso, and micro. On the macro level, it consists of assembling key events in 
the historical review Chapter that “may not only produce an insightful descriptive pattern but 
also may hint at possible causal relationships, because any presumed causal condition must 
precede any presumed outcome condition” (Yin, 2011: 16). Indeed, the historic events that 
were traced back in Chapter Two show that the reality of today is a product of the past. 
The variety of data collection from different sources such as observations, in-depth 
interviews and life stories are checked to ensure consistency of the findings and sources 
(e.g., Duneier, 1999, pp. 345–347) for the analyses of social capital at both meso and micro 
level in the empirical chapter. In other words, triangulating the data in order to establish 
converging lines of evidence to make the findings as robust as possible, and by using an 
explanation-building technique, the evidence will be presented with sufficient clarity (e.g., in 
separate texts, tables, and exhibits) to allow readers to judge independently the 
interpretation of the data and not to mix between evidence and interpretation. 
The analyses covers also the social resilience element in the case study setting, how the 
residents of al-'Eizariyah responded to the shock of the physical obstruction of the Wall and 
all the restrictions that resulted on a day to day basis, including restrictions on access to 
work, housing, health facilities, education, services, and family and social life. The social 
capital element and its role in local development, in such circumstances, will be analyzed to 
better understand the factors that prevent reaching the ultimate objective of social capital 
that is the collective action. 
With the context depicted in this chapter in mind, the next chapter will focus on the empirical 
investigation carried out in al-‘Eizariyah. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH  
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The second section of this chapter after the introduction, illustrates the research main 
problem and explains how the reality of al-'Eizariyah changed in the last two decades. It 
shows at first how al-’Eizariyah expanded to adjust with the new economic boom coupled 
with the political expectations of being part of the future capital of the State of Palestine 
according to the Oslo Accords. Second, it shows how the Wall completely isolated al-
‘Eizaryah and prevented its residents from entering East Jerusalem since mid-2004. The 
following section presents the situation before the Wall, then it focuses on how the Wall 
affected social organizations by restricting access to education, housing, medical services, 
work and social life. Then a discussion on the direct social effect of the Wall such as 
displacement and loss of services, and the indirect effect explaining how the Wall became 
invisible in the eyes of most of the town residents, analyzing the absence of urban planning 
and how the Wall change the social relation map especially in intermarriage relationships. 
And finally the indirect effect of the Wall on political views of the residents of al-‘Eizariyah. 
To study the impact of the Wall on the Palestinian social capital dynamics, types and 
characteristics requires an understanding of the geopolitical environment and al-‘Eizariyahs’ 
social structure. Therefore, the third section of this chapter starts with a discussion on how 
the Oslo Accords categorization; Area B in the center and Area C for the surroundings of al-
‘Eizariyah, encouraged the diffusion of informal economy. Then, an overview of al-
‘Eizariyahs’ social structure to shed light on the locals, and the rest of the displaced 
population in terms of their origin, the level of integration with the locals and among various 
displaced groups, and when and why they were displaced and whether it was for political or 
economic reasons. 
The fifth section investigates the structured social forces that shape al-‘Eizariyah social 
capital in particular and the Palestinian social capital as a whole. It starts with a discussion 
on al-‘Eizariyah social fragmentation explaining the conceptual local/stranger relationship 
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which is further discussed in barriers to collective action section. It displays the types of 
‘strangers’ and the locals’ reaction towards each type. Then follows a discussion about how 
traditions, politics and competition prevent collective action that could resolve community 
problems. In addition, to a discussion on gender inequality from the perspective of education 
and religion and other factors that influence collective action.  
The next section demonstrates the role Civil Society associations in serving the community 
of al-‘Eizariyah and in its role of raising awareness regarding the construction of the Wall. 
The following section tackles the effect of the Wall on social capital from horizontal and 
vertical relationships explaining how bonding and bridging social capital been used as 
coping strategies, first on social capital at the family and extended family levels, then at the 
community level covering the social security issue, education and health care. 
 The last part of this chapter looks at the Wall as a physical intervention shock. The socio-
economic resilience in terms of the time it took the community to rebound from this man-
made hazard and its implication on local development is considered. And the adaptation and 
adjustment strategies, which cover many aspects other than economic, such as education 
and health care, are studied as part of the social resilience that prepares the residents to 
deal with the challenges that al-‘Eizariyah is facing and will face in the future. 
5.2 AL- ‘EIZARIYAH FROM QUASI CAPITAL TO AN ARAB GHETTO  
 
The reality of al-'Eizariyah has changed dramatically in the last two decades. In the first 
period, after the Oslo Accords (1993), al-’Eizariyah expanded to adjust with the new 
economic boom coupled with the political expectations of being part of the future capital of 
the State of Palestine that is East Jerusalem. Palestinian Banks, governmental associations 
and other economic institutions found in al-'Eizariyah an alternative to East Jerusalem, as 
the Palestinian Authority was not allowed to function in East Jerusalem. Al-’Eizariyah 
residents doubled during this period as many Palestinians came from different parts of the 
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West Bank and settled down to invest in the town . All of this socio-economic growth has 
been disrupted by the failure of the Oslo Accords, and the construction of the Wall that 
disconnect the town from its center. The Wall completely isolated al-‘Eizaryah and prevented 
its residents from entering East Jerusalem with some exceptions since mid-2004. Unless 
they have the Israeli identity card (Blue ID) or a Palestinian identity card (Green ID) with a 
permit  to reach Jerusalem through only two controlled entrances, one is for pedestrians; the 
al- Zaytoon “Olive” checkpoint, and the other is for Israeli vehicles only; the al- Za’ayyem 
check point. Until the Wall was built, there was a residential continuum between al-‘Eizariyah 
and East Jerusalem. Although there are main differences in the legal status of the residents 
of both sides of the Wall, the distinction was purely artificial: the social interaction did not 
correspond to this distinction. 
Many of al-‘Eizariyahs’ populations use to work in East Jerusalem and Israel, thus they have 
strong economic and social ties with East Jerusalem and its suburbs. Al-‘Eizariyah 
depended on East Jerusalem in almost all aspect of life such as access to education, health 
care and entertainment and other social activities. This was disrupted since 28 of March 
1993 when Israel announced a full closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the 
Palestinians were prohibited from entering Israel including East Jerusalem with some 
exceptions. The implementations of ‘the Oslo Accords’ did not change these restrictions; on 
the contrary it escalated them to reach the complete physical separation by the Wall. This 
had severe economic consequences; the unemployment rate has risen because those who 
used to work in Jerusalem became unable to reach their jobs. Hospitals of East Jerusalem 
became out of reach; the one small clinic of the town cannot meet the needs of the residents 
therefore women in labor, and those requiring advanced medical care have to drive to the 
nearest city hospitals in Jericho or Ramallah or Bethlehem. The same situation when it 
comes to schooling and socio-economic activities no matter whether shopping for everyday 
life necessities or for the wedding ceremonies that used to take place in the halls of the big 
hotels in East Jerusalem. The Wall had cut off the main road that used to connect the town 
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with the cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem through East Jerusalem. The long alternative 
bypass roads alongside the Wall are costly and time consuming. In addition to the disruption 
of the public transportation system that was efficiently serving the population before the Wall. 
This raised the number of private cars and encouraged the diffusion of the illegal unlicensed 
vehicles for internal transportation. The Wall also redirected the social relations map as 
follows. The ID categorizations ability of inclusion or exclusion became visible and the 
cornerstone of residents' and non-residents' decision-making process, especially on such 
issues as where to live, work or study, and even who to marry. The Wall influences their 
surviving strategies while keeping the Israeli oppression at their backdrop. 
1- The Direct Social Effect of the Wall  
              Displacement  
 
The direct social effect of the Wall was the displacement of some residents of al-Eizariyah. 
The displacement depended on the resident’s house location and the resident type of the 
identity card they hold either blue ID or green ID. Therefore Ash’Shayyah neighborhood is 
the most affected because the Wall literally runs down in the middle of the main street 
leaving half of their residents on the Israeli side of the Wall, and imprisoning the other half 
inside the Wall as shown in the picture bellow. 
 
Figure 20: The Wall in Ash’Shayyah neighborhood. Source: www.arij.org, 2012  
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Ash’Shayyah including and Kobsa Junction100 are the affluent northwest neighborhood of al-
‘Eizariyah, considered to be one of the most organized neighborhoods in al-‘Eizariyah, 
famous for its beautiful houses and its residents’ high standard of living. This neighborhood 
was the most affected by the Wall, not only because of the Wall located very close to the 
houses but also because most of its residents are from the Jerusalemites who held the 
Israeli Identification card (the blue ID). The neighborhood is almost abandoned now; the 
residents had to take fateful decisions. Abu Mahmoud who is a Jerusalemite who settled in 
al-‘Eizariyah in the late fifties explained: 
 
“We left our spacious house empty in Ash-Shayyah. I closed the bakery that had 
been established by my late father in the fifties. Now my wife and I are living with our 
son’s family in his small apartment in Shuafat101, within the Jerusalem municipality 
boundaries, because we are afraid of losing our (blue ID) residency card” (Abu 
Mahmoud, November 12, 2013). 
 
This family has been paying taxes to the Israeli government for a long time and now, as 
they are growing old, they do not want to lose the health insurance and other social 
services benefits attached to the taxpayer's ID. Now they know that this is not a 
temporary situation but they cannot afford to buy a house in Jerusalem, especially as the 
chance of selling their own, at a good price, is almost impossible.  
 
“Who is going to buy a house close to the Wall? Plus it is hard to even think of selling the 
place. It’s not only our family house; it’s our life’s work and struggle, our strong social relations 
and memories. It is not easy to let it go. My father bought that piece of land for housing and to 
establish a family business. Our uncle came and bought the other piece of land. My two 
                                                             
100 Kobsa Junction is the joining point of East Jerusalem suburbs; Silwan, abu-Dis and al-‘Eizariyah. 
101 Shuafat is one of East Jerusalem suburbs outside the Wall. 
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sisters were married to our neighbor’s sons. We became a big family there. Our bakery 
products were delivered, not only to Jerusalem and the suburbs, but to the north and the 
south of the West Bank.  We suffered a lot during the Intifada but we never thought of leaving 
our houses; now we have no other choice” (Abu Mahmoud, November 12, 2013). 
 
Others who hold a West Bank ID (the green ID) still living in Ash’Shayyah because they 
have no other choice but to stay or displace themselves far from the Wall, but within the 
West Bank, as they are not allowed to live in East Jerusalem.  Martha, the British woman 
with two kids who is married to a Palestinian and lives in Ash-Shayyah, the Wall passes by 
their garden separating them from their neighbors shared her story: 
 
I want to rent a house somewhere else. All of our neighbors have left, there is no one left here 
but us. Your fathers’ house will stay here [pointing at her husband], we can come and visit, or 
we could return when the situation is better, our quality of life has declined. When I came to 
live here in 1993, I could go to Jerusalem and any other place in Israel, but not anymore. They 
took the Israeli driving license away from me because of the Wall which drew a border; I am in 
the same house but it's considered to be in the West Bank now. Every day we don’t know if 
we can come back home or not because of the daily confrontations with the Israeli troops; we 
cannot avoid the tear gas, even if we close the windows, we are here almost alone. Our 
neighbors, who have children the same age as my daughters, who used to play together, now 
live in another country two meters away. That’s Israel behind the Wall, and here we are in the 
West Bank. (Martha
102
, November 30, 2013).  
 
The attached picture (the previous figure: 19) was taken while the two daughters were 
talking to their friends through the cracks of the Wall while it was still being built. The family 
had to withdraw their daughters from their school in Jerusalem, they lost their school mates 
and now they lost also their neighboring friends. 
                                                             
102 Martha is a British woman married to a Palestinian with two daughters, 13 and 15 years old. They live 
in Ash-Shayyah. The Wall passes by their garden separating them from their neighbors. 
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During this interview, it was clear that Israeli policies and laws affect even those who hold 
foreign passports. Martha cannot stay 
in the same house with an Israeli 
tourist visa any more. The Wall drew a 
border and she became a West Bank 
resident, and has started to suffer like 
any other Palestinian citizen. Still 
worse was the division they started to 
experience as a family. She wanted to 
rent a house somewhere else to avoid 
the daily suffering and suggested that 
the family come back to their family 
home at weekends, but her Palestinian 
husband refused.                    Figure 19: the daughters talking to their friends through the Wall. Source: The father.  
 
For him, leaving means surrender and would be a betrayal of his father's soul and the 
Palestinian cause. The husband never belonged to al-‘Eizariyah and always felt a stranger. 
“We are refugees; we left our home in Safad103 once. It was a big mistake, and we are not 
going to leave this one too” he said.  His decision is not rational, he knows it, but he does not 
think he should leave, no matter what. Their daughters are following the argument; suddenly 
the 13 year old says “It’s the United States of America to blame for this”.  
 
As shown before, the most direct ongoing hardship is suffered by those who live close to the 
Wall, and those who hold the blue ID (the Jerusalemite). Most of them adapted themselves 
to the situation and reorganized their lives around the Wall and they coexist with it despite 
the difficulties. The Italian “Santa Marta Dei Padri Passionisti” monastery, for example was 
                                                             
103 Safad is a city in historic Palestinian which is now in Israel. 
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included within the Jerusalem municipality boundaries thus continued serving the community 
of al-‘Eizariyah. Karima the monastery kinder-garden teacher explained the situation: 
 
“An 8 meter tall Wall became our convent fence.  The Wall’s route decided that the Santa 
Maria pre-school is on the Israeli side of the Wall, now our students use a controlled doorway 
through the Wall. We tried our best to create normal environment; the ‘Sisters’ painted the 
Wall on the inside and decorated it with paintings of trees and flowers to camouflage the Wall 
ugliness as you see in these pictures” (Karima Hishma
104
 , December 12, 2013). 
 
 
 
Figure 21&22: Santa Maria pre-school. Source: Karima Hishma, 2013. 
 
However, not all the parents agreed to adapt to this controlled environment for their 
children’s school. Ali who is a father of a 5 year old girl and lives in al-‘Eizariyah said: 
 
 “We are already living in a big prison. I do not want to expose my little girl to this experience. 
The school became like a mini-prison despite that the Sisters trying their best to create a 
normal environment inside. I have decided to keep my daughter at home for the time being 
until she is accepted in to another school. Before the Wall, it was easy to enroll your child in 
any of al-‘Eizariyah schools, but now schools have become crowded. Most of those who used 
                                                             
104 Karima Hishma is a pre-school teacher who lives in al-Eizariya and teaches in the Italian convent in the 
north west of the town. 
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to study in Jerusalem are studying in al-‘Eizariyah because of the checkpoint regime. I have 
no other choice but to wait”. (Ali, December 5, 2013). 
 
The Jerusalemite who didn’t live directly beside the Wall but in the center of al-‘Eizariyah or 
in al-Mashroo area, also had to take fateful decisions in order to keep their blue ID; Lana 
who works at Al-Quds University’s is a Jerusalemite with a blue ID, and had lived most of her 
life in al-‘Eizariyah before she decided to leave. Lana a Jerusalemite mother of two 
explained her situation: 
 
“Our lives changed dramatically. My husband and I and our two children had to leave our 
relatively cheap rented, large apartment in al-‘Eizariyah, and sell our furniture to live in a very 
small apartment with my in-laws in Jerusalem. Previously, in 10 minutes, I used to be at Al-
Quds University, in Abu-Dis, where I work. Now, because of the Wall, I have to drive 45 
minutes, at least, along the bypass road, and go through al-Za’ayyem check point, to get to 
my work from Jerusalem. We are suffering to keep our blue ID and to make sure that our 
children will be registered as residents of Jerusalem. We had to move. The Israeli national 
insurance makes unannounced visits to make sure we actually live inside the municipality 
borders. Both of my parents are retired and are still living in their home in al-‘Eizariyah, but in 
uncertain environment, they are suffering too” (Lana, November 26, 2013) 
 
The Jerusalemites who did not move out of al-‘Eizariyah are living in suspension; unsure 
about their future movement and worried about the possible closure of the eastern entrance 
of the town. If the entrance were to close, it would mean that they would not be able to enter 
East Jerusalem by car through al-Za’ayyem105 checkpoint. This will also affect the 
Jerusalemite who lives in East Jerusalem and work in al-‘Eizariyah or Abu-Dis. The only 
entry would be the pedestrian checkpoint at al- Zaytoon (Olive). 
                                                             
105 This checkpoint is located on the bypass road that connects the settlements, in the occupied West 
Bank, to East Jerusalem and Israel. 
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The Loss of Services 
 
In addition to the displacement problem comes the loss of services such as education, 
health care and public transportation. Many of al-‘Eizariyah students used to study in the 
schools of East Jerusalem, the same happened to health care, the Wall has prevented 
people from accessing these services and they have to turn to alternatives to solve the 
problem. Some of these alternatives helped in the local development such as new schools or 
medical centers, others are harming the environment such as the growing use of private cars 
(of questionable quality that damages the environment) in the absence of public 
transportation. Mrs. Sara who is interested in community services explained her concern: 
 
“We do not have good roads but we have lots of cars now that make walking in the streets of 
al-“Eizariyah almost impossible. Before the Wall we had the public transportation that connect 
the town with East Jerusalem and Jericho, now these services had stopped, therefore many 
had to buy cars for their own internal transportations because taxies are too expensive, the 
heavy traffic is harming the environment and causing pollution in addition to the discomfort, it 
is hardly bearable” (Sara, November 13, 2013).  
2- The Indirect Effect of the Wall  
 
The Jerusalemites group (blue ID holders) got accustomed and adapted to the new reality. 
They reorganized their lives around the Wall and they coexist with the hardships. While the 
vast majority of the population of al-‘Eizariyah (green ID) who were denied access to East 
Jerusalem, also adapted their lives to the new reality but in a way that normalize the 
existence of the Wall. They slowly accepted the fact that East Jerusalem is no longer the 
center of their social and economic activities, and they organized their lives accordingly. The 
personal pictures below were taken to document a social event without any consideration of 
the Wall in the back ground of these photos. Perhaps, these pictures demonstrate the 
psychological adjustment and an act of ignoring the Wall. While it is clear that the Wall is 
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part of the general landscape in a way that the majority does not consider its presence 
anymore, they have learned to not think about it. The Wall has become invisible.  
  
Figure 23&24: Personal pictures with the Wall in the background. Source: Facebook 2013. 
 
The Palestinian’s adapting has become necessary but it has since dispersed their personal 
resources; meaning that it increased the cost of living. Khawla who is a Jerusalemite married 
to a West Bank ID holder man and teaches math at Al-Quds University in Abu-Dis, described 
the indirect effect of the Wall on her family life: 
 
“The occupation entered my own bedroom; the Israelis decide if I and my husband can meet 
or not, and where. My husband has a West Bank ID (green), and he needs a permit to visit me 
in Jerusalem. We had to have two houses, one in my husband’s town in the West Bank and 
another in Jerusalem, we are (my children and I) afraid of losing our blue IDs. We used to rent 
houses in Jerusalem for that purpose until we managed to build one last year. It costs a 
fortune to have a house in Jerusalem, as you know, and this year we bought an apartment in 
Abu-Dis too. I thought of my two daughters who are studying medicine in Al-Quds University; 
It takes hours to move from our house in Jabal Al-Mukaber to Abu-Dis and return. They need 
this time to study. We have to be prepared. If the eastern entrance of al-‘Eizariyah were to 
close, it would mean that we would not be able to reach the university by public or private 
transportation through al-Za’ayyem check point as we do now. The only way will be as 
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pedestrians via the al- Zaytoon “Olive” checkpoint; to have an apartment inside the Wall 
solves some of these problems and worries” (Khawla, October 29, 2013). 
 
This family is distributed over three locations, and she is running from one place to the other 
wasting her physical, emotional, and material resources. Most of the people react to the 
Israeli policies through a constant search for solutions which, inevitably, disperse their 
personal resources. “As families grow and children marry, there is an even greater demand 
on the limited housing available in East Jerusalem. This has driven many to build without 
permits, and live in fear that, one day, the Israeli authorities will demolish their homes”106. 
Many have moved to the suburbs even at the risk of losing social security benefits, while 
others simply cannot afford any of these solutions. The Center for Advancement of Peace 
Initiatives (CAPI) noted that “The occupied people consider the circumstances in the territory 
as an abhorrent situation, in which they must organize for survival, rather than for a full life 
(CAPI, 2014; 7).  
 
The Absence of Urban Planning 
 
The life story interview referred to in the previous section took place in the interviewee’s new 
apartment. The building’s entrance was still under construction while they were living in the 
apartment already because of the economic crises and the hardships caused by the 
construction of the Wall. This has become a general rule and an acceptable attitude: people 
care about the inside of their house and they will live in un finished buildings considering this 
act as normal with the idea that it will be completed at later stages, which can take up to 
some more years. This has its impact on the aesthetics level of the general look of the town 
and became an acceptable approach, which enforce the attitude of neglect to the common 
                                                             
106 This analysis was discussed in my article “Al-‘Eizariya (Bethany) and the Wall: From the 
Quasi-Capital of Palestine to an Arab Ghetto” in the Palestine-Israel Journal (2014). 
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space. Dust, the lack of green areas and many eyesores, from scattered trash to unpaved 
side-streets, and the unorganized poorly designed and unfinished high-rise buildings gives a 
general sense of chaos. Although this kind of a problem is common in most developing 
countries, some analyses of the visible seen would often explain stigmatize the behavior of 
the residents as those that are culturally inherent, meaning that chaos is part of the 
Palestinian culture. Also another view sees this chaos as systemic and a natural 
development in such political, economic and cultural circumstances. And third opinion is 
advanced that it was planned by Israel to create this huge gap between Israel and the 
Occupied Territories in order to establish and propagate a negative image of the Palestinian 
people. 
 
The Change in the Social Relation Map 
 
Many of al-‘Eizariyah families, had strong social ties with families living within East 
Jerusalem, mainly by intermarriage. After the Wall, It became difficult for relatives to meet 
and support each other in times of celebration and commiseration. Mr. Izhiman is a 
Jerusalemite who settled in al-‘Eizariyah, before the 1967 war with his immediate family. 
Accordingly they were issued with green West Bank IDs. Mr. Izhiman complained: 
 
“Who would have ever imagined that there would come a time when we would be 
forbidden from entering our own capital city to join our family for funerals and 
weddings? My uncle passed away the other day, I couldn’t be there to pay him 
respect before the funeral; by the time I got a permit to pass through the checkpoint 
everything was over. The other day we received visitors, a father, a mother and a 
potential groom. They left immediately when we told them that we held West Bank ID 
cards. I cannot blame them, they are looking for a bride who can join their son and 
live with him in Jerusalem” (Izhiman, November 25, 2013). 
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Many studies expected that the population mobility along and across the Wall would lead to 
certain difficulties in the short run, and would change the demographic structure of the 
communities in the medium and long term (PCBS, 2004). Jamila who is a mother of a 32 
year old son shared her story: 
 
“I suggested a beautiful, educated relative to be the future bride for my son. He replied:  I 
know her and I like her but she holds a blue ID and I hold a green one. I’ve seen how much 
my friends have suffered in such a situation. It is not only about the difficulties of visiting the 
family; it extends to the type of IDs their children will receive. This will split the family 
eventually and I don’t think it’s wise to go through this, we should instead be rational and think 
twice” (Jamila
107
, December 1
st
, 2013). 
    
Indeed the pattern of marriage during the past ten years has changed. The exclusion from 
and inclusion in Jerusalem has resulted in a different social relationship map being drawn 
and the social structure has changed. People tend to marry someone who has been issued 
with the same ID to avoid the social difficulties they would face otherwise. 
 
The Change in Political Opinions 
 
The Wall raises the political awareness and frustration among the young generation. During 
the Martha family interview, the father found it important that his two young daughters who’s 
half Palestinian and half British were fully aware of the conflict to enforce their Palestinian 
national identity. The father also criticized those Palestinian workers who he had seen 
asking for a job from the Israelis during the construction of the Wall in his own yard. The 
Palestinians who managed to get a working permit are still working in the settlements and 
inside Israel. This has created an inter conflict between their national identity and their 
economic needs, in addition to the image that some of the Palestinians are seen as 
                                                             
107 Jamila is a mother of a 32 year old son,  
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collaborators108 with the Israelis especially if the work they do is involved in construction, 
either in the settlement or the Wall during the time it was under construction. 
The young men, who believe in struggle against the occupation, keep on throwing stones 
and putting used tires on fire at the west entrance that was blocked by the Wall almost every 
day. The Israeli army retaliates by throwing gas bombs as a collective punishment. This 
particular area suffered a lot economically, most of the shops are closed and others 
complain from low frequency of customer’s visits. Mr. Ahmed Al-Khatib whose pharmacy is 
very close to the daily clashes area had another opinion: 
 
“These masked young men are paid by Israel to keep this area unstable to justify the 
refusal of the settlers of Ma’ale Adummim demand to reopen this road for them as it 
is closer to Jerusalem from the bypass road Israel built for them, and they rise a case 
in front of the Israeli supreme court against the construction of the Wall” (Ahmad 
Khatib, December 1
st
, 2013). 
 
Others confirm this opinion and doubt their motive and believe that the Palestinian Authority 
works as an agent to Israel and instructed the demonstrators to carry on this daily act to 
serve the Israeli aims. The trust in the Palestinian Authority is at stake and dwindling, many 
think that the outbreak of the third Intifada, if it will happen, would be against both Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority. 
5.3 THE IMPACT OF THE OSLO ACCORDS ON LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: THE 
DIFFUSION OF INFORMAL ECONOMY 
 
The field work of this research was started in October of 2013 in the West Bank. It took a few 
days to start the interviewing work. However the observation and the scheduling of the 
                                                             
108 The term ‘collaborator’ usually used to those Palestinians who provide the Israeli intelligent with 
information and not for those who work in Israel.   
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interviews program started from the first day.  Returning to the researcher’s home in al-
’Eizariyah after two years of absence had its impact; the town had deteriorated visually and 
environmentally over this period. The first thing I observed in al-‘Eizariyah was the high 
residential density coupled with a general sense of chaos: rubbish and secondhand furniture, 
old machinery and other eyesores on the sidewalks at the main entrance of the town, 
unlicensed vehicles, traffic jams, unpaved side-streets and unorganized, poorly designed 
and unfinished high-rise buildings. 
 
The high density was understandable because al-‘Eizariyah’s loss of land was systematic 
since the Israeli Occupation in the year 1967. To illustrate the land of al-‘Eizariyah was some 
1,135 hectares during the British Mandate period, when Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 
1967, it also annexed some 43 hectares of al-‘Eizariyah land to expand Jerusalem’s 
municipal borders (B’Tselem, 2009). In 1975 Israel expropriated appreciable part of al-
‘Eizariyah land to establish the settlement of Ma’ale Adummim. In 1982, tens of hectares 
more, which lie in the area called E1109, were declared Israeli government property. As a 
result, al-‘Eizariyah’s reserve land diminished greatly; consequently, a pattern of dense 
construction emerged in the town, almost every plot available for construction is utilized for 
tall buildings, and inside the town there is little open space left (Ibid). 
 
In 1995, the Israeli Civil Administration approved a ‘special outline plan’ that “does not mark 
building plots and does not allocate land for commerce and industry, for public gardens, for 
cemeteries, and so forth. The 2.2 percent of the land designated for public buildings is 
miniscule. …The planning scheme sets a high residential density, running from 66 to 150 
housing units per net hectare” (B’Tselem, 2009: 50). 
 
                                                             
109 See map: Figure 7 
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Figure 25&26: al-‘Eizariyah Eastern Entrance. Source: The researcher private camera (October, 2013) 
 
The spatial concentrations of the population had negative effects, not only on the current 
situation but also upon the opportunities to improve the social conditions in the future 
(Ostendorf & De Vos (2001). 
According to the Oslo Accords (1993) the West Bank was divided into three criteria: Areas A, 
B and C. First, Areas A have a full civil and security control via the Palestinian Authority and 
these include eight Palestinian cities and their surrounding areas. Second, Areas B have 
Palestinian civil control and the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Security Control; this includes part of 
al-‘Eizariyah. And finally Areas C have full Israeli civil and security control which includes the 
entrance and the surrounding outskirts of al-‘Eizariyah. The ex-Mayor of al-'Eizariyah, Mr. 
Isam Faroon explained:  
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“The eastern entrance of the town, close to Ma’ale Adummim settlement and also the 
surroundings of the town are in area C. We are forbidden to interfere in this area. There is no 
extra space for al-‘Eizariyah to expand to. Most of the town’s free space was already used and 
what remained was only 20 percent of what was rightly ours. Israel confiscated 80% of our land 
reserves for future growth. There is no possibility to expand laterally. The outskirts of al-
‘Eizariyah were confiscated by the Israel to build the settlement of Ma’ale Adummim, and to 
construct the bypass roads and the Wall. The remaining land was designated as area C. The 
majority of the town are area B, which means an area without National Security Forces 
(Palestinian police), and this explains the chaos we are living in” (Isam Faroon, November 12, 
2013).   
 
This classification of A, B, C areas was supposed to be temporary. The initial proposal was 
that within 18 months, Areas C would be gradually transferred to Areas B, and Areas B to 
Areas A until all of the West Bank, except Israeli military locations and settlements, became 
Areas A with full Palestinian control of security and civilian affairs. The attorney-at-law from 
al- ‘Eizariyah Mr. Ziad AbuZayyad who is also a former Palestinian Authority minister and a 
former member of the Palestinian Legislative Council further explained: 
 
“All of this was disrupted by the end of 1999. Ehud Barak, the then Prime Minister, was against 
the gradual transfer and reclassification of land and suggested to postpone the final stage. In 
2000, Ariel Sharon became the Prime Minister and it all fell apart. The status quo remained and 
Areas A, B and C remained, until the present. The Oslo Accords, however, fell far short of the 
promise of a Palestinian state”. (AbuZayyad, 5 November, 2013). 
 
Therefore the implementation of the process was halted half-way, and the West Bank 
remains divided into three administrative divisions: Areas A, B, and C, all with different civic 
and security authorization (Jamal, 2009). The categorization of Areas A, B, and C were 
based on the Palestinian population density. All Palestinian cities with a high population 
density became Areas A and were given to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) with full 
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civil and security control. It is in these areas that the Palestinian Police is based. After the 
redeployment of Israeli military forces and the transfer of responsibility to the Palestinian 
Police, it is the only Palestinian security that has the authority to systematically act against 
all expressions of violence and terror within these areas. This means that the Palestinian 
Authority is responsible for preventing violence and terror against Israel, as well as for the 
civil security of the Palestinians under its sovereignty. For Areas B, the towns where the 
Palestinian population density is less, there is a different interpretation of the term “joint 
Israeli-Palestinian security control”. For the Israelis, security means only the security of 
Israel, not the civil security of the Palestinians. That is why Israeli security forces only 
interfere in Areas B when there is a threat to their own security but indifferent when it comes 
to Palestinian civil security. When a burglary occurs in al-‘Eizariyah, for example, the Israelis 
take no interest in it. However, Palestinian police based in the nearest Area A, cannot go 
straight to the crime scene without first getting permission from the Israelis via the Joint 
Security Coordination Office. This usually takes up to forty-eight hours to be convened, 
according to the Cairo Protocol110, and of course this is utterly useless in the case of any 
emergencies.  AbuZayyad further explained: 
 
“Al-‘Eizariyah, as Area B in its center and Area C in its east and western entrances and in its 
surroundings, has a very difficult situation when it comes to civil security. 25,000 of al-
’Eizariyah’s inhabitants are without the services of any National Security Forces (Palestinian 
police.)”  (AbuZayyad, November 5, 2013). 
 
On the objective level, it is common knowledge that the administrative authority Palestinians 
have over Areas B, without the presence of law and order, is irrelevant and useless. Al-
                                                             
110The agreement was signed in Cairo by Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat in Cairo on 9 February 1994. 
This agreement was in the form of two documents, one on general principles, and the other on border 
crossings. 
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‘Eizariyah became a perfect place for criminals, as Mr. Ahmad al-Khatib who’s the director of 
a medical center in al-‘Eizariyah indicated: 
 
“Al-‘Eizariyah has become a suitable place for criminals and outlaws. There might be someone 
who is evading a jail sentence, or he or she has committed a crime somewhere else and has 
moved here to hide” (Ahmad al-Khatib, December 1
st
, 2013). 
 
At the perception level, many interviewees expressed their concern regarding the absence of 
law and order but they connect illegal acts to the people who have moved to live in al-
‘Eizariyah from other cities or villages of the West Bank. For example, one interviewee, Mr. 
Ahmad al-Mokahal, who is from the locals of the town and runs a workshop in the al-
Mashroo area of al-‘Eizariyah, declared that the local council confronts him because he is 
not paying for his workshop consumption of water. His reply to the local council was “OK, I 
am not paying but at least my connection to the water system is legal”. Many of the shops in 
al-Mashroo were or are still connected to the water system without any formal permits. Mr. 
al-Mokahal further explained: 
 
“Many of my neighboring shops steal water but the local council cannot force them to pay or 
punish them in any legal way as the local council is afraid to confront them, the owners of these 
shops are dangerous and have become like a mafia.  The other day a man who is not from this 
town told me that I must start to pay him a monthly fee of 400 IS
111
 (around 100 dollars) in 
exchange for security services that he will provide to my workshop. I refused and told him that I 
will leave the doors open and wait to see who dares to come close my workshop. When he 
knew that I am one of the locals he backed off. My neighbors were afraid of him and they are 
paying the khawa” (al-Mokahal
112
, December 5, 2013).  
 
                                                             
111 Israeli shekels 
112 Akhal is a partner of car wash and spare parts workshop in al-Mashroo at the end of  the commercial 
street of al-‘Eizariyah 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 159 
 
‘Khawa’, is the Arabic expression for protection money. People pay it to someone who offers 
the service to avoid the threatened violence, theft or destruction of their property. Being local 
means you belong to one of the town’s clan and you have ‘Ozwa’ which means high number 
of relatives who will be ready to protect you so no one can harm you and get away with it. As 
Robinson (2009) explains “Clans are a source of individual and family security. Outsiders will 
think twice before attacking a member of a clan, particularly a powerful hamula (extended 
family) knowing that revenge will be taken” (Robinson, 2009: 2).  
As al-“Eizariyah is considered to be Area B in the center and Aria C in the surroundings 
which means limited Palestinian Authority in Area B and none of Palestinian Authority in 
Area C. Under such system; tax evasion is possible and this attracted investments, and it is 
a suitable environment for informal economy to flourish. In al-‘Eizariyah one may find all 
forms of informal employment, that is employment without labor or social protection including 
both self-employment in small unregistered enterprises and wage employment in 
unprotected jobs (Chen, 2005). The profusion of the unlicensed vehicles is an example, they 
contribute to the environmental chaos of the town, Mr. Faroon, the ex-Mayor explained: 
“They are a major problem; on the one hand they give a cheap internal means of transport to 
the residents of al-‘Eizariyah in the absence of a public transportation system. On the other 
hand, the vehicles themselves are in unacceptable condition”. These vehicles are ex-Israeli, 
with Israeli number plates, which were rejected as not suitable for driving within Israel. The 
owners, rather than send them to the scrap yard, sell them on to Palestinians. They are 
attractive because they cost 70 percent less than a licensed Palestinian number plated 
vehicles. They are not legal so they are only found in Areas B because of the absence of law 
because of the Palestinian police vacuum. The only place for such cars is the scrapyard. 
This is not the only example of informal economy in the town. The sales of scrap metal and 
recycled items located on the side of the road at the entrance of al-‘Eizariyah is another 
example. All this gives a poor first impression of the town and also contributes to the general 
feeling of chaotic disorder. Mr. Faroon continued: “Some people collect what they think is 
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useful from the Israeli rubbish dump113, situated on the right when entering the town, and try 
to sell it on from the sidewalks along the entrance of the main road. This part of al-‘Eizariyah 
is in area C, where we have no control over and there is no control shown by Israel either”.  
Another important issue that I researched in my study is concerning the general look of al-
‘Eizariyah; the poorly designed and unfinished high-rise buildings. In this regard Mr. Faroon, 
the ex-Mayor explained: “we may say that the economic development started in an 
environment of chaos since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. The structural 
plan that was adopted by al-‘Eizariyah local council was virtually done with computer 
technology; fake streets, fake public places, and fake services that were unworkable and 
unrealistic.” Therefore, there were enormous violations of the structural plan for new 
buildings and the punishing of developers were, and still are, not applicable. Following the 
construction of the Wall, local people could no longer hold their weddings in Jerusalem, 
therefore wedding halls started to be built in the town. However there are now 18 wedding 
halls in al-‘Eizariyah none of which have their own car parks. This results in double parking 
and parking on the sidewalks whenever there is a wedding celebration. What should be a 
happy occasion often nurtures disharmony because other residents resent the traffic jams 
the poor parking causes, or they are unable to retrieve their own cars because of being 
trapped by the cars parked illegally. Mr. Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish; the son of al-'Eizariyah’s ex-
Mayor and one of the regional notables noted: “We have no land left, we can expand only 
laterally. Even this is not a good solution without proper infrastructure. We have no sewers. 
There is a cesspit beneath every house here in al-‘Eizariyah, we are living over a sea of 
shit.” Abu-Rish114 said with bitterness. Al-‘Eizariyah’s reserves of land were dramatically 
reduced because a lot of it being included within the jurisdiction area of the Ma’ale Adummim 
                                                             
113 The nearby rubbish dump was part of al-‘Eizariyah and Abu-Dis land. Some 44 hectares that was 
confiscated and has been used as a refuse dump for various Israeli waste plus contaminants starting from 
the early 1980s (B'Tselem, 2009). 
114Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish: The son of al-'Eizariyah’s ex-mayor the late Mahmoud K. Aburish, and one of 
the regional notables. 
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settlement (Ibid). “We are suffering from severe traffic jam[s] every day at the eastern 
entrance, which is the only entrance for vehicles we have left. The entrance is in Area C and 
the right of priority at the junction was given to the few settlers of Kedar115, thus causing long 
tailbacks in al-‘Eizariyah’s commercial street.” Abu-Rish further explained: “This created 
economic hardship, the Jerusalemites stopped coming to shop from al-‘Eizariyah because of 
these traffic jams. In addition their cars may face inspection at al-Za’ayyem checkpoint, 
therefore adding time to the whole task”. The Jerusalemite, who shops from al-‘Eizariyah, 
might be subjected to car inspections at this checkpoint. A fine has to be paid if it is found 
they are transporting large quantities of goods. The prices in East Jerusalem are much 
higher than in al-‘Eizariyah which used to encourage many Jerusalemites to shop from the 
town. 
This categorization of the town since the implementation of the Oslo accords twenty years 
ago transformed the town to what it became today. The `neighborhood effect’ which implies 
that there are some behavioral, attitudinal, or psychological features of neighborhoods that 
affect its residents (Friedrichs et al, 2003) is clear to observers. Mr. Khalil M. Abu-Rish; the 
ex-member of al-‘Eizariyah local council explained the change in behaviors and attitudes;  
 
“The new generation has less of a sense of belonging; they don’t even care about 
throwing litter on the street, or about driving too fast and hitting an electricity pole. I 
call them the ‘generation of the Intifada116’ most of them were jailed by Israel and 
therefore did not finish school. They are confused and always ready to create social 
problems. The spread of drugs became a new phenomenon. Israeli security forces 
will get involved only if drugs are being sold to an Israeli, otherwise they do not” 
(Khalil M. Abu-Rish, October 20, 2013). 
 
                                                             
115  Kedar is an Israeli settlement, was established in 1984 with around 153 families. 
116 He means the Second Intifada in 2000 
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 Notably, all Jerusalem suburbs were classified as Area B which produces social effect such 
as displacement, impoverishment and social fragmentation. Many of the interviewees 
expressed their belief that this classification was deliberate to serves the Israeli scheme 
which is to influence the destiny of these areas and transform them to what they are today, 
desperate, de-grading, and damaged especially after isolating them from East Jerusalem by 
the Wall. 
 5.4 THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF AL- ‘EIZARIAYAH   
 
Traditional sociological and anthropological cross-cultural studies have emphasized that the 
concept of family in Mediterranean societies is founded on two main axes: joint possession 
and dependence. The family is perceived as the cornerstone of life of its individuals with 
different roles for each of them like father, mother, child, and spouse. These members are 
linked together by a strong bond and mutual respect of the value of family culture (Davies, 
1977; Smith, 1981). In this traditional society, the individual is inscribed within the family and 
the community (Laudani, et al, 2014). Family in the Palestinian society indicates a diffuse 
network of relationships, obligations, and loyalties (Ibid). The Palestinian society is 
characterized by three types of clan-like familial structures: tribes, clans, and notable families 
(Robinson, 2009). The first refer to progenies of nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin 
populations; they are few who are currently still semi-nomadic. The last refer to clan-like 
grouping in the urban elite notable family while the clan structure type is the dominant one in 
Palestine (Ibid). A clan usually consists of at least several extended families claiming a 
shared ancestry, and linked through the father’s male line. The three types share similar 
extended familial attributes, behavioral obligations (especially on males), informal networks, 
and honor-shame cultural systems (ibid). For al-‘Eizariyah, the social structure is similar to all 
Palestinians villages of the West Bank under Ottoman, British and Jordanian rule, that is the 
clan structure in which the traditional extended family leaders had dominated village life and 
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had the power to solve inter-village and inter-family rivalries and disputes (Peretz, 1977). 
Before 1948, the residents of al-‘Eizariyah were homogeneous; around 7000 inhabitants 
were purely from the village. The head of the village; al-Mukhtar or Sheikh who also 
represented the village in front of neighboring villages and considered to be the 
government’s main contact point responsible for the law and order. With his respectful 
power, al-Mokhtar practiced sovereignty over the village clans’ heads, which then had the 
same authority over all their own clan members. In the seventies, this system changed, 
ostensibly at the beginning, by local council’s elections and al-Mukhtar position was replaced 
by an elected Mayor. After the 1948 war, a wave of refugees came from different Palestinian 
villages of historical Palestine to settle down in al-‘Eizariyah. Therefore the populations of al-
‘Eizariyah are divided into two main categories; the locals, who are originally from the town 
itself, and those who came to settle down in deferent periods of time and for different motive, 
the ‘strangers’ as the locals call them.  Mr. AbuZayyad and other key interviewees explained 
the flow of people: Between 1952 and 1954 the Anglican Church adopted a project that 
aimed to resettle refugees who were expelled from the three villages of Suba, Durban, and 
Qastal, in the south west of Jerusalem. The church bought the land from the locals, cheap 
and far from the center, and built houses for those refugees. This area was named “Al 
Mashroo” which literally means “The Project”. Despite the fact that these refugees lived far 
from the center of al-Eizariyah, with time, they managed to integrate to a certain limit with 
each other and the locals, either through marriage, or as colleagues at work, or classmates 
at school. 
During the war of 1967 some of the same displaced people and a number of the locals of al-
‘Eizariyah left for Jordan out of fear for their lives. Many of those who fled to Jordan did so 
because they remembered the trauma of the 1948 war. After the 1967 Six Day War and the 
occupation of East Jerusalem, a new wave of refugees were displaced in the village after 
Israel demolished the neighborhood of Waqf Abu Madyan in East Jerusalem which was 
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adjacent to the Wailing Wall.117 The residents were evacuated and transferred to al- 
‘Eizariyah, and were settled in the empty houses of those who had fled to Jordan118. The 
people of Abu Madyan were originally from the city of Hebron, so later many of their relatives 
came and settled in al-‘Eizariyah too. A few years later, many of the locals of al-‘Eizariyah 
again left, this time to work in Jordan, the Arabian Gulf, and the United States of America. 
In the late 1980s, the overall number of al-‘Eizariyah inhabitant was 15-16,000. It was at this 
point that many Jerusalemites moved to live in al-‘Eizariyah, in order to escape the housing 
crisis in Jerusalem. It cost much less to buy land and build a house there than in Jerusalem. 
However, these Jerusalemites continued to spend the whole of their working day in 
Jerusalem and returned to their houses in al-‘Eizariyah only to sleep. This meant that they 
did not actually integrate with the locals; therefore this group suffered the most from the 
separation Wall as it disrupted their daily routine. Other Palestinians, from various parts of 
the West Bank, especially from the villages near to Hebron, moved to live in al-‘Eizariyah 
because it was the closest point where they could enter Israel. This was during the period of 
the implementation of the Israeli closure policy and the restrictions on movement. In addition 
to those who moved to establish businesses in the hopeful atmosphere of the Oslo Accords 
in 1993.  This phase continued until the construction of the Wall, which started in 2002-2003. 
The rumors that al-‘Eizariyah would be annexed to Jerusalem and that its residents might 
get an Israeli blue identity card, thereby gaining benefits, encouraged other Palestinians to 
settle in the town. “These new migrants were generally unskilled, uneducated, and 
considered to be citizens of lower class. The locals and other integrated groups of people 
began to feel like strangers as drugs, and disputes over land, and other social problems 
                                                             
117The Western Wall, Wailing Wall or Kotel, located in the Old City of Jerusalem at the foot of the western 
side of the Temple Mount., It is arguably the most sacred site recognized by the Jewish faith outside of the 
Temple Mount itself. 
118By using the Absentees’ property’ laws that were designed to establish Israel’s legal control over lands 
and properties. This body of law focused on formulating a legal definition for the people (mostly Arabs) 
who had left or been forced to flee from these lands. 
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started to spread in al-‘Eizariyah” (AbuZayyad, 5th November, 2013). The estimated 
population, at the time was between 25,000 and 27,000 inhabitants. 
Mr. Khalil Abu-Rish, the son of the head of the village (Sheikh) of al-‘Eizariyah explained 
how the village structure had changed since his father: “now it is difficult to control and 
discipline the people, we used to know everyone, now the town is full of strangers”. The late 
notable Mahmoud K. Abu-Rish was the most influential person in al-‘Eizariyah which was 
inherited from his late father. He was the head of the committee before it was transformed 
into a local council in the 1960s; he became the first local council president, he gained the 
trust of the village population including the refugees and other inhabitants; in 1977 he won 
the local elections. His son Khalil further explained: 
 
“He had power over every member of the village; they trusted him, listened to him and 
accepted his advice and judgments when it came to solving disputes inside the town, or with 
other villages. His main responsibilities were providing services such as roads, water and 
electricity. He used to help the poor who couldn’t afford to pay their water or electricity bills by 
‘forcing’ rich people to pay them instead, preventing the poor from being disconnected from 
these crucial services. From the young to the old used to obey him. These days even the son 
doesn’t listen to his father”. (Khalil M. Abu-Rish, October 20, 2013). 
 
The late Abu-Rish used to have a good relation with the government during both the 
Jordanian and the Israeli rule. He passed away before the first Intifada in 1988, which since 
then, social structure and relationships have witnessed a notable change; Allegra (2010) 
pointed out that “the first Intifada had put an end to that system of informal mediation that 
had developed in Occupied Territories between the Israeli administration and the Palestinian 
notables” (Allegra, 2010: 17). The first Intifada has created a new form of Palestinian 
leadership; Al-Shabab (Young Men) became the new social reference point instead of the 
head of the clan or the head of the extended family in the Palestinian Occupied Territories 
(AbuZayyad, November 1, 2013). 
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 The urbanization of al-‘Eizariyah village cobbled with the increase of its population and the 
new leadership of the first Intifada reduced the role of the traditional clan leaders and the al-
Mukhtar (later the Mayor), as the son of the late Abu-Rish, who was a member of the local 
council four years ago further explained:   
 
“al-Mukhtar or ‘al-Sheikh’ in the past used to be available twenty four hours a day, seven days 
a week, in contrast of the Mayor  who now is a government employee with limited 
responsibilities; his daily job ends with his working hours and he is not willing to carry the 
population’s worries and concerns back home with him. The system has changed. The people 
who came from outside to live in al-‘Eizariyah considered to be almost fifty percent of the 
population now. The formula changed as well as the society equilibrium which has certainly 
changed too” (Khalil M. Abu-Rish, October 20, 2013). 
 
Although it seems that there is no discrimination between the main two groups (locals-
strangers) when it comes to the local council services. However, on the social level the 
society has become polarized; one pole is the locals and the second is the others who the 
locals refer to them as the ‘strangers’. The populations who originally came from Hebron (al 
Khalayla) and now live in al-Mashroo area, for example, only interact within their own 
community and do not interact with the locals (natives). For them al-‘Eizariyah is only a 
residential location, not a place to belong the same for the Jerusalemites. 
5.5 THE STRUCTURAL MACRO-SOCIAL FORCES THAT INFLUENCE SOCIAL 
CAPITAL IN AL-‘EIZARIYAH  
 
Patulny (2004) argues that although social capital is seen as shaped by individuals through 
their personal characteristics, the structural macro-social forces, such as, materialism, 
inequality, gender-family dynamics, and cultural clashes, which are embedded within 
material reality, also shape social capital. Therefore, the research investigation focused on 
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understanding the different structured social forces that shape al-‘Eizariyah social capital in 
particular and the Palestinians in general. 
5.5.1 SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION 
 
Al-‘Eizariyah social fragmentation is a result of various political, socio-economic and 
cultural factors; as explained before, the Palestinian society have a clan-like familial 
structures, meaning that each member of the community can be traced to one of the 
community clans. Therefore, anyone who is not from the locals is clearly recognized and 
labeled as a stranger. Many of old men and women still use the word ‘stranger’ to refer to 
their daughter’s groom if he is from another Palestinian town, and sometimes if he is from 
a different clan of the same town. However, the Palestinian society also has a degree of 
sensibility regarding displacement because of the 1948 Exodus (al-Nakba119). Some 
380,000 fled to the West Bank, and were consisting of two categories, namely those who 
were displaced in refugee camps established by the United Nations (some 100,000) and 
the rest who settled down in the West Bank cities and villages (Bisharat, 1997). Both 
categories were labeled by the locals as ‘strangers’. This label is applicable not only to 
the refugees themselves as first generation, but also to their second and third 
generations all of whom were born in the West Bank. 
In the case study, the term ‘stranger’ embraces everyone who is not local (native) of al-
‘Eizariyah. Although the refugees of the 1948 war integrated with the locals, either via 
marriage or work, and some of them occupy important jobs such as teachers or members of 
the local council, they still express deep feelings of bitterness and a huge sense of 
discrimination. Soguk (1999) pointed out that there are many refugee figures whose 
meanings and identities are negotiated in processes of displacement in time and place, 
Moghissi et al (2009: 169) noted that “separation from one’s homeland … inevitably involves 
                                                             
119 Al-Nakba is the Arabic word for catastrophe  
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continuous emotional vulnerability, distrust of others and clinging to a hope or a dream of the 
impermanency of the situation. This tortured existence seems to be embedded in any 
involuntary separation from one’s homeland”. Mr. Nabeil Adwan; the refugee who is the 
headmaster of the boys high school and a member of al-‘Eizariyah local council was born in 
the town but his father was displaced in after the 1948 war, shared his feelings; 
 
“I did not feel any discrimination against me when I was a student in the boy’s school until the 
ninth grade. However this changed when, with my friends, I joined one of al-‘Eizariyah’s social 
associations. When we were trying to elect a president I felt discriminated against by those who 
I considered to be my best friends. Till now, I feel there is discrimination against me as a school 
master and as a member of the al-‘Eizariyah local council. You are considered a refugee even 
if you were born here, and if you forget they will remind you.  We also feel that our presence in 
al-‘Eizariyah is temporary and we should return to our home town of al-Qastal. My father 
worked hard to buy a small piece of land here and we built a house, but we as a family still feel 
as ‘strangers’ even after three generations. A year ago, I organized a summer camp, the 
students were from al-Mashroo, and we asked the local council to provide the camp with water 
and some cold drinks. The proposal was presented to the local council committee, they did not 
approve it. I think it got refused because the director and the students were not considered 
“locals” of al-‘Eizariyah”. (Mr. Nabeil Adwan, November 24, 2013). 
 
After further investigations and while it seems that there is no discrimination on the official 
level, some of the interviewees accused the local council of discrimination when it comes to 
services. The justification was that al-‘Eizariyah’s population is as large as the population of 
the city of Jericho, but the local council of al-‘Eizariyah has only 50 employees, while the 
council of the city of Jericho has 350 employees. Their budget from the Palestinian Authority 
is also much bigger. Mr. Isam Faroon, the ex-Mayor explained: “Al-‘Eizariyah has one of the 
longest commercial streets in the West Bank; four km long. It is in need of good services. To 
do so we need at least to double the current budget and double the number of the council 
employees”.  With this logic we may say that scarcity of resources explains why some 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 169 
 
neighborhoods are not well served. On the other hand, a member of the local council who 
prefer to remain anonymous said; “Seventy percent of the local council members are from 
the locals, the refugees and other groups are not equally represented. Al-Mashroo area 
represents two thirds of the town population while the center represents only one third, but 
the services go to the center because voters usually are from the locals, who live in the 
center”.  This interview on one hand revealed that there is discrimination also on the official 
level and that the exclusion against other groups is not only social but also in service 
distribution. On the other hand it revealed that the other groups (strangers) who live in al-
Mashroo boycott the local council elections out of carelessness, therefore services are 
distributed among the locals who elected the local council members as a matter of gratitude. 
5.5.2 BARRIERS TO COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
Coleman (1998) presented the concept of social capital as a resource for action; and he 
pointed out the social action is governed by social norms rules, and obligations. This means 
that social action could be shaped, constrained, and redirected by the social context 
(Coleman, 1998). The social structure that was illustrated in the previous section of this 
chapter shows that social action and relationships are governed by certain cultural and 
traditional constraints. Therefore social capital arises in certain limited forms because of the 
barriers that prevent collective social action to reach the ultimate desirable goal of social 
capital, which is to enhance local development and solve community problems. These 
Barriers are: 
1-  The Local-Stranger Relationship   
 
Discrimination was the major feeling of all the refugees that were interviewed or observed, 
even when the question was discussed with the local interviewees, their answers were 
always that they respect and do not discriminate against the refugees who has been living 
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with them since 1948 but they used the term ‘strangers’ when they refer to them. This shows 
that the local- stranger relationship is deeply rooted in the social structure of al-‘Eizariyah 
and considered to be one of the barriers to collective action. As such it prevents cooperation 
among actors to solve the community problems. It especially becomes clear when it 
important decisions such as marriage and business partnership have to be taken, and the 
tendency is mainly to choose the partner from the same group. Although the term ‘stranger’ 
covers all displaced groups in al-‘Eizariyah, it has different interpretations based on the type 
of each group and when and why they were displaced in the town. 
It is well known that the Arabs in general and the Palestinian in particular are warm and 
welcoming towards other people. In fact, the locals of al-‘Eizariyah are generally warm and 
they show good manners towards their neighbors, whether they are locals or they came to 
settle down in the town for different reasons. However, the term “strangers” has a territorial 
significance; as the Palestinian is generally defined by his family-clan name and the place of 
origin, therefore, there are different types of “strangers” in al-‘Eizariyah categorized 
according to when and why they were deported from their place of origin or if the 
displacement was by free choice. Narrowly, these factors determine the locals’ attitudes and 
behavior towards them. As mentioned earlier, till the year 1948, the residents of al-‘Eizariyah 
were only from the locals, first group to join them were the refugees of 1948 War. Other 
waves joined in different times and different motivations. Yet, they are all labeled by the term 
‘strangers but this term has different interpretations:  
The Refugees of 1948 
 
The Palestinians of the historic Palestine became refugees in the surrounding Arab countries 
and also in the West Bank and Gaza strip after the creation of the State of Israel that led to 
the 1948 war. Being a refugee in another country had its own implications; but the term 
‘stranger’ that refer to a refugee in the West Bank and Gaza had a taste of bitterness, Abu 
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Safwan a refugee from the town of al-'Abbasiyyah, Jaffa sub-district whom and his family 
fled to the Ramallah district then to al-‘Eizariyah expressed his feelings: 
 
 “In the al-'Abbasiyyah / Jaffa sub-district (before 1948) we used to have an elementary and a 
secondary school, while al-‘Eizariyah had a primitive school system called “al-kuttab”.  We were 
friends with the late notable, Mahmoud Abu-Rish of al-Eizariyah at that time, and we used to 
exchange visits.  During the 1948 war my family, along with many others from al-'Abbasiyyah, 
fled to the district of Ramallah, and we rented a house there. Mahmoud Abu-Rish searched for 
us and insisted that he’d host us in one of his houses in al-‘Eizariyah. We accepted his 
invitation and later we bought a piece of land in the best area of al-‘Eizariyah. Ten years later, I 
married his daughter and I became the respected, well-known English language teacher in al-
‘Eizariyah boys’ school.  However, when I was promoted to the position of headmaster, there 
were voices amongst the locals that the headmaster of al-‘Eizariyah boys’ high school should 
be one of them not a ‘stranger’. We are all Palestinians, we were displaced from the north to 
the center, we were lucky not to live in a refugee camp while our cousins did, and after all these 
years we are still strangers in the eyes of the locals of al-‘Eizariyah” ( Abu Safwan120, April 13, 
2003). 
 
Habashi (2008) points out that “recollection of such events is evidence of the impact of the 
events of the year 1948 on the collective consciousness and the contemporary political 
situation” (Habashi, 2008: 15). The Palestinian refugees’ feelings of displacement are close 
to the emotions felt by Italian migrants’121 and their term ‘spaesato’ which was translated by 
Vanni (2013) as ‘without a village, without a country’. The term “encompasses further 
meanings of having lost familiar relations to things and places, being in an unfamiliar 
environment, being or feeling lost, having lost one’s bearings, being displaced, being 
                                                             
120 This interview with the late Abu Safwan was recorded by the author for “Diaspora by Design: Muslims 
in Canada and Beyond” research ‘book’ by Haideh Moghissi, Saeed Rahnema, Mark J. Goodman (2009). 
University of Toronto Press  
121 The Italian Diaspora in Australia In the postwar years, 
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confused, being out of place … [The term] covers the concepts of home, homeland, 
hometown, and denotes the fundamental unit of belonging” (Vanni, 2013:2). The territorial 
emphasis is well illustrated in the everyday language which gives “place of origin great 
importance” in grounding the refugees’ identity, which embodies their histories, memories 
and their slight differences in culture (Yiftachel, 2002). The word “ghourba” (dispersion, 
estrangement) or “ghareeb” (the person himself, which mean stranger) is very much rooted 
in the social structure. This word refers to every person who is not from the locals; even if 
this person is from the second or third generation and was born in the town. When it comes 
to the refugee “stranger” term represents a two-sided problem between the receiving 
community (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and those from the sending community 
(Historic Palestine known now as Israel). The refugee’s lack of feeling of belonging to the 
receiving community is not only because the locals always express superiority over them, 
but also because the refugees themselves do not want to lose their rooted original identity. 
This feeling of pride is driven by the Palestinian nationalism in order to keep the Palestinian 
question alive; the new generations should not forget; the grandfather will transfer the feeling 
of “ghourba” to his son who will do the same with his children. This is applicable also to the 
displaced group of Waqf Abu Madyan which was demolished by Israel because it was 
adjacent to the Wailing Wall after the war of 1967.  
Although the locals do not accept them, the refugees themselves do not accept the locals in 
order to keep their own Identity.  Bisharat (1997: 205) pointed out that “naturalizing the link 
between a people and their ‘homeland’ … implying the power and right to exclude the 
others”. In deed exclusion of the other is proved by their choices when it comes to marriage 
or business partnerships; they usually chose the bride in case of marriage and the partner in 
case of work from their own group. Although the refugees almost lost hope of a just political 
solution to their displacement, by the time the Palestinian question moved to the back of 
their minds, the everyday practices kept the feeling of being a stranger alive, and always in 
the front of their own minds. This had a great overall impact on the homogeneity of the 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 173 
 
Palestinian society especially that ‘the refugees’ communities constitute approximately 42 
percent of the total population of the West Bank” (Bisharat, 1997: 206). The Palestinians in 
general give more importance or some kind of ‘power’ to the ‘territory’ someone are from. 
Alatout (2006) explains that “the territorial conception of power stems from the uniqueness of 
the Palestinian experience of occupation and dispossession, i.e., loss of territory in the war 
of 1948, the refugee status of the majority of Palestinians, the experience of occupation in 
1967” (Alatout, 2006 : 604). Therefore, conflict over territory is not only between Israelis and 
Palestinians but also between different Palestinian groups in the Occupied Territories. 
Alatout (2006) further explains that “the dominance of the sovereign nation-state as the only 
internationally recognized form of political organization also plays an important role. Extra-
territorial relations of power, those constructed and exercised along class and gender lines, 
residency status (refugee, rural, urban), and color (black and non-black), are sidelined in 
favor of a narrow territorial focus (Ibid). 
The Jerusalemite   
 
The above analysis is partially applicable to the Jerusalemite group, although they are 
considered by the locals as “strangers” too, because the superiority here is in favor of the 
Jerusalemite because of his/her social class.122 They are urbanized notable families from the 
city of Jerusalem who bought land and built their spacious houses in the best locations of the 
town to escape the housing crisis in Jerusalem. However they kept their interaction with the 
locals, the ‘Fellahin’ meaning ‘rural’, to the bare minimum. Yousef who is a refugee, his 
family fled from north Palestine to al-‘Eizariyah during the 1948 war expressed his feeling 
regarding the different attitudes the locals have for the Jerusalemite:  
“Of course we feel different as refugees. We have been displaced and forced to settle here, 
while the Jerusalemites choose to come for better housing or other reasons. The locals look 
down on us while they respect them” (Yusef, November 30, 2013). 
                                                             
122 Social conflict; city versus village 
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The Displaced Groups for Economic or Political Reasons 
 
For the urbanized (al-khalayla) who are originally from the city of Hebron, this group came 
after the 1967 war and settled in the al Mashroo area of al-‘Eizariyah for economic reasons, 
this group expressed no sense of alienation and described the social sphere as positive.  
Ahmad the young merchant who settled in al-‘Eizariyah four years ago and the owner of an 
optician’s shop in al-‘Eizariyah, Abu Helweh expressed their opinions as follows: 
 
“I do not feel like a stranger. All Palestinian cities and villages are my home. I just miss my 
family, my mother and my brothers and sisters. Al-‘Eizariyah is a central place between my 
wife’s family in Jerusalem and my own in Hebron” (Ahmad November 12, 2013). 
 
“I did not feel like, a stranger although I am a refugee who was raised in the orphanage of al-
‘Eizariyah. Every family in the town wanted to give me their name because I was good at school 
and I always behaved well. However I noticed that the locals appreciated me more after my 
optician’s shop became famous not only in al-‘Eizariyah but also in the surroundings 
communities” (Abu Helweh, November 14, 2013). 
  
The locals call this category ‘strangers’ too but their social status depends on what type of 
occupation they practice. However, the group of relatively new migrants who are generally 
unskilled, uneducated, and considered to be of a lower class, the locals refer to them as 
strangers too. The jobs they practice for a living are mainly illegal, some are drug dealers, 
and others use unlicensed cars for internal transportation, or trade with items that have been 
collected from the Israeli refuse dump or other kinds of illegal jobs. Ali who is an unskilled 
worker; he created a job for himself as a parking guard for the cars of those who use al-
Zaitoon checkpoint to go in to Jerusalem. 
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 “I am using this piece of land in area C very close to the checkpoint, as a car park. I charge my 
customers only five IS (almost one Euro) with no time limit” (Ali,
123
 November 30, 2013). 
 
The locals might use some of their services but without any kind of respect. They aren’t 
welcomed, neither by the locals nor by the other quasi-integrated groups. 
2 - Traditions Politics and Competition in Relation to Collective Action 
 
Traditionally the family is considered to be the basic unit of production, in fact; it is 
recognized as the center for economic and social interactions (Barakat, 1993; Sirhan, 1975). 
However, “when traditional societies are challenged by political and social change, family 
roles are often questioned, most notably among the upcoming generation … [who start] to 
question their authority and seek independence from the family, as a result of the Intifada 
“(Fronk et al, 1999: 705). The first Intifada created a new role for the young generation “Al 
Shabab”, which means the young men. “Al Shabab became the reference point of the 
society; the dominance of the family has been weakened and also disintegrating since then” 
(AbuZayyad, November 20, 2013). Politics also influence relationships; the locals had also 
been marked by inter-family rivalries depending on their members’ political affiliations. “You 
may find two brothers, each one belongs to a particular party, one is Hamas and the other is 
Fatah. A conflict might occur in the family and it's difficult to solve it as there is no power in 
the hands of the head of the family, who, before the Intifada could have imposed a particular 
opinion” (Ibid). The hamula124 (clan) and leading notable families became second in the 
political structure after the creation of the Palestinian Authority; this is also made clear during 
                                                             
123 Ali is an unskilled worker, who created a job for himself as a guard for cars for those who use the al-
Zaitoon checkpoint to go in to Jerusalem. 
124 "The (Hamula    ةلومحلا )  consists of at least several extended families (a’ila   ةلئاعلا ) claiming a shared 
ancestry, and linked through the father’s male line. Each extended family will generally include male first 
and second cousins, the women they marry, and the children of that union. Female children who marry 
outside of the hamula (and their children) then belong to the other hamula. Their “in-laws”, will bind 
them to a new hamula” (Robinson, 2009: 2). 
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al-‘Eizariyah local council elections over recent years. Those who won did not belong to the 
most notable families of the town.  
The social fragmentation reaches to the neighboring localities also. There was always some 
kind of competition between al-‘Eizariyah and its neighbors, especially with the town of Abu-
Dis. Although al-‘Eizariyah is well known for its historic and religious status, Abu-Dis has Al-
Quds University built on its land, in addition to its contemporary political importance as, at 
least, two of its local members had and still have political powers as members of the Fatah 
Party. Those are Ahmed Qurei, the former Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, and 
Saeb Erekat, the chief negotiator for the peace talks with Israel. A small incident is enough 
to revive grudges among the two neighboring towns. The following statement reveals how 
the people reacted after some rumors that the name of al-‘Eizariyah was being wiped from 
the map.  
 
“I can't believe this Palestinian Authority (PA); they are wiping off the name Bethany al- 
Eizariyah from the map, a historic, biblical town, and the fourth holiest town in Palestine. I've 
understood that Abu-Qrei’, a bloody member of the PA who suggested this change and merge 
the nearby town of Abu Dis with al Eizaryiah....shame on you PA, you are acting and behaving 
like a Zionist Occupier Israel” (Walid Khatib
125
, April 13, 2015)
126
.  
 
This statement brought alive the concept of “asabiyah”, which Ibn Khaldun, the famous Arab 
sociologist describes, in his introduction (The Muqaddimah),127as “the group to which an 
individual feels most closely attached is his clan or tribe, the people with whom he shares a 
common descent (Rosenthal & Dawood, 1969). According to Ibn Khaldun the term 'tribalism' 
or 'clanism' reflects the bond of cohesion, which exists at any level of civilization, but its 
                                                             
125 Walid Khatib is one of al-khatib family of al-‘Eizariyah who lives in Amman and he is active on the 
social media. 
126 Sourced from Facebook personal page  
127 The Muqaddimah, an introduction to history in three volumes, was published by Princeton University 
Press in 1969. 
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stronger in the nomadic era, and he further explained that the Arabs are the least docility to 
one another because of their competition over gaining power; only religion or state restraint 
could dominate their arrogance (Ibid). Indeed, the political party of Hamas is strong because 
of the fidelity of its members; it even gained the respect of ordinary Palestinians because 
exists under the umbrella of Islam. From another point of view, Salzman (2008) pointed out 
that “Arab culture addresses security through "balanced opposition" in, which everybody is a 
member of a nested set of kin groups, ranging from very small to very large. These groups 
are vested with responsibility for the defense of each member and responsible for harm any 
member does to outsiders ... deterrence lies in the balance between opponents. Any 
potential aggressor knows that his target is not solitary or meager but rather, at least in 
principle, a formidable formation much the same size as his” (Salzman, 2008: 23). This 
statement on Facebook and all the discussion that followed comes from the educated elite of 
al-Eizariyah. It reflects the imbedded nomadic norms which influence certain behaviors. The 
tribal structure enhances feelings of unity among the one tribe, and normalizes antagonism 
against outsiders (Ibid). The Palestinian people, in general, accept the occupier because of 
its military superiority but they do not accept the superiority of their peers. The locals of Abu-
Dis are ‘strangers’ too in the eyes of the locals of al-‘Eizariyah, and vice versa. This is clear 
in everyday language especially when it comes to marriage; they will refer to their daughter’s 
groom128 as a ‘stranger’ if he is from another Palestinian town.  
3 - Gender Inequality from Education and Religion Perspective and other Variables  
 
This gender inequality is present in the Palestinian society, on the education level, family 
invest in boy’s education more than girls: 
 
“I was top of my class. I was sent to the local UNRWA school while my brother was sent to a 
private school; there he was able to study English and French from kindergarten until high 
                                                             
128 In the past they called the groom a “stranger’ even if he is from the same town but from a different 
clan. 
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school. Meanwhile English only starts being taught in the fifth grade in UNRWA and 
government schools. I did not feel angry at this inequality as the general belief is that sons are 
a greater asset to the family. A good education will lead to better job opportunities for them 
and they can help the family financially, while daughters will get married and even if they work; 
their money will contribute to their husbands after marriage. My brother did not do well at 
school and my parents had to send him to another private school, but when he didn’t achieve 
there either, he was sent to a government school; at the age of 13 he dropped out of school 
and went into work” (Rasha
129
, November 29, 2013).  
 
What is remarkable is that females were and still are more committed to education. They are 
more likely to progress on to university and furthermore, the margin of social freedom for 
them is limited to education and certain types of work, mainly in education and health 
sectors and other administrative work. The Palestinian male, in general, accepts that the 
females under his authority (daughters, sisters) will leave the home for study and work. He 
can see the benefits of education which generally lead to greater financial contributions on 
their part, to the family’s income, thereby helping to alleviate their financial burden. However 
the male keeps control over their social life. This includes inheritance rights and no freedom 
for relationships with males outside the marriage institution, under the pretext of maintaining 
the family honor130. Most families in the Palestinian society violate women’s inheritance 
rights; according to the Islamic Shari'a law131 the female gets fifty percent less of the male’s 
share from her late parents’ inheritance. One of the justifications for this is that it is only the 
males who carry the financial obligations and responsibilities of the family (Welchman, 
                                                             
129 Rasha is a mother of two who was married at the age of 18, without any consideration to her excellent 
educational attainment. 
130 The situation in cities like Ramallah and Bethlehem is different as girls have more social freedom. This 
social freedom for females is less in rural areas; it depends on how far the village is from the city center 
and the geographical location of the city (the north and south of the West Bank are more conservative 
than the center). 
131The Islamic law “Shari'a” is based on the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917and is part of the 
Palestinian legal system. 
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2003). Although Islamic law is not based on equal rights for both sexes, and the fact that 
most of the population is Muslim, they do not even follow the Islamic Shari'a law. A 
consolation amount of money (which is generally less than their right according to the 
Islamic Shari'a law) will be paid to the female instead. This is under the pretext of keeping 
the family fortune within the family, in case the female marries a man from another clan. 
Welchman (2003: 35) referred to Hammami (1993) who further explained that "the 
generalized social compromise that took place on this issue was that peasant women 
exchanged their rightful share of land inheritance for the guarantee of economic and social 
support from their brothers”. This logic (asking for bonding social capital instead of their 
right) is still embedded, even in the mind of many women. Mrs. Halima who is a mother to 
six girls and is a sister of wealthy brothers said: “I forgive my brothers, I do not want my 
share from my late father’s property, and I only ask them to keep the good relations with me 
and my family, such as visiting me and my married daughter in times of feasts to show their 
husbands that they have a big wealthy family” (Mrs. Halima, October 24, 2013). Women 
accepted this social norm and find a way out by other means such as education. Education 
is an access to a better, more independent socio-economic life; otherwise they will be 
traditionally married at an early age and moved from under the authority of her father/brother 
to the authority of her husband. It is common to see both cases in the society; those who 
finished their high school and continued into higher education and work, and those who were 
married around the age of seventeen and started a family young. The latter especially 
occurs in the rural-areas of Palestine. Many families’ condition for approving a marriage, the 
proposal to their relatively young daughter is that the bride should complete her higher 
education after the marriage. Mrs. Nahawand who is a refugee who married her relative and 
lives in al-‘Eizariyah represented her case: 
 
I come from a refugee family who were displaced in Ramallah area after the 1948 Palestinian 
Exodus (the Nakba). I was married to one of my father’s relatives (in al-‘Eizariyah) right after I 
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finished high school. Although I am a mother of five children, I had insisted to finish my 
university education to get a bachelor and then a master’s degree. I work in university 
teaching and I am only thirty six years old. Although I have a successful and a happy 
marriage, sometimes I wonder why I didn’t finish my education first before getting married! My 
marriage is successful because I love my husband and I appreciate his strong bond with his 
family. His parent  lost his eldest son, my husband was only sixteen then, he felt he should 
work hard to compensate the family’s great loss, he even exaggerated especially with his 
mother who compensates her loss and sadness by over spending. I believe his act is driven 
by his profound Islamic teaching; Islam order sons and daughters to seek their parents’ 
satisfaction. It is the road to heaven especially it is true about mothers like following Prophet 
Mohammad’s saying ‘heaven is under the feet of mothers’. At the end we all benefit out of his 
hard work, our three stores building gave the family as a whole a higher social status and 
compensate for our feelings as refugees. (Nahawand, November 25, 2013). 
 
The interview above reveals the role of religion on social capital and social behavior, before 
the seventies the Palestinians in general were “Muslims by name” meaning that they did not 
fully practice Islam especially among the young. Some would only fast Ramadan and pray 
once a week. The older people most likely to practice Islam more; they pray more frequently, 
in general. The population of al-’Eizariyah were described as ‘More Open’. Shahid (1988) 
pointed out that the Middle East has witnessed an increase in Islamic fundamentalism during 
the seventies including the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the discussion here is 
about Islam as a religion which influence social behavior and not Islamic Fundamentalism, 
but the general influence of the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism was that Islamic believes 
and practices among the Muslim population increased.  The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood 
was established in Jerusalem in 1946, but “It was only after 1976 that the Brotherhood 
began to re-emerge as was evident in its recruitment activity and increased membership. 
However, the “Brotherhood faced a formidable obstacle in the popular Palestinian nationalist 
and leftist support in the West Bank. Here the process of the secularization of Palestinian 
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society was apparent at every level, from pattern of consumption to leisure activities. … The 
increasing secular nature of society extended to the establishment of a mass-based national 
movement in the West Bank and the founding of a large number of ‘national institutions’ 
throughout the 1970 and 1980s including universities, hospitals, research centers, 
newspapers and magazines” (Milton-Edwards, 1999: 131).  The West Bank intellectual 
trends reinforced additional secularization and were aware of the brotherhood’s intention for 
societal and political reforms. Although the rural areas and towns like Hebron remained 
traditionally conservative, politically and socially the impact of a more secular society was 
obvious (Ibid). However, the increase of the Brotherhood’s followers among Palestinians 
was substantially aided by the growth of the Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East 
region as a whole, particularly after the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979” 
(Shahid, 1988: 662). The table below presents the result of the survey132 conducted by 
Shadid & Seltzer (1988) that aim to measure change in the religious and social behavior in 
the West Bank and Gaza during the period from 1978 to 1984. 
 
Type of Islamic Practice Percentage of all respondents 
1978 
Percentage of all respondents 
1984 
Pray five times a day 44.4 49.0 
Read the Holy Koran daily 11.0 12.3 
Fasting during the month of Ramadan 73.3 76.4 
Reading of religious literature daily 5.1 7.4 
 
 
Figure 27: Islamic Observation in West Bank and Gaza. Source of information: (Shadid & Seltzer, 1988) 
 
The trends continued to escalate during and after the first Intifada in which the offshoot of 
the Muslim Brothers movement (Hamas) was created. The 2006 elections, during which 
                                                             
132 The survey by the authors consisted of 3,306 interviews conducted between August 1983 and 
February 1984, 
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Hamas won the majority in the Palestinian Parliament, reflect not only the political affiliation 
of the Palestinians but also the religious and social behavior. The manifestations of religiosity 
are clear in al-‘Eizariyah too, the increase in the number of vailed women, the frequency of 
people praying in the mosque, and the celebrations of religious feasts are notable. Many of 
the young people practice Islam not only because of their strong belief, but also for the 
higher social status and for the respect that religious people gain in the society. Social norms 
that were driven mainly from the Islamic teachings oblige sons to respect and be responsible 
of the welfare of their parents, and seek their satisfaction particularly that of their mother. 
Therefore the financial aid in so many cases exceeds the basic needs and is often spent on 
luxury. Reciprocity here is mutual as it leads to community respect and higher social status 
for both; the son and the parents. The economic practices influenced by Islamic teachings 
are closer to capitalism than communism; increase in domestic consumption is an indication 
of wealth and reflects the wellbeing as (God would like to see the reflection of his grace on 
his slave (follower)133.  Therefore exaggeration is notable especially in weddings, size of 
houses, and types of cars…etc. Although the Islamic teachings urge personal cleanliness 
inside and outside the house, the public places get less attention from the people. There are 
several ways to explain this lack of cleanliness in public space. One of the explanations is 
that this is the responsibility of the Local Council. Another one is the absence of law and 
order in area B. However, the prevalent view of the locals is that this is how the ‘strangers’ 
behave, they do not care. There are many examples to show the impact of Islamic teachings 
on the Palestinians behavior, but one of the most important is that it is used to release 
political tension and to accept the dramatic acts by the Israeli government such as killing 
young demonstrators or arresting them. Mothers in general and the society as a whole 
consider this, in addition to an act of resilience in the face of the Israeli Occupier, as God’s 
will who will compensate their pain and reward them by a good place in heaven after life. 
                                                             
133 An interpretation of prophet Mohammed saying (هدبع ىلع هتمعن رثا ىري نا بحي الله نا ( 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 183 
 
This is the general reaction of helpless parents and family, while it might increase rage 
against the Israeli practices among the younger generation.  
Ostrom (1998) in her study ‘A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of 
Collective Action’  arrived at the conclusion that “Individuals achieve results that are "better  
than rational" by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to 
overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest” (Ostorm, 1998: 1). The actor in 
al-‘Eizariyah, whether he is a man or a women, young or old, local or displaced, certainly has 
goals and might arrive at them via a motive of self-interest especially in the absence of the 
state, which would normally provide services and ensure care of its citizens when they reach 
old age, such as health insurance and pensions. However the dominant social norms led to 
social fragmentation and prevented the whole community from benefiting from the relatively 
strong bonding social capital within each social group in al-‘Eizariyah. Trust and reciprocity, 
for example, were strong within each group but weak enough among various groups to 
prevent coordination and cooperation for a better outcome for all. The problems that were 
observed are not only a reflection of the long term Israeli occupation over many years, nor 
the principles of the Oslo Accords which did not implement full Palestinian self-government 
over Areas B and Area C. They also reflect the lack of cooperation and coordination at 
community level. Strong social relations, which helped holding the population together in the 
past, now started to disintegrate for the reasons that some of them have been analyzed 
previously in this chapter. 
5.6 THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ASSOCIATIONS IN SERVING AL-
‘EIZARIYAH  COMMUNITY 
   
The presence of the modern form of civil society associations in al-‘Eizariyah is notable but 
their role has its own special case which needs to be understood. Jamal (2007) pointed out 
that the existence and effectiveness of civil associations usually used to evaluate the 
potential for democracy in the developing states across the ‘Third World’. Scholars argue 
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that “Civil societies help to hold states accountable, represent citizen interests, channel and 
mediate mass concerns, bolster an environment of pluralism and trust, and socialize 
members to the behavior required for successful democracies” (Jamal, 2007: 1). “But in 
states where government extends into all facets of civil society, as is characteristic of many 
non-democratic and state-centralized life; they promote specific agendas, fund certain 
programs, and monitor associational activities. Particularly in non-democratic polarized 
polities (with strong pro-regime and anti-regime cleavages) like those in Palestine and other 
Arab countries, ruling governments extend their influence by promoting associational 
agendas that directly serve their political mandate to the detriment of the general interests of 
the polity and basic democratic procedures” (Jamal, 2007: 3). Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi from al-
‘Eizariyah, who teaches law at Al-Quds University and is also the director of the al-Montada 
Social Association explained: 
 
“There are twenty two social associations in al-‘Eizariyah, they can be categorized according 
to the type of services they provide such as development, healthcare, education and charity, 
or according to the target group such as children, women, youth, disabled, and the elderly. 
Unfortunately, most of these associations’ community services are limited and ineffective; the 
beneficiaries are usually the directors and their relatives, volunteer work is almost 
disappearing. In my opinion, the conditional external funding contributed to this failure. These 
associations look for projects that will be accepted and financed by the international donors. 
Therefore, those projects serve the funders’ interests, not the societal needs; this reflected 
negatively on volunteer work. Before the split between Fatah and Hamas in 2007 there were 
social associations created by these and other political parties. They served the community as 
a whole; now each association serves only their own party followers” (Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi, 
November 28, 2013). 
 
Indeed, (ARIJ) the Applied Research Institute (2012) pointed out that the community 
services programs are channeled and duplicated according to the international political 
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trends. The surplus of the civil society organizations (CSOs), along with generous 
international funding has created a complex environment and a growing dependency on 
foreign aid in addition to project duplication (ARIJ, 2012). Khalil M. Abu-Rish as one of al-
‘Eizariyah notable shared his opinion regarding one of the most important associations of the 
town: 
 
“The sports club of al-‘Eizariyah did not make any progress;  they don’t have sports activities, 
not even a football team although they have a headquarters, facilities and generous financial 
aid from one of the town’s rich benefactors, in the USA. I think it is because they do not have 
good management. In general, the associations here serve individuals and not the whole 
community. Politics had a major role in the way they work; most of the al-‘Eizariyah 
associations are Fatah oriented. During the sport club elections, for example, they made sure 
that those who won were from the Fatah Party. Maybe two of them were good but the other 
five were not qualified to run the club, they were elected only because they are members of 
Fatah Party” (Khalil M. Abu-Rish, October 20, 2013). 
  
Jamal (2007) pointed out that the “civic associations in the West Bank were polarized along 
two axes - associations with close ties to and favorable opinions of the government (the 
PNA) and associations that more or less opposed the PNA … Those associations with 
strong ties to the PNA [Fatah] derived more resources and benefits, security, prestige, 
legitimacy and credibility than associations without ties of similar strength.” (Jamal, 2007:21). 
Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi further explained: 
 
 “We of the ‘al-Montada  ىدتنملا’ Forum, which was established in 2007. We studied the needs 
of the population; we found that education, health, social and culture aspects need more 
attention, especially with the young.  We held meetings with the teachers from the schools, 
the parents’ committee, and people from the town and with students. We focused first on the 
al-‘Eizariyah boys’ high school, Al-Muscat, as it had low success rates for the annual national 
exams (Tawjihi يهيجوت). It was 22 percent compared to the Girls’ High School which had been 
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achieving between 80-90% every year for decades. We observed a decline in the values of 
co-operation and reciprocation within the School. In addition there was a notable lack of in 
health and environmental awareness. In a few years, our efforts with Al-Muscat School paid 
off; their success rates rose from 22 to 80 percent” (Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi, November 28, 
2013). 
 
The 2001 study of Palestinian civil society organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, noted a decline in the proportion of “cultural, scientific and educational” associations 
(Hilal, 2009). Al-Montada ىدتنملا’ Forum of al-‘Eizariya worked intensively with the boys’ high 
school to enforce these three dimensions. One of the strategies was the initiative of Om 
Mahmoud, one of Al-Montada members: 
 
“I agreed to join the al-Montada forum to serve al-‘Eizariyah community because I believed in 
the community service and I am not a member of any political party. I had an idea and  I 
discussed it with my colleagues first then with the headmaster of the boys’ school who agreed 
in a private meeting with class twelve to motivate them to study and pursue their entrance into 
higher education. I simply told them my story, how I joined the university when I was thirty 
nine years old, and how education influenced the type of job I occupy now and how my 
income increased accordingly. The bottom line was “do not complain of the occupation, the 
Wall, the closure, our economic situation, or family problems; the first person responsible 
about your future is you”. Then we, as al-Montada, promised the students university 
scholarships for the most outstanding students; after that I had a meeting with their mothers to 
discuss different types of motivations to help their sons to concentrate and focus on their 
studies” (Om Mahmoud
134
, November 24, 2013). 
 
                                                             
134 Om Mahmoud is a women who was married at the age eighteen, had three kids, lived abroad for 
twenty years then, with the support of her family, she divorced her husband and returned to al-‘Eizariyah, 
she worked for few years then she decided to pursue her higher education at the age of forty, she gain the 
respect of her community for her determination. 
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The efforts of al-Montada Forum harvested results as most of those student passed the 
annual national exams (Tawjihi) for that year. The role model and the strong linking social 
capital between the Forum and Fatah influential figures facilitated the scholarship issue for 
the top three graduates in the class. Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi continued regarding the volunteer 
work: 
“Before the establishment of the PNA, back in the 1970s and 1980s there was a clear 
understanding of the volunteer work. That is the sum of activities that enhance social relations 
among individuals, families, and groups. The motive for volunteering comes from the feeling of 
belonging. Back then, the volunteer work within the popular committees offered services to all 
sectors; their goals were clear and they did not need finance. After the establishment of the 
PNA, all these popular committees needed government approval to be able to work. Those 
who got the approval became official associations with salaries and financial privileges for 
their directors and his deputies. These associations became politicized. This resulted in a 
reluctance of local people to put themselves forward for volunteer work; scouts activities, for 
example, became limited to political ceremonies which involved beating their drums while 
marching; this kind of activity only demonstrates power and disrupts traffic” (Abdel-Raof al-
Sinawi, November 28, 2013). 
 
Jamal (2007) in her book “Barriers to Democracy” pointed out Putnam’s formulation, “the 
density of horizontal voluntary associations among citizens (in contrast to the vertical 
associations under the dominion of the state) correlates with strong and effective local 
government” (Jamal, 2007: 4). The president of al-Muntada association noted that before the 
PNA, the voluntary associations in al-‘Eizariyah were horizontal and efficient (Abdel-Raof al-
Sinawi, 28 November, 2013). Jamal pointed out that after 1994; the PNA was in charge of a 
social and political context where the rule of law needed to be implemented and “the 
judiciary and the executive branches of government were still highly integrated while a clear, 
coherent and accessible system of arbitration remained in its nascent stages” (Jamal, 2007: 
p. 23-24). The hierarchic system got consolidated during Arafat’s time in office and it favored 
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a system of vertical linkages between associations and the PNA. Although associations were 
welcome to support statewide reforms, the same associations needed to be recognized by 
the PNA in order to work.  In other words, the associations supporting the PNA receive 
better access to local resources, more security, prestige and legitimacy compared to non- 
supporting associations – no matter what (Jamal, 2007: p. 21).   After the establishment of 
the PNA in 1993, vertical relationship were created by directly and indirectly taking control 
over these associations; they interfered with their strategies and in some cases changed the 
administrative director and staff if they faced some resistance or reticence to this control, as 
was the case with the ‘Lazarus Home for Girls’ which was established and run by Ms. 
Sahaar. She wanted to remain politically independent and struggled with the powers that be 
but was eventually accused of using the Association for her own benefit and she was 
replaced. Clare Roberts, a member of a solidarity group in Britain shared her observations 
and opinions: 
 
I am a member of a solidarity group in Britain. The al-‘Eizariyah council put me in contact with 
many local associations all dealing with their separate areas of work. A couple of these 
associations stood out for me on that first visit, not only for the important work that they were 
doing within the community but for the obvious integrity and openness of their Directors. One 
of them was Ms. Sahar of the Lazarus Home for Girls, an orphanage not just for orphans but 
also for girls rejected by their families. She was clearly a fighter for her “girls” and unusual in 
that she spoke openly about the inadequacies within the PA. One of the issues she was 
struggling with concerned a family who had left their daughter with the orphanage for many 
years. The young woman didn’t want to get married to the man suggested by her family and 
appealed to Ms. Sahar for support. Ms. Sahar gave her this support and came into direct 
conflict with the family and eventually the PA. It was during this dispute that Ms. Sahar 
became very aware that highly negative rumors were circulating about her and her 
directorship of the orphanage. However she remained vocal but eventually she was forced to 
relinquish the directorship of the orphanage she had established, many years before (Clare 
Roberts, July 16, 2015). 
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Another example is the Alortozexie Orphanage known as ‘Madam Sik-Sik’ which was also 
financially independent but came under the supervision of the PNA. The workers then 
started to suffer a financial crises and a monthly delay of their salaries. One association 
which is the only one that deals with disabled children in al-‘Eizariyah is going to close down 
because of the sickness of its founder who himself used to transport the children from and to 
the association. He cannot afford to hire a driver. And he is not supported by either Hamas 
or Fatah while his strong relations with an international solidarity group cannot help him 
much in terms of financial support. 
While discussing the inefficient role of civil associations in serving al-‘Eizariyah’s community 
with the key interviewees a shining exception of efficient social engagement would always 
be the voluntary work of the ‘Mothers’ Council’ of the Girl’s High School. The Council was 
the idea of the headmistress135 of eighteen years ago, before the establishment of the PNA. 
A group of notable women from the town, were internally elected, along with the president 
and became the ‘Mothers’ Council’. At the beginning, their mission was to help students from 
poor families, by providing school uniforms and other clothes. Their efforts gradually 
increased to building class rooms and providing computers. Finally their involvement 
included the annual graduation ceremony in which valuable prizes are distributed amongst 
the outstanding students, including university scholarships. Wajiha or as they call her ‘Om 
Safwan’ is the daughter of the late Mahmoud Abu-Rish and the Wife of al-‘Eizariyah boy’s 
high school late headmaster further explained: 
 
“We have a good reputation in all the schools of the West Bank. We are successful because 
we believe in our mission. We are united and we trust each other and we trust the school’s 
administration. Our goal is to promote the education of our girls. Islamic teaching urges us to 
educate girls. We have been lucky in always having good headmistresses, responsible and 
with discipline. Our girls are committed to learning, unlike most of the boys who have other 
                                                             
135 The headmistress of the school is Suad al-Sinawi who’s from the locals of al-‘Eizariyah 
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interests such as politics, sports or bad habits, like smoking. In my opinion and in so many 
others, the headmaster of the boys’ school is not strict enough when it comes to student 
absence and dropout; the follow-up strategy, directly with the parents, is missing. The boys’ 
school, in the past, had a similar reputation as the girls’ school. During the first Intifada the 
then head master used his power to forbid participation in demonstrations during school 
hours. His principle was that education is the best weapon against the Occupation. He was 
right; the Intifada produced an ignorant generation who unfortunately rose to power after the 
creation of the PNA” (Wajiha Abu-Rish, December 1st, 2013).  
 
 
 
Figure 28: The recognition of contribution gift to the head of the “Mothers Council” from the Officer of the Palestinian Ministry of 
Education and al-‘Eizariyah Local Council President in the 17th graduation ceremony of al-‘Eizariyah Girls School. Source: Al-
Awail news agency, 2014. 
 
The interviews in this section reflect that social capital, in the form of a cohesive network of 
clan, families, caring individuals and social associations who give support, through schools, 
to strengthen and serve the community of al-‘Eizariyah. Determination and trust were at the 
core of all successful efforts of social engagement. 
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5.6.1 THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL ASSOCIATIONS IN RAISING AWARENESS 
REGARDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WALL 
 
Regarding the role of the civil associations in raising awareness among the population 
regarding the Wall, the director of al-Montada Forum explained:   
 
“There were no effective roles for these associations in raising awareness regarding the Wall; 
they had the ISO
136
 acceptance of security, therefore, they would risk losing their funding from 
both the PNA and international bodies, if they organized or raised awareness against the Wall. 
The people of al-‘Eizariyah did not have enough information about how the Wall would 
eventually impact their lives; Israel gave out limited information, piece-meal, and used the 
“divide and rule” methods while implementing and constructing the Wall. Each family, whose 
land was to be confiscated on the route of the Wall, or for the construction of by-pass roads, 
was contacted separately. Therefore the facts on the ground slowly changed and deteriorated 
without the community organizing a united opposition. Eventually, the people accepted the 
creeping status quo and did not rebel as it was thought to be too late. Now, after ten years, 
the consequences of the construction of the Wall affected the whole population; the rise in 
divorce rate is just an example” (Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi, November 28, 2013).  
 
Indeed, and although divorce rates are escalating in societies nowadays as a trend but many 
thinks that in the Palestinian case it is attributed mostly to the imprisonment by the Wall; 
according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics shows that divorce rate had risen 
from 0.9% in 2002 to 1.7% in 2014 in the West Bank and from 1.1% in 2002 in Jerusalem to 
1.5% in 2014137. However, there had been efforts of resistance to the Wall organized by 
individuals and organizations by where Israel had to change the route of the Wall. The al-
Quds University in Abu-Dis for example, was aware that “the Wall would cut through the 
University splitting it in two and would result in the confiscation of a third of the University's 
                                                             
136 The International Organization for Standardization 
137 See http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/VS-2014-07.htm 
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grounds, approximately 70 dunums”138. The al-Quds University acted on two axes to prevent 
that; via the law and via popular, peaceful resistance. First, the University appointed an 
attorney to fight the case in the Israeli Supreme Court. Second, they set up a tent in the 
University grounds, exactly where the Wall was proposed to run cutting the campus into two 
halves. The University President relocated all the administrative meetings to this tent. 
Teachers shifted their lectures to the playground, supporters and popular musical bands 
came to join in the evening. These efforts paid back positively, and the Wall’s route was 
moved to run along the boundary of the University campus.139 In this act, The al-Quds 
University depended on Bourdieu’s notion of “potential resources” in his definition of social 
capital "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and 
recognition" (Bourdieu, 1986: 284). Meaning that The al-Quds University used the potential 
power of its community to protest for months against the route of the Wall, and eventually it 
achieved its goal. This was along with the attorney efforts in defending the case in the Israeli 
Supreme Court. Other cases of where the Wall was to run beside their domestic gardens 
used only the legal approach but managed also to change the route of the Wall away from 
their property.  This changed very little in the destruction, dislocation and general theft of 
land, as the Wall was constructed in the end and if it was not on my land it was on my 
neighbor’s land. The argument here that if civil associations in al-‘Eizariyah, and elsewhere 
in the West Bank, had adopted al-Quds University’s strategy, and worked collectively against 
the construction of the Wall, with education and peaceful, direct resistance, the result would 
have been different.  
                                                             
138  See Israel's "Security Wall" to spilt Al-Quds University in two Date posted: September 03, 2003  By 
MIFTAH http://www.miftah.org  
139 I witnessed this case personally and participated in the final ceremony that was organized to thank all 
who supported al-Quds University in its struggle against the Wall. 
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5.6.2 THE WALL AND THE EFFECTS ON SOCIAL CAPITAL: FROM 
HORIZONTAL TO VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
The political situation that led to the construction of the Wall and the Wall itself affected 
social capital at different levels; from family to the extended family level, the social 
organizations and civil associations as well. 
1- Social Capital at the Family and Extended Family Levels 
  
The life stories that were conducted for this research, bonding social capital is at the core of 
the story in confronting the hardships caused by the separation Wall. Strong bonds are not 
only between the members of the family who are living but also with those who have passed 
away. Important decisions such as the selling of a house or renting another somewhere else 
were influenced by the spirit of an intimate family member whether a father, mother, 
grandparent etc. The bonds with these “places” were mostly connected with the people who 
are living or who have lived there. 
Family-related values, such as trust in family members and respecting the elderly, are still 
present and became stronger coupled with  high sense of responsibility by parents towards 
their children, not only when it comes to health and education but in supporting them with 
wedding expenses and setting up a home. Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish, the son of al-'Eizariyah’s 
ex-Mayor and one of the regional notables shared his experience: 
 
“I worked hard to ensure my sons’ future. I have two daughters and four sons. I reorganized 
the house that I inherited from my late father. It is located on the main street. In the nineties, 
when our hopes were high regarding the promised economic boom in al-‘Eizariyah, following 
the Oslo Accords, I built a three store building in the front yard. There are stores on the first 
floor and four offices on the second and third floors. I rented them all out and this became my 
main source of income. The old two-store house was transformed into two apartments, one in 
which I live with my wife and children and the second for my son who married six years ago 
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and who now has two children. Having a big family was an asset in the past; boys grew up, 
worked and supported the family. Now it is a burden; you raise them, you pay for their 
education, their marriage expenses and provide them a home in which to live. At this point you 
may think that they’re off your hands, they’re married and have become independent, and 
then you discover that when they left you they were one person but now they return with their 
wives and children. Of course this is a great joy but it is also a financial burden. In such 
circumstances, the Israeli occupation, the closure and the Wall makes the family stick together 
(Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish, November 26, 2013). 
 
The Arab cultures in general and the Palestinian culture in particular enforce their social 
capital by having more children especially males. This “preference for boys over girls was 
deep rooted because boys carried the family or tribal name, helped their fathers with their 
work and in their old age, and, importantly, were useful in fights with other families, which 
often developed into blood feuds” (Aburish, 1991: 22).  “A man’s Tribal status was often 
judged by the number of men behind him, his azzwa [ozwa]” (Ibid). The more children one 
has the more ‘Ozwa’ he will enjoy. In the past it was normal for a family to have up to ten 
children, now the number is reduced, but still, it is considerably high in comparison with 
western culture.   On the other hand the strong bonding social capital especially between the 
parents and their grown up children had a negative influence on their development as adults 
in terms of independence and maturity.  In such times of crisis, the family has become a 
strategy of protection and solidarity between immediate family members has increased. 
Nevertheless, the situation is slightly different when it comes to the extended family. Ahmed 
al- Mukahal is a co-partner of a workshop for car wash and spare parts, he shared his 
experience: 
“My workshop location is at the end of the commercial street of al-‘Eizariyah. In the past, most 
of my customers were from my immediate and extended family and from friends. They 
supported me according to our traditions and norms. Purchase from relatives is a priority, 
despite the distance. Now they think about the financial cost first. One liter of fuel costs 7 IS 
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(1:8 euro). They calculate the overall cost first and usually prefer to wash their cars 
somewhere closer to their homes. Family relations are not as strong as before, even 
relationships with friends have changed. The economic crisis has made everyone think of 
his/her own interest first. Our traditions and norms have changed; this Facebook thing that 
occupying the people minds and time is a disaster, no privacy any more. There are no basic 
services such as well asphalted roads but all kinds of luxury is available from the newest 
models of new cars to IPhones and IPads” (Ahmed al- Mukahal
140
, December 5, 2013).   
 
The economic situation influences relationships amongst the extended family; there are 
priorities when it comes to expenditures, the immediate family comes first especially that of 
luxuries became part of the necessities such as cars in the absence of good and cheap 
public transportation system. However solidarity is still strong between them when it comes 
to disputes. Robinson (2009) argues that Palestinian clans have flourished both under Israeli 
occupation and under conditions of PA breakdown because of the absence of a strong state 
that can reliably protect its citizens. 
 
2-  Social Capital  at the Community Level 
 
Edwards & Foley (1998) concluded that both civic society and social capital have proven 
useful heuristics for drawing attention to neglected relationships and aspects of social reality. 
Minkoff (1997) argued that “civil society organization plays a critical role in civil society and 
the production of social capital by providing an infrastructure for collective action”. Bridging 
social capital, in particular, builds trust and civic engagement, and facilitates collective action 
(MAS, 2007). The rise of many problems after the construction of the Wall directed the 
community towards other solutions in the absence of law and order and the irruption of the 
educational and health systems: 
                                                             
140 Ahmed al- Mukahal is a partner of car wash and spare parts workshop in al-Mashroo at the end of the 
commercial street of al-‘Eizariyah 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 196 
 
a- Social Security 
 
This rise of social problems because of the Walled imprisonment of most of al-‘Eizariyah 
residents, the social security vacuum and the absence of law and order, especially in areas 
B, the local community compensated by the reinforcement of traditional tribal justice. In 
September 1994 the Palestinian Authority considered the role of community leaders in 
parallel with the force of law to solve societal problems. Therefore, the PA reconstituted 
"management of tribal affairs" to support the rule of law and the establishment of social 
peace141. Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish who is one of the regional notables explained: 
 
“I am a member of the al-‘Eizariyah Reconciliation Commission. We are trusted by the people. 
Our mission is parallel and bilateral with the official court system; the people are familiar with 
the tribal justice to solve disputes. It is efficient especially in Areas B where the Palestinian 
Authority is forbidden to act. If two people are arrested by the police, we have the authority to 
release them, without bail, by stamping the tribal reconciliation document ةوطع ،يرئاشع حلص كص
)ةيرئاشع) authorized by the Reconciliation Committee. This then binds the two heads of clan 
with the Commission’s decision. This takes a lot of effort, to have a full-time presence and an 
ever-readiness to solve disputes. This system is efficient and binding to all clan members; 
now one foolish act by a young member of one of the clans might destroy the agreement” 
(Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish, November 26, 2013). 
  
Robinson (2009) pointed out that “the formal cement that ties together clan members is 
mithaq al-sharaf or code of honor, which is binding to all male members. They pledge not 
only their loyalty to each other, but agree that an attack (physical or honor based) on one 
member constitutes an attack on all members of the hamula [the extended family]. Given 
that the Palestinian society shares the honor-shame social system common to 
Mediterranean countries, individual members cannot easily violate this code without 
                                                             
141 See www.wafainfo.ps  (Tribal justice in Palestine ءاضقلا يرئاشعلا يف نيطسلف  ) 
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dishonoring themselves and their families. It is powerful social glue, especially in the 
absence of a functioning state that can provide public security” (Robinson, 2009: 3). 
The negative side of solidarity between clan members can erupt sometimes in violent 
arguments. Members of the extended family might engage in a fight, supporting one or more 
of their relatives, while they have no idea what the fight is all about. “The idea here is; fight 
first, understand later” (Khalil M. Abu-Rish, 20 October, 2013). The popular saying “My 
brother and I against my cousin, and my cousin and I against a stranger’ is still dominant, 
particularly amongst adolescents” Mr. Abu-Rish continued. This tribal attitude, which could 
be considered as negative social capital, creates large social problems and reflects the 
failure of the Reconciliation Commission, in some cases. Mr. Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish 
continued: 
 
“We, as the Reconciliation Commission, prefer that our role is limited to functioning at only a 
minimal level, and to have instead a full Palestinian police force as it is in Areas A. In al-
‘Eizariyah, which is considered Area B, we only have ten police officers who have neither 
weapons nor uniforms. According to the Oslo Accords the police are not armed, but the 
population is! The spread of weapons is a new phenomenon, gunshot became familiar in 
family disputes; we used to have lawlessness, but now we have organized crime, the arms 
trade, drugs, money laundering, and prostitution. The outlaws of other Palestinian cities come 
to hide in al-‘Eizariyah, and the security of its civilians is going from bad to worse. The 
Commission still has the majority of the population’s respect however there are exceptions 
and these may well increase in the future and sabotage its fragile existence” (Zakariyya M. 
Abu-Rish, November 26, 2013). 
 
The absence of low and order developed some forms of negative social capital which can be 
seen in the formation of new social networks that deals with the arms trade, drugs, money 
laundering, and prostitution. These networks cooperate with each other and with their source 
inside the Wall and also outside. Drug dealers of East Jerusalem distribute drug through 
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their agents in Area B, these operations happen before the eyes of the Israelis but they 
interfere only if the customer is an Israeli. One of the Israeli policies is to subvert the minds 
of young Palestinians and to create such social problems in order to weaken the Palestinian 
communities. Since Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip it plunges the OPT 
with drugs. The journalist Sawsan Ramahi wrote on the Middle East Monitor on the third of 
January 2011: 
 
Prior to 1967, the number of people known to use drugs was listed in dozens; at that time, the 
West Bank was under Jordanian control and statistics available from the Global Report on 
Drugs showed no narcotics production or trafficking. ...The situation changed after the Six Day 
War and the start of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Occupied 
Territories became fertile ground for smuggling and use of all types of illegal substance. … 
The occupation authorities appear to condone the drug-smuggling networks in East Jerusalem 
where no serious attempts have been made to raid dealers’ and addicts’ "nests", even though 
some are well-known and only 50 meters or so from police stations or other Israeli occupation 
institutions… There is a feeling locally that the police know very well what is happening but is 
"comfortable" with the situation as long as the victims are the Palestinians. It has been 
observed that a known drug dealer is left free to peddle his poisonous wares in East 
Jerusalem, but as soon as he tries to do the same in Israeli West Jerusalem he is picked up 
by anti-drug units of the local police” (Sawsan Ramahi,142 January 3, 2011). 
b- Education 
 
Many of al-‘Eizariyah students who were attending schools in East Jerusalem and who were 
over 16 years old  were denied entry into East Jerusalem. However those who were under 
this age could still pass through the check point by showing their birth certificates but the 
journey to and from school was both time-consuming and humiliating as the experience of 
going through the check point is a demeaning one.  Because of this, many families took the 
                                                             
142See  https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/1907-the-scourge-of-drugs-in-
jerusalem  
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decision to change schools for their young children and enroll them at al-‘Eizariyah schools. 
This has created a problem for the Palestinian Ministry of Education as they had to provide 
the schools with extra space (classes), teachers, and facilities following the increase in 
demand. At the beginning they increased the student numbers of each class, then they 
managed to convert some activity spaces into class rooms and later they built extra classes 
or new schools to absorb the increasing number of students in all grades. This direct effect is 
applicable for both sexes. The Wall also had an indirect effect on  education as well, Mrs. 
Wajiha Abu-Rish; the head of the ‘Mothers’ Council’ of al-‘Eizariyah Girl’s High School 
further explained: 
 
“The construction of the Wall did not only affect the girls (students) directly, but also indirectly; 
it affected their parent’s economic status, especially those who used to work in hotels and lost 
their jobs in Jerusalem. The number of poor girls escalated after the Wall. Local fund raising 
has fallen too. Before the Wall, if I asked a young man for a donation he would have given me 
at least 100 IS (20 Euros), now he will simply say sorry and give nothing (Wajiha Abu-Rish, 
December 1st, 2013). 
 
Since the occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in 1967, Israel has 
witnessed a rising numbers of international tourists attracted to its historical and religious 
sites (Mansfeld, 1999). Therefore, investment in the tourism industry has created jobs for 
both Israelis and Palestinians; however, this was disrupted because of the geopolitical 
instability during the second Intifada, followed by the construction of the Wall. Many of al-
‘Eizariyah’s residents, who hold green IDs and used to work in Jerusalem’s hotels or 
other tourism services such as tourists guides, taxi drivers or in restaurants, lost their 
jobs after the Wall policies were introduced. Therefore, social capital played its role 
through social association to help in solving some of the economic problems: 
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 “Our main source of donation comes from those families who are prosperous in al-‘Eizariyah 
and those who work and are doing well in the USA and the Arab Gulf. Most of them are my 
relatives. They trust me and the other Council Members; we act freely in terms of where we 
choose to spend the funds, for the benefit of the community as a whole. Every year we 
prepare a list of the students from poor families based on both our knowledge of our 
community and the school social worker reports. We also give yearly rewards to the 
outstanding students. We do not discriminate against the ‘strangers’, we help all, whether they 
are from the locals or not but we’ve noticed that the ‘strangers’ who hold a blue ID are the 
most privileged; they are better-off because their fathers/mothers still work in 
Jerusalem/Israel” (Wajiha Abu-Rish, December 1
st
, 2013). 
c- Health Care 
 
After the Wall, the hospitals of East Jerusalem, which were within walking distance from the 
town, became out of reach. The one small clinic positioned in al-‘Eizariyah cannot meet the 
needs of the residents. Women in labor, and those requiring advanced medical care, have to 
drive to the next nearest municipal hospitals in the West Bank, either in Jericho (an hour’s 
drive), or Ramallah (an hour and a half’s drive away). The pharmacist Ahmid Al-Khatib 
explained his motive in establishing a health care center in al-“Eizariyah: 
 
“Before the Wall, we were the only pharmacy that was open for extended hours, so my 
customers were not only from al-“Eizariyah, but they came from East Jerusalem and other 
suburbs too; Silwan, the Mount of Olive and even settlers from Ma’ale Adummim. After the 
Wall was built I lost those customers. The area was cut off from medical care. Our main 
hospital, Al-Makassed Hospital
143
, became on the other side of the Wall; providing medical 
care by the privet sector was one of the solutions to solve this problem. Therefore I thought of 
establishing a medical center with general practitioners, specialist doctors, as well as a 
laboratory and x-ray section. ” (Ahmad Al-Khatib, November 24, 2013). 
                                                             
143 The Al-Makassed Islamic Charitable Hospital which was established in 1968, a 250-bed medical facility 
with in-patient and out-patient services is located in At-Tur (Mount of Olive). 
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Professional individuals’ initiatives in addition to the health ministry small clinics served the 
community, awareness also helped to overcome the problem. Mr. Isam Faroon, the ex-
Mayor further explained: 
 
“Although the health care sector still needs further development and investment in al-
‘Eizariyah after the Wall, awareness in promoting health care has increased among 
the population. The community became aware of the difficulties of reaching 
Jerusalem’s hospitals. Therefore they regularly follow up with the local clinics; these 
centers now co-ordinate with the hospitals in East Jerusalem to get medical permits 
on time for their patients when needed, women in labor, for instance, will do all the 
bureaucratic procedures before the due date” (Isam Faroon, November 12, 2013). 
5.7 LOCAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE 
 
The previous section showed the multiple effects of the construction of the Wall on the local 
society. Now I will focus on social resilience, adaptation and adjustment to the new situation 
and local development. 
1- Socio-Economic Resilience and Local Development 
 
The residents of al-'Eizariyah responded to the physical intervention shock presented by the 
Wall in different ways. Indeed, communities’ response to the changes occurred will depend 
on their resilience: their resources, vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities (Maguire & 
Cartwright, 2008). The Palestinian concept of the Arabic word “Sumud” which means 
determination to exist through being steadfast and rooted to the land, is at the heart of the 
Palestinian resilience to the Israeli occupation (Nguyen‐Gillham et al, 2008). The general 
attitude and practice of the residents of al-‘Eizariyah reflect their belief that suffering and 
endurance has to be interpreted at both levels; individual and collective. “The construct of 
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resilience goes beyond an individualistic interpretation: resilience is (re)constituted as a 
wider collective and social representation of what it means to endure” (Nguyen‐Gillham e al, 
2008: 292). From this point of view and as a matter of resilience144, the ex-Mayor of al-
'Eizariyah argued that the construction of the Wall had a positive impact on the town’s socio-
economic life, and eventually on local development. In fact, there have been many 
investments by individuals who either lost their jobs in Israel or felt the need of certain 
services after the Wall had cut off the town from its center; some of them cooperated and 
established businesses to fill the gap. Scholars have argued that entrepreneurship is 
embedded in a social context (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986) and that “social ties provide a 
mechanism by which investors obtain information, thereby allowing entrepreneurs, without 
high-capital endowments, to obtain resources to pursue business opportunities” (Shane & 
Cable, 2002: 378). However, The Wall’s immediate impact was a sudden rise in the 
unemployment rate as many of those who used to work in Jerusalem and Israel lost their 
jobs.  Over time, the general attitude has changed from seeing only the problems and 
inconveniences brought by the Wall, to adapting and making the most out of the town’s 
changed socio-economic and political environment. While effective policies for local 
development should be formulated and implemented through cooperation between public 
and private actors, and civil society (Sabel, 1988; Streeck, 1992; Cooke and Morgan, 1998). 
Therefore, business opportunities were taken, money invested and solutions sought by the 
public and private actors as well. Mr. Isam Faroon, the ex-Mayor further explained: 
 
 “Today I visited Jerusalem to pray in al-Aqsa Mosque.
145
 I realized how close Jerusalem was 
before the Wall, it was only ten minutes’ drive away. Now it takes between forty minutes to 
one hour, via a difficult and unpredictable journey, to reach the city.  I thought of how al-
                                                             
144  The aim of using the concept of resilience, which can be somehow conservative in the context of 
Palestinian, is because it is the term close to the word “Sumud” in Arabic (Liking).  
145 The Israeli civil administration allows men and women, over fifty, to enter Jerusalem on Fridays to 
pray in al-Aqsa mosque in East Jerusalem 
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'Eizariyah has developed economically and socially after the Wall. We used to depend on East 
Jerusalem in all aspects of life; schooling, medical care, and shopping. East Jerusalem 
suburbs including al-'Eizariyah are quasi-recovered from the negative implications of its 
separation from the Capital. We have become self-sufficient when it comes to education and 
economic activities and partially in medical care too. We used to even buy our daily bread 
from Jerusalem; now we have the longest commercial street in the West Bank. Many of those 
who lost their jobs in Jerusalem and Israel started their own businesses, whether they had 
high-capital endowments or just work experience; we witnessed many partnerships and 
commercial projects between family members and friends. These projects cover services and 
commerce from mini-supermarkets, hardware and furniture stores to private schools and 
medical centers. It is my belief that East Jerusalem has suffered more by the Wall. They lost 
their customers from the suburbs and now the streets of East Jerusalem are almost empty, I 
think this is the aim of the Israeli occupation” (Isam Faroon, November 12, 2013). 
 
Sapirstein (2007) argue that “Social Resilience” is measured by the time it takes for a 
community (or organization) to rebound from a natural (or man-made) hazard. The longer it 
takes a community or organization to “bounce forward” after a natural or man-made hazard, 
the greater the risk of damage to the social fabric that holds a community or organization 
together. Similar to the notion of “broken families”, the effect of psychological or relationship 
dysfunction reaches beyond the economic impact of that lack of functioning (Sapirstein, 
2007). The time needed for al-‘Eizariyah community to rebound after the construction of the 
Wall, according to many, was approximately ten years. Abu Helweh, the owner of an 
optician’s shop in al-‘Eizariyah share his own experience: 
 
“I was the first optician in al-'Eizariyah in 1996. My shop was close to Kobsa Junction at the 
western entrance of the town. 80 percent of my customers were from Jerusalem and the rest 
were from al-'Eizariyah and the surrounding villages. The second Intifada started two years 
afterwards. I was not lucky with the timing. A few years later, the Wall was constructed very 
close to my store.  Although I moved away from the Wall, in doing so I lost most of my 
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Jerusalemite customers, I thought of moving to Ramallah, but I am well known here and had 
already built a good reputation regarding my career and people trust me, so I decided to give 
it some time.  Now I can say that my work is at its peak. There is zero competition from the 
Jerusalem opticians after the complete closure of the Wall and my customers are not only 
from al-'Eizariyah but also from the neighboring villages, all of whom are denied access to 
East Jerusalem. My business actually flourished more after the Wall.” (Abu Helweh, 
November 29, 2013). 
 
The Banks of al-‘Eizariyah had a remarkable role in enhancing local development by the 
banking facilities they offer to local business men; Mr. Rajaee Ayyad, a department 
responsible at the Arab Bank explained the role of the Bank before and after the construction 
of the Wall.:  
 
“The Arab Bank was the first to open a (selling point) branch in al-‘Eizariyah in 1997, we were 
forbidden from restarting the bank branch in East Jerusalem, which was closed by Israel after 
the 1976 war, and no one imagined that we would be disconnected from East Jerusalem by 
an eight meters high Wall. It was a period of prosperity and fast economic growth which 
reached 70 percent. After the Wall, we still serve our customers of East Jerusalem because 
they prefer to deal with a Palestinian bank who speaks their language and understand their 
customs and traditions although the Israeli banks are economically stronger. Trust is essential 
in any economic activity, the political instability negatively affect trust, I do not have trust that 
the customer who lives behind the Wall could reach me, so my distrust is for the 
circumstances not the customer. The bank business despite all is prospering after the Wall, 
we helped many business men to start their own economic projects,  if we have stability in 
terms of security, the bank would’ve opened another branch east in al-Mashroo area” (Rajaee 
Ayyad, November 28, 2013). 
 
Trigilia (2001) argue that “The consequences of social capital for local development are not 
always positive; and it is precisely the under-evaluation of politics, which makes it more 
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difficult to distinguish under which conditions social capital can have a favorable impact for 
local development, instead of generating collusion, patronage, political dependence or even 
corruption and criminal economies” (Trigilia, 2001:433). Mr. Faroon the ex-Mayor also 
referred to the vast economic recovery after the Wall to the fact that “Al-'Eizariyah is in Area 
B & C. This attracted investment as it is considered to be close to the term ‘free trade zone’ 
because of the spread of tax evasion in absence of both the Israeli and the Palestinian 
Authority when it comes to enforcing law and order. Criminal economies are present in the 
town; they became notable such as arms trade, drugs, money laundering, and prostitution as 
mentioned earlier. Local development in al-‘Eizariyah was forced by the need to survive 
“survival” more than an ideology of self-sufficiency, endogeneity, like some cases of local 
development in Europe or elsewhere. The complicity of the economic agreement of the Paris 
Protocol (1994) between the Palestinian Authority and Israel had determined certain Israeli 
channels for the Palestinian economic activities especially that the West Bank has no access 
to sea ports and do not have airports as well; the only two access to the outside world are 
through Israel and Jordan. Mohammed Sayyed Ahmad, who runs a trade for motor oils, 
explained: 
 
“Usually I import from Israeli companies, and some items from abroad through the Israeli 
ports. It is a complicated process, if I do not write my address in the West Bank coupled with 
“via Israel” the Israelis will hold the goods at the port and I have to pay a fine in order to 
release them. My cousin works with the trade of Stones Quarries, other friends export Olive 
Oil, they are obliged to stamp their products with “made in Israel” if they are going to use the 
Israeli ports, sometimes they export their Palestinian products through an Israeli company for 
easier access but they have to pay a commission of course.  Even if they export through the 
overland “trade bridge” to Jordan, sometimes they allow it, and sometimes they stress on the 
“country of origin” should be changed to Israel not Palestine. (Mohammed Sayyed Ahmad, 
March 12, 2016). 
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This has limited the Palestinian capacity to establish stable links with distant markets. local 
development became limited to service providing and trade of everyday life necessities, 
besides to the fact that al-‘Eizariyah had no farming activities and its industrial production is 
limited to few products for local use. Some exceptions were made by small social 
organizations to sell women’s traditional handcrafts in Europe via foreign solidarity 
movement but indirectly to avoid Israeli export complications and taxations. 
2- Adaptation and Adjustment Strategies 
 
The adaptation and adjustment to the problems or surviving that hardships occurred after the 
Wall covered many aspects in addition to the economy such as education and health care. 
The Palestinians were the first to value education in the Arab world; their university 
enrolment rates were the highest among the Arab nations (Peretz, 1977). Palestinian 
university graduates constitute more than ten percent of all Arab university graduates 
although they comprise only 2.2 percent of the Arab population (Ibid). High human capital 
became an economic substitute for the loss of land during the 1948 and 1967 wars. Most 
families invested in education and had at least one well educated member who left to work 
abroad and support the family back home. This made a major economic contribution to the 
society as a whole and increased in bonding social capital. Education in the Occupied 
Territories faced three major problems since 1967; first, the phenomenon of boys dropping 
out of school, to work in Israel, was pervasive, especially before the first Intifada in 1987. 
The second was during the first Intifada; school boys were at the heart of the dynamics; 
most of them were jailed by Israel for periods ranging from several months to several years. 
Most of them did not go back to school when released, and some of them were later 
appointed to jobs in the PNA as a reward (Jamal, 2007).The third was with the closure 
regime and restriction on the Palestinian free movement that started in 1993 and reached its 
highest level by the construction of the separation Wall that started in 2002. Before the Wall, 
many of al-‘Eizariyah students were attending schools in East Jerusalem, those who were 
over 16 years old  were denied entry into East Jerusalem because they held a Palestinian 
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identity card (green ID). This has created a problem for the Palestinian Ministry of Education 
as they had to provide the schools with extra space (classes), teachers, and facilities 
following the increase in demand. Mr. Nabil Adwan the headmaster of al-“Eizariyah boys’ 
school further explained: 
 
“At the beginning we increased the student numbers of each class, then we managed to 
convert some activity spaces into class rooms and later with the help of the ministry of 
education we built extra classes in the old schools and new schools to absorb the increasing 
number of students in all grades” (Mr. Nabeil Adwan, November 24, 2013). 
 
This was not the only challenge as the Palestinian Education system suffers also from a 
decrease of male teachers, as shown by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics for the 
academic year 2013/2014. Many male teachers neglect the profession to work in more 
profitable jobs mainly as workers in Israel.  The table below refers to the number of both 
male and female teachers in government, UNRWA, and the private schools and show the 
difference in the numbers that favored female teachers in all types of schools. 
 
 Figure 29: The number of female school teachers. Source: PCBS (2014). 
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This problem was solved by substituting the male teachers in elementary boys’ schools with 
female teachers, where the age of the students is between six and twelve years old. Having 
female teachers at this age does not contradict with the generally conservative society, 
where only male teachers are allowed to teach in boys’ secondary schools. In al-‘Eizaryah, 
the Ministry of Education has applied the same strategy to solve the increasing number of 
students following the Wall and by building the new Muscat Boys’ Secondary School via a 
donation from the Government of Oman. The old school building now hosts the elementary 
school; from classes one to six. It has a female headmistress and female teachers. The new 
building hosts the boys’ secondary school; from classes seven to twelve. It has a male 
headmaster and only male teachers. For the health care, most of al-‘Eizariyah residents’ 
health care centers were in East Jerusalem. They were cut off from the town by the Wall, the 
pharmacist Ahmid Al-Khatib noted: 
 
“The area was cut off from proper medical care; our main hospital, Al-Makassed Hospital, 
became out of reach, on the other side of the Wall. Therefore I thought of establishing a 
medical center with general practitioners, specialist doctors, as well as a laboratory and x-ray 
section. The population that we serve is some 70,000 inhabitants. We are still in need of more 
medical facilities. We now have no hospital nearby; women in labor, for example, need to 
travel quite a distance away to reach one in Jericho, Ramallah or Bethlehem. This is if they 
have been refused a permit by Israel to go through the Wall to enter Jerusalem and give birth 
in, what was, their local hospital” (Ahmid Al-Khatib, November 24, 2013). 
 
The PCBS (2003) report argued that “although long waiting times at check points, and more 
time-consuming and costly travel, are frustrating and humiliating, it remains to be seen if the 
worsened access to health services will have any significant effects on the health of the 
Palestinian population. … For most users contact with the health sector is rather infrequent, 
but for education it is the other way around, usually there are no emergencies (except during 
exams, perhaps) - it is the regular daily work that counts. If this is frequently interrupted or 
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disturbed the quality of the education will suffer, but this is will only become visible after 
some time” (PCBS, 2003: 50). Now as we are in the year 2013, it seems that the quality of 
education has declined, many university teachers complained from the declined level of 
education and culture of the undergraduate students and they think that restrictions on the 
students movement has to do with it. Students and teachers are from the same town, no 
access to public libraries located in the nearby cities, lack of diversity and free movement 
limit the chances for good education and cultural diversity. These two interviews and other 
observations reflect the ‘Social Resilience’ which is usually measured by the time it takes for 
a community to rebound from a natural or man-made hazard (Sapirstein, 2006). The majority 
of the interviewees said that al-'Eizariyah has recovered by 60 percent economically, 
socially, and in providing services including education and health care. This recovery, in a 
relatively short time could be explained negatively by seeing it as surrender to a fait accompli 
and normalizing the abnormal (normalization). Or it can be seen positively as resistance 
“Somud دومص” showing resilience and an ability to adapt to ever-changing conditions. 
However, most of the key informants expressed their concern about the future. They think 
that the urban sprawl has reached its peak and expressed their concern about future 
regarding the economic growth. Isam Faroo the ex-Mayor shared his concern: “There are 
five banks in the town and we have the longest commercial streets in`` the West Bank. The 
question now is about continuity. We have used up all the available land, there is no land 
left”. 
 
The pictures below demonstrate the al-‘Eizariyah expansion over the last 30 years. The rapid 
growth over the last ten years refers to the construction of the Wall. The first picture below 
shows the town’s main street free from commercial buildings or shops, approximately ten 
years before the Oslo Accords. The second picture demonstrates the same part of the street 
a few years later, while the third gives a recent overview of the town. 
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Figure 30, 31 & 32: al-‘Eizariyah natural growth over the years since the 80s. Source: Al-‘Eizariya page, Facebook. 
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3- The Future Challenges of al-‘Eizariyah 
 
Summerfield (2002) argued that recovery is ‘grounded in the resumption of the ordinary 
rhythms of everyday life – the familial, socio-cultural, religious and economic activities that 
make the world intelligible’. However, recovery in the case study setting is partial and the 
continuity is not guaranteed. B’Tselem (2009) explained the future development challenges 
that al-‘Eizariyah is facing as most of the land in the north and in the south of the town’s 
built-up area has steep inclines: “the town is blocked on the west by the Separation Wall, 
which runs between it and Jerusalem’s municipal border, and in the southwestern section, 
the built-up area of al-‘Eizariyah runs up to the built-up area of the nearby town of Abu Dis. 
Hence, al-‘Eizariyah could develop only eastward, where there are contiguous sections of 
land having moderate inclines. But this land was expropriated and is now part of Ma’ale 
Adummim’s built-up area ... At present, al-‘Eizariyah is choked, and its residents have no 
planning prospects for the community’s development and natural growth” (B’Tselem, 2009: 
55). Sapirstein (2006) pointed out the four components of social resilience which are: 
Response, Self-Organization, Learning, and Adaptation. When the eastern Wall will be 
completed, the Abu-Dis area will be the only open space to connect al-‘Eizariyah with the 
surrounding towns and Palestinian cities in the southern part of the West Bank. It will be 
disconnected also from Jericho and Ramallah and other northern parts of the West Bank146. 
In al-‘Eizariyah’s case and in the absence of planning prospects for the community’s 
development and natural growth the community response will be random, not organized, 
repeating the same mistakes. And adaptation to this absence of a decent present and a 
decent future will be to surrender to a fate once again.   The community started to suffer 
from social problems already even before the complete closure, especially among the 
younger generation. Mr. Khalil M. Abu-Rish, one of al-‘Eizariyah notables observed: 
                                                             
146 The alternative bypass road (fabric of life road) that will be constructed through Anata, to the north, 
will connect al-‘Eizariyah with Ramallah and other cities in the northern part of the West Bank. There will 
no longer be a direct road to Jericho. Residents of al-‘Eizariyah will have to go through Ramallah in the 
north, and then turn south east; instead of the direct route they have had for centuries on the ancient 
biblical road to Jericho.  
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 “Expressly, most of the young generation does not belong; just watch them how they move 
around, ready for a fight or an assault on public property.  I would say that this is because we 
are imprisoned by the Wall. The tension among the young is very notable; the difficulty they 
face in order to obtain livelihoods is one of the reasons. The main problem in my opinion, that 
the younger generation are not cultured. They did not experience normal life starting with the 
first Intifada to the second. Most of them were jailed by Israel at that time and now the Wall 
encloses them. They have never had the freedom to travel and experience life, to learn about 
themselves, what they like or not. They’ve never had the opportunity to evolve, naturally. 
They’ve suffered tremendously under the restrictions and humiliations of the Israeli 
Occupation and therefore experience inner conflict, low self-esteem and daily pressure, so 
they expect difficulties and are only equipped for dealing with problems. That is why drugs and 
drug dealing have become such phenomena. The drug dealers are from outside the town. 
They ask the unemployed to distribute the drugs in exchange for a supply for their own use. I 
am very much concerned about this. Personally I think I did the right thing sending my son to 
the States to live and work during the first Intifada. There is no future here” (Khalil M. Abu-
Rish, 20 October, 2013). 
 
In 2008 the Birzeit University’s Institute of Community and Public Health’s study on 
Palestinian youth, pointed out that the normalization of everyday life within abnormal 
living conditions reveals contradictions and tensions. “Therefore young Palestinian 
people complain of emotional distress and boredom. Feelings of desperation are 
intermingled with optimism” (Nguyen‐Gillham et al, 2008: 291). Although the social 
associations, that work with the youth in al-‘Eizariyah, managed to help somewhat, this 
sector of the community certainly needs more attention and resources. Other 
associations’ work is limited to the distribution of supplies amongst the most needy. 
These institutions are accused of incompetence because the beneficiaries are usually 
their relatives and other members of the political parties they are affiliated to. In a way, 
this turns bridging social capital into some kind of bonding social capital.  
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CHAPTER SIX: THE CONCLUSION  
 
The previous Empirical Chapter demonstrated the role of social capital in coping with the 
constant social, political and economic change over the past decade.  Previous studies 
on Palestinian social capital concluded that the Wall has prevented access to fields; 
consequently the importance of the family in becoming a strategy for protection and 
solidarity between the extended family has increased. This research examined the 
impact of the Wall on Palestinians’ social capital in urban areas; between East Jerusalem 
and al-'Eizariyah (Bethany). The methods used were the life story approach to collect 
personal data, and the in- depth interviews with key informants to collect community level 
data. The Empirical Chapter shows that the family became a strategy of protection, even 
in urban areas, after the construction of the Wall, i.e. the solidarity between family 
members helped to hold families together in the face of different types of socioeconomic 
hardships as well as rural areas. The Empirical Chapter shed light on some components 
of the shared set of norms, values and attitudes that govern interactions among actors 
and influence social networks and social interaction; it also discussed barriers to 
collective action at the community level such as the slow integration between various 
groups because of the strong bond with their place of origin and the locals labeling 
everybody else as ‘strangers’. 
 
This and the embedded gender inequality regarding inheritance in Palestinian society are 
specific characteristics amongst others caused sever deficit in both civic behavior and 
community trust. This chapter will conclude the Empirical Chapter’s discussions 
presenting the findings in a way that explain the current situation following ten years 
since the construction of the section of the Wall that separates al-‘Eizariyah from East 
Jerusalem.  
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1- The Wall General’s Effect: Political, Economic and Cultural 
 
The failure of the peace process, within the framework of the Oslo Accords as explained in 
Chapter Two, led to a general sense of uncertainty and confusion among the Palestinians in 
the Occupied Territories. The Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 
1993, had failed to fulfill the aspiration of the Palestinians people. Over the years, and as a 
consequence of this failure, the Palestinians became politically ‘schizophrenic’, meaning that 
the majority of them believe historic Palestine belongs to the Palestinians but the major of 
this land was lost in the 1948 war, in addition they lost the remaining West Bank and Gaza 
Strip in the war of 1967, which were then “occupied”. The Palestinians, in general, are 
accepting Israel only as an occupier whether they support Hamas or Fatah, working in Israel 
or not. Therefore, the mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) was a golden opportunity for Israel to implement peace, but it was only 
the first step. The promised economic prosperity would have helped the Palestinian 
leadership to change the Palestinian population’s embedded concepts regarding Israel; but 
instead of reaching an agreement according to the timetable set out by the Oslo Accords, 
negotiations were an endless process leading to dead ends because of the Israeli 
intransigence and procrastination. This is in addition to the fact that Israel has used the time 
since Oslo (1993) to confiscate more land, to expand existing settlements and to build new 
ones. This is coupled with the escalation of restrictions on Palestinians free movements 
using various approaches and apparatus up to the construction of the separation Wall, which 
was built not only to separate Israel and East Jerusalem from the West Bank but also to 
isolate Palestinian communities from each other by a complicated system of checkpoint and 
bypass roads. The general oppression by Israel and the daily hardships that all Palestinian 
face under the occupation, despite the general trend of hostility between the followers of 
Fatah and Hamas, Palestinians unite, at least emotionally, during every Israeli invasion and 
bombing of Gaza. This is because it is in the souls and subconscious of all Palestinians that 
they are all in the same boat and have one enemy, however, with the lack of a charismatic 
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leadership and unless the whole population unites, this power will remain latent. Israel is 
very aware of this, therefore, all the Israeli policies are made to further weaken and fragment 
the Palestinians to prevent such unity; the real threat to the state of Israel. The fact that 
some Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza work in Israel is another ideological 
fragmentation and reflects the political schizophrenia amongst the Palestinians; the “Working 
in Israel” image range from absolute acceptance to the accusation of betraying the 
Palestinian cause. The notion that Palestinians should be grew boycotting working in Israel 
and purchasing the Israeli products is a growing social movement especially during the 
Israeli wars on Gaza in 2008, 2012 and 2014. This added to the confusion regarding the 
economic integration with Israel. On one hand some envy those who have the possibility and 
are given the permits to enter Israel, whether for work or shopping and entertainment, on the 
other hand this is seen by others as a lack of national affiliation and will be accused of 
“normalization” with the occupier. Peace has become more difficult to achieve; this is only 
possible if the two populations, both Israelis and Palestinians, accept each other on a basis 
of equal rights for both communities. If the two populations can start to think internationally 
instead of nationally with Human Rights as their point of reference, only then can peace start 
to be implemented. 
With their imprisonment inside the Wall, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are 
deprived of their very basic needs to move, to travel and to have the ability to plan their 
future. These constraints also add mental and emotional constraints. The Israeli security 
justification for the construction of the Wall has proven false, especially around Jerusalem, 
where the Wall actually is separating Palestinians from Palestinians. This proves the human 
right organizations’ view in which they see the Wall as new border with the aim to annex 
more land from the West Bank in favor of Israel, and not as a security measure. In addition, 
the fact that Israel deliberately postponed the negotiations regarding East Jerusalem within 
the framework of the Oslo Accords demonstrates the result of wining time to change the 
demographic reality and the character of East Jerusalem, by Judaizing it, which makes it 
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much more difficult to withdraw these settlements later.  The Wall in Jerusalem, as a tool of 
fragmentation, succeeded in isolating the Palestinians; those of East Jerusalem outside the 
Wall, and those of the West Bank inside the Wall. The social and economic interaction 
between these two Palestinian regions is decreasing; consequently social capital dynamics 
has become limited. Palestinians on both sides of the Wall are busy with problems in their 
everyday lives which vary according to the different legal statuses and different Israeli 
policies on either side of the Wall. This means that Palestinians do not share or face the 
same problems and this sets them apart even more (diametrically difference needs and 
problems solutions are needed, thus Palestinians get fragmented even further on to resolve 
them).  
The fact that all the West Bank suburbs of East Jerusalem, in clouding al-‘Eizariyah, were 
categorized as Area B surrounded by Area C, means that the Palestinian Authority has civil 
control over Aria B without social security control (Palestinian Police). This means that the 
PA cannot enforce law and order over these areas, while the surroundings areas are Area C, 
which were Area B’s reserves of land for natural growth, are under full Israeli control. This 
means it is almost impossible to have building permits issued, by the Israeli authorities, 
therefore the Palestinians cannot expand into these areas as shown in Chapter Five: ‘The 
impact of the Oslo Accords on Local Development’ section. The twenty years since Oslo has 
transformed these suburbs to what they have become today; it has generated what is known 
as the ‘neighborhood effect’, which implies that there are some behavioral, attitudinal, and 
psychological features of neighborhoods that affect its residents including impoverishment 
and social fragmentation. Because of economic hardships, many people live in buildings 
where the exteriors are still under construction hoping that the external work will be 
completed in a later stage. This is done to reduce overheads. While this usually takes 
several years, it has become an acceptable behavior, and this has a detrimental impact on 
the aesthetics, culture and the general character and look of these areas. This, coupled with 
the decrease of the green areas because of lack of spare land and planning schemes, the 
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rapid construction of extensions to existing buildings or new buildings, and the profusion of 
many poorly designed and ugly buildings with poor finishing and no landscaping, give a 
general sense of chaos which some explain it as “cultural”, meaning that chaos is part of the 
Palestinian culture. The empirical evidence shows, however, that this has been 
systematically planed and developed and it is a direct result of the occupation, its political 
agreements and economic hardships. Many believe that this is the plan by Israel to 
deliberately create this huge gap between “civilized” Israel with its space and order, trees 
and flower beds and the Occupied Territories to reinforce a stereotypical negative image of 
the Palestinian people around the world, and it has worked. The Jerusalem municipality 
discriminates against Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and the Old City in the 
distribution of services compared with the Jewish neighborhood in the west of the city and 
the settlement in the east to dedicate this image. Soon this will lead to a real negative 
change in the Palestinian culture especially among the young generations as has been 
demonstrated in the Empirical Chapter: ‘The Future Challenges’ section. 
2-  The Wall’s Direct Effect on al-‘Eizariyah’s Residents 
 
The Wall paralyses social life and has had major economic consequences; the 
Jerusalemites who lived in al-‘Eizariyah were the most affected class as explained in the 
Empirical Chapter.  Reverse migration began for fear of losing their blue ID card and all the 
benefits that comes with it especially the relatively free movement compared with those who 
hold green ID; the Jerusalemites are allowed to move freely in Israel and use Israeli airports 
to travel abroad, but they still have to go through checkpoints whenever they travel within the 
West Bank. This difficulty forced most Jerusalemites to leave their homes in al-‘Eizariyah to 
avoid the daily hardship they would face having to go through checkpoints and onto the 
bypass road to get to work or school each day. Instead they have made the difficult decision 
to live in Jerusalem despite the poor living conditions and the extra expense this entails in 
relation to accommodation. Most of them have returned to live with one of their first degree 
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relatives (son, daughter, or parents) as they cannot afford to buy or rent private housing 
within Jerusalem itself. This has had a negative social and economic effect; spacious houses 
have been left empty, producing a noticeable decline in real estate prices in al-‘Eizariyah 
itself and rise in those in East Jerusalem. Others who hold a blue ID card and still living in al-
“Eizariyah, and those who hold a green ID but with an Israeli permit to work in East 
Jerusalem are the daily users of the pedestrian al- Zaytoon “Olive” and al- Za’ayyem 
checkpoints with all the suffering and time consumed that comes with it. What the 
Jerusalemites are being forced to do, as a reaction to the Israeli policies, is dispersing their 
personal resources; especially those who cannot cut off their socio-economic activities with 
the West Bank. Many have decided to have two houses, one in Jerusalem and the other in 
the West Bank to better cope with the situation. One of these two houses will be temporary 
and sometimes neither of them good enough for living in. The vast majority of al-‘Eizariyah’s 
residents, who holds a West Bank green ID and are forbidden from entering East Jerusalem 
and Israel, directed their lives in a way that normalize the existence of the Wall. They 
accepted the fact that East Jerusalem could no longer be the center of their social and 
economic activities, and have organized their lives accordingly; the Wall for them became 
invisible (see Chapter five: “The Indirect Social Effect of the Wall” section). 
The Wall literally broke families apart; especially those families where members hold 
different IDs and those who live very close to the Wall.  It has changed the social relation 
map and disrupted the socio-economic activities between Palestinians on each side of the 
Wall. This redirected social networks by weakening some such as football teams that 
comprising players with different civil status.  Those who hold green ID’s had to be 
dismissed because they cannot enter Jerusalem and they were replaced with others who 
hold blue ID. Other networks became stronger such as local teachers in local schools; 
before the Wall teachers were from different places and not necessary from the town itself. 
Now, because of the restrictions on mobility most teachers are locals; this will limit the 
inspiration, motivation and openness to new life styles of the students they teach. Other 
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undesirable networks were created; such as the drug dealers network, and the trade of the 
un-roadworthy ex-Israeli cars that are used for illegal transportation networks (see Chapter 
five: “The Diffusion of the Informal Economy” section). 
The social fragmentation named as “local-stranger relationship” of al-‘Eizariyah was further 
subcategorized into those who hold the blue ID and those who hold the green ID, in addition 
to the subgroups of those who hold green ID with working permit; meaning that there are 
those who could enter, live and work in Jerusalem (Israel) and those who couldn’t. Social act 
such as traditional marriage have been directed in a way that each ID group now seeks not 
to interact with the other group to avoid temptation leading to dramatic consequences such 
as not being able to exchange family visits, or being told where to live and where not; where 
to buy or rent a house, and what services they could be entitled to or denied from. In cases 
in which these groups could not avoid such interaction, couples have had to deal with the 
consequences and find solutions that inevitably disperse their personal resources such as 
running and equipping more than one house, the limited choice of schooling, medical care 
and extra transportation cost, etc. 
3-  The Wall’s Impact on Social Capital 
 
The first glance of the reality shows that the impact of the Wall on social capital types was 
positive; bonding social capital became stronger, bridging and linking social capital as well. 
Family became a strategy of protection more than in the past. Hardships such as the rise in 
the unemployment rate, the confiscation of land, house demolitions, the restrictions on free 
movement and the series of laws and policies that constrain the natural growth of the city 
had created conditions in which families are literary “sticking together”; meaning that they 
live together in uncomfortable and over-crowded conditions. Although this strong bonding 
social capital reflects solidarity and solves many social and economic problems on the short 
run, it also creates other types of social problems caused by the discomfort of both 
reciprocate and recipient. This may harm the relationship between the family members on 
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the long run as the solution that was considered to be initially temporary became long-term 
or permanent. In such circumstances family disputes are most likely to occur, hence the 
attention and efforts being paid to discuss and solve the core of the problem. However these 
fall far short from a national collectivism to confront the Israeli occupation which is the very 
cause of these hardships and sufferings. Many believe that this is a deliberate aim of Israeli 
policies to engage the Palestinians in social disputes between each other, fighting over 
resources, which would eventually force some to give up hope and leave their homeland. 
Others argue that when the pressure reaches the point of despair, it will explode and this will 
turn negatively on Israel, with a civil uprising. 
One of the most important impacts of the political and economic hardships on the Palestinian 
bonding social capital is that trends are changing, i.e. the usual common dominant trend was 
that sons were helping parents and the eldest son would help both parents and younger 
siblings, especially after the loss of land in 1948 war up until recently. The Palestinian family 
used to invest in their children’s education to enhance job opportunities whether in the 
Occupied Territories or abroad. Now the general trend is reversed; most families are 
continuing to support their children, particularly the males, and working hard to help them to 
bear the cost of their daily life expenses and to build for them a dignified future at least in an 
economic sense.  Bonding social capital among the extended family is present but 
sometimes it could be described as superficial; especially if the indicator is participating in 
social events. Members of the extended family still support each other in good and bad times 
such as visits during feasts and participating in wedding ceremonies and funerals. These 
activities sometimes are attributed to social norms obligations, more rather than strong 
bonds. Cases of estrangement started to occur between family members regarding 
distributing inherited land or money usually because of the gender inequality. Women 
became more aware of their rights and this complicates the situation especially when 
females who were married outside the family are involved. The imprisoned population 
directed their anger against each other and tolerance between them became less; the rise in 
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divorce rates after the Wall could be considered as one of the indicators of lack of tolerance 
and the increasing trend of impatient in addition to different types of family disputes. 
The challenges caused by the construction of the separation Wall that started in 2002 
were too large to be handled only by bonding social capital, therefore combined efforts 
between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the local civil society associations and the 
privet sector to overcome problems related to education, health care services, trade and 
labor in addition to social security. Hence bridging social capital and linking social capital 
were strongly present after the Wall too. According to the discussion on the existence of 
the Palestinian civil society in the absence of the state in the Literature Review Chapter 
(3.4.1), one of the opinions stated that the Palestinian society is structured along 
patrimonial, familial, clannish, tribal lines and contradictory geographical cleavages; 
hence, it was unable to create a civil society based on the bond of citizenship. While civil 
associations are strongly present in al-‘Eizariyah, most of them work in a way that 
transformed the intended outcome of bridging social capital to some kind of bonding 
social capital; because the beneficiaries and the participants are mostly from their family, 
clan members, or those who belong to the same political party, not the wider community 
as a whole. All cases of success and failure of these associations’ efforts are linked to 
rich or powerful individuals, who were either independent or representatives of the 
Palestinian Authority or International Bodies. A rich and powerful relative supports an 
association logistically and financially to help in achieving its goals, on the other hand this 
support might have negative consequences on the association performance especially 
when staff is appointed for political or personal reasons rather than for their ability to do 
the job well and efficiently. The associations who give precedence to the donor interest 
not the community needs in order to stay funded by them, serve only themselves and the 
donors’ agenda. Others who do not have linking social capital have a greater chance of 
not succeeding, or their services would be limited according to their own resources. The 
relationship between civil associations is governed by competition over funding rather 
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than co-operation and collaboration in providing integrated services; if human rights 
projects most likely to be funded, at a given time, then associations work on a human 
rights project proposal, whether this is the greatest need in a community or not. 
The research findings were positive regarding all types of social capital, however, 
observations and the empirical evidence show that bonding is stronger than bridging 
social capital. Many of the community problems could be solved by cooperation between 
the community members.  However, the investigation reveals that there are some 
barriers to collective action. This problem was attributed to the social fragmentation 
caused by several social forces such as the local-stranger relationship, the clan social 
structure, traditions and gender inequality. The empirical analyses explore the feeling of 
the displaced Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war who were displaced in al-‘Eizariyah, 
and reached an explanation of their lack of belonging; it is not only because the locals 
always express superiority over them, but also because the refugees themselves do not 
want to lose their rooted original identity, this exceeds the first generation to the third 
which was born in the town. On the practical level, both the locals and the refugees 
prefer to interact within their own group when it comes to business partnership or 
marriage. And although the refugees almost lost hope of a just political solution to their 
displacement, the everyday practices kept the feeling of being a stranger alive. This had 
a great overall impact on the homogeneity of the Palestinian society especially that ‘the 
refugees’ communities constitute approximately 42 percent of the total population of the 
West Bank” (Bisharat, 1997: 206). However, these barriers to collective action could be 
disintegrated by deep understanding to the local-stranger relationships in order to elevate 
the quality of the relationship by focusing on the common struggle against the occupier. 
Also by strengthening the most survivalist and wellbeing traditions and efforts being paid 
to reduce gender inequality struggles that are embedded in the Palestinian society. 
Displacement, traditions, clan social structure and the unstable political, socio-economic 
environment became part of the Palestinian society characteristics which makes bonding 
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social capital the dominant type in the absence of the state147 and efficient civil society 
institutions. 
Trust in first degree family members is high; it is almost the only safety net that an 
individual could have in the absence of the state148 and efficient civil society institutions. 
Trust in the extended family and the clan is limited to big social problems such as 
disputes between clans, it also helps if an individual wants to brag or show-off within a 
larger crowd, such as family celebrations or at times of mourning. Trust in the Palestinian 
Authority is decreasing in general, and depend mostly on the individual political affiliation; 
supporters of Hamas are against and their trust is around zero; they highly criticize the 
‘security coordination ينملاا قيسنتلا‘between the Palestinian Authority and Israel; they claim 
that the PA are doing the dirty job for Israel by arresting Hamas members in the West 
Bank. Those who support Fatah, their trust is affected either by their true faith in Fatah 
principles or interest in the benefits and influence they gain by being a member of this 
party. Worth mention that education attainment was inversely correlated with trust in 
political institutions. However, trust in international bodies is decreasing in general unless 
there is a direct tangible financial aid; solidarity movements for instance are welcomed by 
the society of al-‘Eizariyah but as what they are usually offering is far from financial aid, 
the enthusiastic cooperation between the two parties tends to be less with time on the 
practical level. 
Although the attempts to remedy environmental and societal damage caused by the Wall 
is continues in al-‘Eizariyah, the general attitude of the population is that if there is no 
personal direct negative effect, there is no initiative to solve the problem. Despite the fact 
that there is a social security vacuum, the scale of existing problems is balanced out due 
to the presence of remaining family ties and the efforts made by some heads of notable 
families, people in power and ordinary people including women.  
                                                             
147 According to many political opinions the Palestinian Authority is not yet a State. 
148 According to many political opinions the Palestinian Authority is not yet a State. 
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4- The Impact of the Wall on Local Development and Socio-Economic Resilience 
 
Before the two main influential events on al-‘Eizariyah local development that is the Oslo 
Accords and the construction of the Wall, al-‘Eizariyah and al-Mashroo were two 
separated communities that constituted the poles of one road; few shops on the west 
side (the Kobsa Junction) and other few shops on the east side (al-Mashroo). Now, and 
in addition to the natural growth, after the Wall disconnected al-‘Eizariyah from its social 
and economic center, these shops have been joined by so many other shops and 
businesses that now Commercial Street, the main street of the town, is lined on both 
sides by commercial businesses for its complete four kilometer length. It is considered to 
be the longest in the West Bank and despite that the motive behind many of these 
commercial projects was profit and maximizing utility; these projects boosted local 
development in the whole area; they created jobs and served the community in a way 
that became self-sufficient. Al-‘Eizariyah became not only economically independent from 
East Jerusalem, but it also became the commercial center for the whole isolated region 
inside the Wall; the town of abu-Dis and al-Sawahra al-Sharqiya, in addition to 
communities behind the Wall (East Jerusalem and its suburbs) who shop from al-
‘Eizariyah because of the price difference. Although social integration between the 
communities inside the Wall is slow due to cultural aspects, the local development is in 
progress; the trend in investment now is going towards cultural activities and 
entertainment after fulfilling the community’s basic needs; sport centers including 
swimming pools, restaurants and coffee shops started to function.  However, till now, 
there is no public library or book store in the town but there are many internet café.  
Communities’ response to the changes that have occurred will depend on their 
resilience: their resources, vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities (Maguire & Cartwright, 
2008). Although local development is visible, it lacks careful planning, future vision, and 
hope in political, security and economic stability. When the eastern Wall will be 
completed, the Abu-Dis area will be the only open space to connect al-‘Eizariyah with the 
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surrounding towns and Palestinian cities in the southern part of the West Bank. It will be 
disconnected also from Jericho and Ramallah and other northern part of the West 
Bank149. In al-‘Eizariyah case, social resilience will not hold for long in the absence of 
resources and planning prospects for the community’s development and natural growth. 
The community response will be random, not organized, repeating the same mistakes 
and adaptation will be just surrender to a fate. Some call this kind of coping with the new 
reality “enhancing the resilience” or “resistance by existence”, others think that this is the 
only thing they can do. Those few who still believe in negotiations and the Two State 
Solution assume that, within the framework of any political settlements on Jerusalem, the 
Israelis will give back Palestinian populated areas to reduce the number of Palestinians 
in Jerusalem, and at the same time annex all the Jewish settlements around Jerusalem 
to increase the number of Jews in the city and guarantee that the demographic balance 
will be always in favor of Israel. 
5- The Future Challenges 
 
The population of al-‘Eizariyah are now living in suspended, monitored mode worried 
about the possible closure of the eastern entrance of their town, according to the stated 
Israeli plan for the route of the Wall. In this case al-’Eizariyah will be surrounded by the 
Wall on the east, west and north sides, the only entrance and exit to the town, for traffic 
will be via  Abu-Dis connecting al-‘Ezariyah with surrounding towns and Palestinian cities 
in the southern part of the West Bank. If the eastern entrance is permanently closed, that 
means the town will be cut off from the city of Jericho and Ramallah and other cities in 
the northern part of the West Bank.  The alternative bypass road that will be constructed 
via the neighborhood of Anata to the north is a shorter bypass road to Ramallah but a 
                                                             
149 The alternative bypass road (fabric of life road) that will be constructed through Anata, to the north, 
will connect al-‘Eizariyah with Ramallah and other cities in the northern part of the West Bank. There will 
no longer be a direct road to Jericho. Residents of al-‘Eizariyah will have to go through Ramallah in the 
north, and then turn south east; instead of the direct route they have had for centuries on the ancient 
biblical road to Jericho.  
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long journey to Jericho. The people of al-‘Eizariyah and the surrounding towns will have 
to go to Ramallah in the north first, then from there to the southeast, instead of the direct 
short road they currently have as explained in Chapter Two: The Research Context and 
Research Questions; “The Wall in East Jerusalem” section. 
The Palestinians on both sides of the Wall are tired, and have lost faith in politics and 
politicians; everyone is busy doing what he or she has to do to survive and save the 
family, and this causes selfishness, which leads to the individual family becoming more 
important than the sense of national collectivism. Israel policies succeeded in isolating 
the Palestinian Jerusalemite and reducing their numbers in East Jerusalem. Israel 
prevented all types of interaction between the population on both sides of the Wall, the 
streets of East Jerusalem are empty from its neighboring towns visitors, the suburbs 
inside the Wall swell, suffering from the growing population density  and overcrowding 
with the people themselves having very little control or power in the situation. Social 
capital remains the only mechanism that Palestinians can use to defend their continued 
presence, although these efforts can only soothe their problems, they certainly have no 
power to cure them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 227 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abdel Shafi, S (2004). Civil Society and Political Elites in Palestine and the Role of International 
Donors: A Palestinian View. Gaza Community Mental Health Program (GCMHP) 
http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/media/paper33_final.pdf  
Abou-El-Haj, R. A. (1982). The Social Uses of the Past: Recent Arab Historiography of Ottoman 
Rule. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 14(02), 185-201. 
AbuZayyad, Z. (2012).  Civil Society Chalanges . Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & 
Culture, 18. 2&3, 5-6 
Adam, F. & Ronvcević, B. (2003): Social Capital: Recent Debates and Research Trends.     Social 
Science Information 42 (2): 155–183. 
Afflerbach, H., & Strachan, H. (Eds.), (2012). How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender. Oxford 
University Press 
AIC, (2007). The Economy of the Occupation Socioeconomic Bulletin. 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/opt_econ_aic_separation_wall_eastjerus 
Ajluni, S. (2003). The Palestinian economy and the second intifada. Journal of Palestine Studies, 
32(3), 64-73. 
Alatout, S. (2006). Towards a bio-territorial conception of power: Territory, population, and 
environmental narratives in Palestine and Israel. Political Geography, 25(6), 601-621. 
Aldrich HE and Zimmer C (1986). Entrepreneurship through social networks. In: Sexton D and 
Smilor R (eds) The Art and Science of Entrepreneurship. New York: Ballinger, 3–23. 
Allegra, M. (2012). Settlement policy in Israel. Transforming Jerusalem’s contested metropolitan 
landscape, Metropolitics 
 American Sociological Association (1990), Social institutions. Their emergence, maintenance, 
and effects. M. Hechter, K. D. Opp, & R. Wippler (Eds.). Transaction Publishers 
Andriani, L (2011). ‘Social Capital and Corruption Puzzle: Evidence from a Palestinian Survey’. 
Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS)  
Atkinson, P., Coffey, A., Delamont, S., Lofland, J., & Lofland, L. (Eds.). (2001). Handbook of 
ethnography, Sage 
Atkinson, P., & Hammersley, M. (1994). Ethnographyand participant observation.Handbook of 
qualitative research. Thou-sand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Amir, M. (2011). On the Border of Indeterminacy. The Separation Wall in East Jerusalem. 
Geopolitics (November 14). http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf 
ARIJ, (2012). Measuring and Developing Social Capital in the Democratization and Governance 
Process in Palestine CSOs.  http://www.arij.org/publications/books-atlases/82-2012/250-social-
capital.html  
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 228 
 
Atkinson, R (1998). The Life Story Interview. Qualitative Research Methods series 44, Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi 
Bagnasco, A. (1988) La costruzione sociale del mercato. Bologna: Il Mulino. —— (1999), ‘Trust 
and Social Capital’, in K. Nash and A. Scott (eds) Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Barakat, H. (1993). The Arab world: Society, culture, and state. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Bargouthi, M (1995) and George Giacaman, “The Civil Society Organizations and Their Role in 
the Coming Period,” paper presented at Birzeit University conference. 
Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. 1966. The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of 
knowledge. London: Penguin Books. 
Beinin, J., & Vairel, F. (Eds.). (2013). Social movements, mobilization, and contestation in the 
Middle East and North Africa. Stanford University Press. 
Berti, B. (2013). Armed political organizations: From conflict to integration. JHU Press. 
Bimkom & B’tselem. (2002). “LAND GRAB” Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank. 
https://www.btselem.org/download/200205_land_grab_eng.pdf 
Bimkom & B’tselem. (2005). “UNDER THE GUISE OF SECURITY” Routing the Separation Barrier 
to Enable the Expansion of Israeli Settlements in the West 
Bank.http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/publication/200512_under_the_guise_of_se
curity_eng.pdf 
Bisharat, G. E. (1997). Exile to compatriot: transformations in the social identity of Palestinian 
refugees in the West Bank. Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology, 203-
233. 
Bollens, S. A. (2000). On Narrow Ground: Urban Policy and Ethnic Conflict in Jerusalem and 
Belfast. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Brown, N. J. (2010). Hamas-Fatah Conflict: Shallow but Wide, The. Fletcher F. World Aff., 34, 35. 
Brouwer, I. (2000). Weak democracy and civil society promotion: The cases of Egypt and 
Palestine. In M. Ottaway & T. Carothers (Eds.), Funding virtue: Civil society aid and democracy 
promotion (pp. 21-48). Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
B’tselem. (1999). On the Way to Annexation: Human Rights Violations Resulting from the 
Establishment and Expansion of the Ma’ale Adummim Settlement. 
B’tselem. (2006). A Wall in Jerusalem: Obstacles to Human Rights in the Holy City. 
http://www.btselem.org/download/200607_a_wall_in_jerusalem.pdf 
B'tselem. (2007). Ground to a Halt. Denial of Palestinians’ Freedom of Movement in the West Bank 
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/publication/200708_ground_to_a_halt_eng.pdf 
B'tselem. (2009). THE HIDDENAGENDA. The Establishment and Expansion Plans of Ma’ale 
Adummim and their Human Rights Ramifications. 
http://www.btselem.org/download/200912_maale_adummim_eng.pdf  
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 229 
 
B'tselem. (2010). Route of the barrier around East Jerusalem    
http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier/jerusalem 
B'tselem. (2011). Human rights in the occupied territories     
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/2011_annual_report_eng.pdf 
B'tselem. (2012). Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation 
Barrier in the West Bank        
http://www.btselem.org/download/200708_ground_to_a_halt_eng.pdf 
Boari, C &Presutti, M. (2004). Social Capital and Entrepreneurship inside an Italian Cluster: 
Empirical Investigation. http://uu.divaportal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid 
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The Forms of Capital. In: Richardson (Ed.). Handbook of Theory and   
Research for the Sociology of Education, 241-258, New York: Greenwood. 
Brynen, R (1995). “The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation”. The Journal of Palestine 
Studies, 24:3. 
Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural Holes. The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
CAPI. (2014). Geography of dispossession; Settlers Activities in Silwan. http:www.capi.org  
Carothers, T., & Ottaway, M. (Eds.). (2005). Unchartered journey: Promoting democracy in the 
Middle East. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Cavatorta, E., Ghazawneh, H., Andriani, L. (2009). Bonding Versus Bridging Social Capital, 
Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS)  
Challand, B (2009). Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign Donors and the Power to Promote and 
Exclude. Routledge: London. 
Chen, M. A. (2005). Rethinking the informal economy: Linkages with the formal economy and 
the formal regulatory environment 
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp46_2007.pdf  
Cheshin, A, Separate and Unequal: The Inside Story of Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, 31. 
Cheshin, A., Hutman, B., Melamed, A., &Cheshin, A. (2009). Separate and unequal: The inside 
story of Israeli rule in East Jerusalem. Harvard University Press 
Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American Journal of 
Sociology: 95–120. 
Coleman, J.S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Collier, P. 2002. “Social Capital and Poverty: A Microeconomic Perspective,” In: Grootaert C. And 
Thierry van Bastelaer (Eds). The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical Assessment, 
19-41, Cambridge University Press. 
Cooke, P. and Morgan, K. (1998) The Associational Economy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 230 
 
Press. 
Costantini, et al. (2011). “Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory”. http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/civil-society-organisation-
mapping-study-palestinian-territories  
Darker, I. (1992). Discourse dynamics: Critical analysis for social and individual psychology. 
London: Routledge. 
Dasgupta, P. (2000). Economic progress and the idea of social capital. In: Dasgupta, P. and 
Serageldin, I (Eds). Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, 325-399, World Bank. 
De Voir, J., & Tartir, A. (2009). Tracking external donor funding to Palestinian non governmental 
organizations in the West Bank and Gaza strip 1999-2008. 
Dhaher, S. (2014). Al-‘Eizariya (Bethany) and the Wall: From the Quasi-Capital of Palestine to an 
Arab Ghetto. Palestine-Israel Journal. 19.4 & 20.1, 113-123. 
Dickey, C. & Dennis, M. (1995).  A Fence Across the Sand, Newsweek, Vol. 125, Issue 6, February 
6th, 1995. 
Dilley, P. (2004). Interviews and the Philosophy of Qualitative Research. The Journal of Higher 
Education, 75(1), 127–132. 
Dolphin, R. (2006). The West Bank Wall, Pluto Press, London. 
Durkheim, É & Hall, R. (1993). Ethics and the sociology of morals, Prometheus Books. 
Durlauf, S. & Fafchamps, M. (2004). Social Capital, the Centre for the Study of African Economies 
Working Paper Series, Paper 214. Economic Issues, 31 (3), 805-816. 
Fenster, T. &Shlomo, O. (2011).  In the Shadow of the Wall and Separation: Everyday Life in East 
Jerusalem, in Palestine-Israel Journal Vol. 17 No. 1&2, 2011 pp. 54 
Edwards, B., & Foley, M. W. (1998). Civil society and social capital beyond Putnam. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 42(1), 124-139. 
Eilat, M (2009). The Institutionalization of Privatization: Israeli Checkpoints Revisited. 
Emerson, R. M., Fretz, R. I., & Shaw, L. L. (2001).Participant observation and fieldnotes. 
Handbook of ethnography, 352-368, 
Field, j. (2003). Social Capital, Routledge. 
Friedrichs J, Galste G C, Musterd S, (2003). Neighbourhood effects on social opportunities: 
The European and American research and policy context'' Housing Studies 18 797 ^ 806 
Fronk, C., Huntington, R. L., & Chadwick, B. A. (1999). Expectations for traditional family roles: 
Palestinian adolescents in the West Bank and Gaza. Sex Roles, 41(9-10), 705-735. 
Fischer, S., Hausman, L. J., Karasik, A. D. and Schelling, T. C. (eds) (1994). Securing Peace in the 
Middle East. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Fischer, S., Alonso‐Gamo, P., & Von Allmen, U. E. (2001). Economic developments in the West 
Bank and Gaza since Oslo. The Economic Journal, 111(472), 254-275. 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 231 
 
Foley, M. & Edwards, B. (1996). The Paradox of Civil Society. Journal of Democracy 7.3,  38-52 
Fox, J. (1996). How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural 
Mexico. World development, 24(6), 1089-1103. 
Fournillier JB (2009). Trying to return home: a Trinidadian’s experience of becoming a ‘native’ 
ethnographer. Qualitative Inquiry 15(4): 740–765. 
Fuqaha, N. (2012). Civil Society Chalanges 2012. Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics 
& Culture, 18. 2&3, 31-35. 
Gambetta, D. (1996). The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Gazit, S. (1985).The Stick and the Carrot.Tel Aviv, Zmora-Bitan. 
Glick, P., & Sahn, D. E. (2000). Schooling of girls and boys in a West African country: the effects of 
parental education, income, and household structure. Economics of education review, 19(1), 63-
87. 
Granovetter, M. (1983). The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited.” Sociological 
Theory 1 (1): 201–233. 
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology: 1360–1380. 
Grassroots Palestine (2010). “Anti-Apartheid Wall”, available, [on-line] 
http://www.stopthewall.org/news/boycot  
Greenberg, G. (2006): The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements 1967– 
1977. 
 Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays (Vol. 5019). Basic books. 
Grootaert, C. &Bastelaer, T. (2002). Understanding and Measuring Social Capital. The World Bank, 
Washington, DC.  And The IRIS Center, Department of Economics, University of Maryland 
University at College Park. 
Grootaert, C. (1998). Social Capital: The Missing Link? Social Development Department 
Publications, the World Bank. 
Grootaert, C., & T. Van Bastelaer. (2001). Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: a Synthesis 
of Findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital Initiative. Social Capital Initiative 
Working Paper (24) http://www.citeulike.org/group/4365/article 
Gordon, N. (2008). From Colonization to Separation: exploring the structure of Israel's 
occupation. Third World Quarterly, 29(1), 25-44. 
Gross, O. (1999). Mending Walls: The Economic Aspects of Israeli-Palestinian Peace. Am. U. Int'l 
L. Rev., 15, 1539. 
Hall, S. (2001). Foucault: Power, knowledge and discourse. In M. Wetherell, S. Taylor, & S. J. 
Yates (Eds.), Discourse theory and practice: A reader: 72-81. London: Sage. 
Hammami, R. (1993). Women in Palestinian society. Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and 
Arab Jerusalem. Fafo Report, (151), 283-311. 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 232 
 
Hanafi, S., & Tabar, L. (2005). Donors, international organizations, and local NGOs: The 
emergence of the Palestinian globalized elite. Jerusalem, Israel: Institute for Jerusalem Studies. 
Heller, M. & Nussiebeh, S. (1993): No Trumpets No Drums: A Two-State Settlement of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Hill and Wang, New York. 
Heyl, B. S. (2001). Ethnographic interviewing. Handbook of ethnography, 369-383 
Hever, S. (2007).Economic Consequences.Journal of Palestine Studies, 35 (3).6-19. 
Hilal, J. (2006). Hamas's Rise as Charted in the Polls, 1994–2005.Journal of Palestine Studies, 35 
(3).6-19. 
Hilal, J. (2007). Assessing the Impact of Migration on Palestinian Society in the West Bank and 
Gaza. The European University Institute, RSCAS. 
Hilal, J. (2010). The polarization of the Palestinian political field.Journal of Palestine Studies, 39 
(3), 24-39. 
Hilal, J. (2011): Civil Society in Palestine: A Literature Review. Heinrich Boll Foundation 
http://www.ps.boell.org/downloads/Mapping_Study_FINAL_with_new_.pdf 
Hoepfl, M. C. (1997). Choosing qualitative research: A primer for technology education 
researchers. Journal of Technology Education, 9(1), 47-63. Retrieved February 25, 1998, from 
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JTE/v9n1/pdf/hoepfl.pdf 
Hroub, K. (2006). A “new Hamas” through its new documents.Journal of Palestine Studies, 35 
(4), 6-27. 
Jamal, M. A. (2012). Democracy promotion, civil society building, and the primacy of politics. 
Comparative Political Studies, 45(1), 3-31. 
Jamal, A. (2009). Barriers to democracy: The other side of social capital in Palestine and the Arab 
world. Princeton University Press 
John, P., Smith, G., & Stoker, G. (2009). Nudge nudge, think think: two strategies for changing civic 
behaviour. The Political Quarterly, 80(3), 361-370. 
Khaldūn, I. (1969). The Muqaddimah: an introduction to history; in three volumes. 1 (No. 43). F. 
Rosenthal, & N. J. Dawood (Eds.). Princeton University Press. 
(Kaldor, M. (2003). The idea of global civil society. International affairs, 79(3), 583-593. 
King, M. E., King, M., & Carter, J. (2009). A quiet revolution: the first Palestinian Intifada and 
nonviolent resistance. Nation Books. 
Kinyanjui, M, & Khayesi, M. (2006). Social Capital: Micro and Small Enterprises and Poverty 
Alleviation in East Africa. OSSREA 
Klyver, K, & T. Schøtt. (2011). How Social Network Structure Shapes Entrepreneurial Intentions? 
Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research 1 (1): 3–19. 
Kusow, A. M. (2003). Beyond indigenous authenticity: Reflections on the insider/outsider 
debate in immigration research. Symbolic Interaction, 26(4), 591-599. 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 233 
 
Le More, A. (2008). International assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political guilt, wasted 
money. London, UK: Routledge. 
Lin, N. (1999). Building a Network Theory of Social Capital. Connections 22 (1): 28–51. 
Lin, N. (1982). Social Resource and Instrumental Action, In: Marsden Peter V. And Nan Lin. Social 
Structure and Network Analysis, 131-145, CA: Sage. 
Longland, M. J. (2013). A sacred trust?: British administration of the mandate for Palestine, 1920-
1936 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nottingham). 
Lustick, I. S. (1993). Writing the Intifada Collective Action in the Occupied Territories. World 
Politics, 45(04), 560-594. 
Madison, D. S. (2005). Critical ethnography: Method, ethics, and performance. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. 
Malla, Y. B. (2001). Changing policies and the persistence of patron-client relations in Nepal: 
stakeholders' responses to changes in forest policies. Environmental history, 287-307 
MAS: The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute. (2007). Measuring Social Capital in the 
Palestinian Territories http://www.mas.ps/2012/node/162#.URqhr2dT-80 
MAS: The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute. (2009). Studies on Social Capital in   the 
Palestinian Territories http://www.mas.ps/2012/node/206#.URqgfWdT-81 
Margalit, M. (2007). No Place Like Home: House demolition in East Jerusalem. Jerusalem: The 
Israeli Committee Against Home Demolition. 
Maguire, B., & Cartwright, S. (2008). Assessing a community’s capacity to manage change: A 
resilience approach to social assessment. Canberra: Bureau of Rural Sciences. 
Mansfeld, Y. (1999). Cycles of war, terror, and peace: Determinants and management of crisis 
and recovery of the Israeli tourism industry. Journal of Travel Research, 38(1), 30-36. 
Matar, I. (2011). The Quiet War: The Jewish Conquest of West and East Jerusalem: 1948 to the 
Present. Palestine-Israel Journal, 17. 1&2, 214-223. 
Meagher, K. (2005). Social Capital or Analytical Liability? Social Networks and African Informal 
Economies, Article. Global Networks http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/glob_enhanced 
Merriam, S. B. (2002). Introduction to qualitative research. Qualitative research in practice: 
Examples for discussion and analysis, 1, 1-17 
Michael, K., & Ramon, A. (2004). A Fence Around Jerusalem: The Construction of the Security 
Fence Around Jerusalem; General Background and Implications for the City and Its Metropolitan 
Area. Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, the Teddy Kollek Center for Jerusalem Studies. 
Milton-Edwards, B. (1999). Islamic politics in Palestine (Vol. 10). IB Tauris. 
Miller, G &Dingwall, R (1997). Context & Method in Qualitative Research", SAGE Publications 
Mishal, S., & Sela, A. (2006). The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence. Columbia 
University Press.Moran, P. & Ghoshal, S. (1997): Value Creation by Firms. INSEAD 
http://flora.insead.edu/fichiersti_wp/inseadwp1997/97-19.pdf 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 234 
 
Ministry of Planning (2008). Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008–2010. Palestinian 
Ministry of Planning. Available online at: www.mop.gov.ps. 
Minkoff, D. C. (1997). Producing social capital national social movements and civil society. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 40(5), 606-619. 
Moghissi, H., Rahnema, S., & Goodman, M. J. (2009). Diaspora by design: Muslims in Canada and 
beyond. University of Toronto Press 
Moser, C. O. N. (1998). The Asset Vulnerability Framework: Reassessing Urban Poverty Reduction 
Strategies. World Development 26 (1): 1–19. 
Mutti, A. (1998) Capitale sociale e sviluppo. Bologna: Il Mulino. Ouchi, W. (1980) ‘Markets, 
Bureaucracies and Clans’, Administrative Science Quarterly 25: 129–41. 
Narayan, D. (1999). Bonds and Bridges: social capital and poverty. Policy Research Working Paper, 
no. 2167, The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Naqib, F. (2006). The Concept of Social Capital and its Relevance to the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory. Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), Ramallah, (Arabic) 
Nasr, M. And Hilal, J. (2007). Measuring Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories. Palestine 
Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), Ramallah, (Arabic). 
Narayan, D. (1999). Bonds and Bridges: social capital and poverty. Policy .Research Working 
Paper, n. 2167, The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Nguyen‐Gillham, V., Giacaman, R., Naser, G., & Boyce, W. (2008). Normalising the abnormal: 
Palestinian youth and the contradictions of resilience in protracted conflict. Health & social care 
in the community, 16(3), 291-298. 
North, D (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic performance. Cambridge 
University Press. 
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) (2001). The Wellbeing of 
Nations: the Role of Human and Social Capital, Paris: OECD. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/22/1870573.pdf 
Ophir, A.Givoni, A. &Hanafi, S. (2009). The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of Israeli Rule in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories. New York: Zone Books 
Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: 
Presidential address, American Political Science Association, 1997. American political science 
review, 92(01), 1-22. 
Tamari, S. (2008). Mountain against the sea: Essays on Palestinian society and culture. Univ of 
California Press. 
Tamari, S. (1982). Factionalism and class formation in recent Palestinian history. In Studies in 
the economic and social history of Palestine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (pp. 177-
202). Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Tarrow, S. (1996) ‘Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on 
Robert Putnam’s “Making Democracy Work” ’, American Political Science Review 2: 389–97. 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 235 
 
Trigilia, C. (2001). Social capital and local development. European journal of social theory, 4(4), 
427-442. 
Pappe, I. (2007). The ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Oxford: Oneworld. 
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation methods (2nd ed.) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative evaluation and research methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, Inc. 
Patulny, R. (2004). Social capital norms, networks and practices: A critical evaluation (p. 35). 
Social Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales. 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics,( 2004). Demographic and Social Consequences of the 
Separation Barrier on the West Bank, Ramallah- Palestine 
Peretz, D. (1977). Palestinian social stratification: the political implications. Journal of Palestine 
studies, 48-74 
Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. B., & Hardy, C. (2004). Discourse and institutions. Academy of 
management review, 29(4), 635-652. 
Plummer, K. (2001). The call of life stories in ethnographic research. Handbook of ethnography, 
395-406. 
Portes, A. (1998). Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. Annual Review 
of Sociology 24 (January 1): 1–24. doi: 10.2307/223472. 
Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1994). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in 
modern Italy. Princeton university press. 
Pressman, J. (2006). The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict. Journal Of Conflict Studies, 23(2). Retrieved from 
http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/220/378 
PRI (2005). Social Capital as a Public Policy Tool: Project Report. Policy Research Initiative, 
Ottawa. 
Robinson, G. (2009). Palestinian Tribes, Clans, and Notable Families. Strategic insights, (on-line 
journal of the Center for Postgraduate Conflict). 
Pundak, R. (2001). From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong? Survival, 43(3), 31-45 
Pundak, R. & Khoury, S. (2012). Civil Society Chalanges 2012. Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, 
Economics & Culture, 18. 2&3, 8 
Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press. 
Ribot, J. C., & Peluso, N. L. (2003). A theory of access. Rural sociology, 68(2), 153-181. 
Rubio, M. (1997). Perverse social capital: some evidence from Colombia. Journal of economic 
issues, 805-816  
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 236 
 
Sabatini, F. (2005). Social capital as social networks: A new framework for measurement. 
http://129.3.20.41/eps/othr/papers/0506/0506013.pdf 
Sabatini, F. (2009). Social capital as social networks: A new framework for measurement and an 
empirical analysis of its determinants and consequences. Journal of Socio-Economics, 3, 429-442. 
Sabel, C. (1988) ‘Flexible Specialisation and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies’, 
in P. Hirst and J. Zeitlin (eds) Reversing Industrial Decline. Oxford: Berg Publishers. 
Sadiq, N. (2012). Civil Society Chalanges 2012. Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & 
Culture, 18. 2&3, 42-45. 
Safieh, A. (2011). On Jerusalem. Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture, 17. 
1&2, 224-229. 
Said, E.; Rabbani, M. (1995) Symbols versus substance: a year after the Declaration of Principles. 
Journal of Palestine Studies, 60-72. 
Salem,W. (2012). Civil Society Chalanges 2012. Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & 
Culture, 18. 2&3, 17-23. 
Salzman, P. C. (2008). The Middle East's Tribal DNA. Middle East Quarterly. Pp. 23-33. 
Sapirstein, G. (2007). Social Resilience: The Forgotten Element in Disaster Reduction. 
Organizational Resilience International Boston, Massachusetts, USA 
http://www.oriconsulting.com/social_resilience.pdf 
Ramahi, S. (2011). The scourge of drugs in Jerusalem. Middle East Monitor, Monday, 03 January 
2011 17:10 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/1907-the-scourge-of-
drugs-in-jerusalem 
Schanzer, J. (2008). Hamas vs. Fatah: the struggle for Palestine. Macmillan. 
Schafft, K. (1998). Grassroots development and reconfiguration of local political institutions: local 
minority self-governance as a political and economic resource for Hungary’s Roma population. 
Paper presented at the Graduate Student Conference on International Affairs, George Washington 
University, Washington DC. 
Samara, A (2001). Epidemic of Globalization: Ventures in World Order, Arab Nation and Zionism. 
Palestine Research and Publishing Foundation. California. 
Schwartz, S. J., Pantin, H., Sullivan, S., Prado, G., & Szapocznik, J. (2006). Nativity and years in the 
receiving culture as markers of acculturation in ethnic enclaves. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 37(3), 345-353. 
Scott, W. R. (1987). The adolescence of institutional theory. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
32: 493-511. 
Shane, S., & Cable, D. (2002). Network ties, reputation, and the financing of new ventures. 
Management Science, 48(3), 364-381. 
Shlaim, A. (2005). The rise and fall of the Oslo Peace process; International relations of the 
Middle East, 241-61 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 237 
 
Shavelson, R & Towne, L. (2002). Front Matter. Scientific Research in Education, Washington, DC: 
The National Academies Press. 
Shihadeh, R. (1993). Can the Declaration of Principles bring about a Just and Lasting Peace? Eur. 
J. Int'l L., 4, 555. 
Shlomo, O. & Fenster, T. (2011). In the Shadow of the Wall and Separation: Everyday Life in East 
Jerusalem. Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture, 17. 1&2, 54-63.  
Sluglett, P. (2008). The urban social history of the Middle East, 1750-1950. Syracuse University 
Press. 
Sirhan, B. (1975). Palestinian refugee life in Lebanon. Journal of Palestinian Studies, 4, 91± 107. 
Smith, C. D. (2009). Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict: [a history with documents] (p. 624). 
Bedford/St. Martin's 
Stolle, D. (1998). Bowling together, bowling alone: the development of generalized trust   in 
voluntary associations, Political Psychology, 19, 497-525. 
Streeck, W. (1992) ‘Productive Constraints: On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality 
Production’, in Social Institutions and Economic Performance. London: Sage. 
Sullivan, Denis (1996).“NGOs in Palestine: Agents of Development & Foundation of Civil Society”. 
Journal of Palestine Studies, 25:3. 
UN-OCHA, (2009). The Planning Crisis in East Jerusalem: Understanding the Phenomenon of 
“Illegal” Construction. East Jerusalem: United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
Usher, G. (2006). The democratic resistance: Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian elections. 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Spring 2006), pp. 20-36Published 
Vanni, I. (2013). 'Oggetti spaesati', unhomely belongings objects, migrations and cultural 
apocalypses. Cultural Studies Review, 19(2), 150-174. 
Varshley, A. (2000). Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslim in India. 
Wallis, J. And Killer by, P. (2004): Social economies and social capital. In Boas, S. (2007): How Can 
Social Capital be operationalized as a Public Policy Resource in Palestine. Unpublished Master 
Dissertation 
Woodilla, J. (1998). Workplace conversations: The text of organizing. In D. Grant, T. Keenoy, & C. 
Oswick (Eds.), Discourse and organization: 31-51. London: Sage. 
Woolcock, M. (1998). Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical     synthesis 
and policy framework. Theory and Society, 27(2), 151-208. 
Woolcock, M. (2001). Microenterprise and Social Capital: A Framework for Theory, Research, and 
Policy. The Journal of Socio-Economics 30 (2): 193–198.  
Woolcock, M., and D. Narayan (2000). Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, 
Research, and Policy. The World Bank Research Observer 15 (2): 225–249. 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 238 
 
World Bank (2002). Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A Multidisciplinary Tool for 
Practions. 
World Bank (2003). Twenty Seven Months – Intifada, Closures, and Palestinian Economic Crisis. 
Jerusalem, World Bank. 
World Bank (2004). Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements, Jerusalem, 
World Bank. 
World Bank (2010). Checkpoints and Barriers: Searching for Livelihoods in the West Bank and 
Gaza Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse, World Bank. Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Yiftachel, O., &Yacobi, H. (2002). Planning a bi-national capital: should Jerusalem remain 
united?Geoforum, 33(1), 137-144. 
Yiftachel, O. (2002). Territory as the kernel of the nation: space, time and nationalism in 
Israel/Palestine. Geopolitics, 7(2), 215-248. 
Yin, R. K. (2011). Applications of case study research. Sage. 
Yousef, O. (2011). Jerusalem: Palestinian Space, Behaviors and Attitudes. Palestine-Israel 
Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture, 17. 1&2, 43-53. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 239 
 
APPENDIX I: THE SOCIAL CAPITAL INDICATORS OF 2009 STUDY: 
 
Dissertation manuscript 
Author: safadhaher@yahoo.co.uk Page 240 
 
 
 
 
